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This thesis focuses on social transformation involving active tensions between political 
structure (State) and insubordination (social movements). It does so in the context of the 
rise of Buen Vivir in institutional politics in contemporary Ecuador. It offers a detailed 
sociological analysis of the agents involved in the political process, providing a 
comprehensive account of their historical background, goals, frame definitions, and 
strategic actions. In doing so, the thesis argues that the political process of Buen Vivir in 
Ecuador entails the complex-multifaceted dispute over the leadership of actions of 
change that redefine political settlements and move the country away from the neoliberal 
course. 
 
Away from essentialist and static interpretations on the matter, this thesis argues that the 
political process in contemporary Ecuador moves through complex dynamics, involving 
moments of articulation and fragmentation in which agents and events move closer to or 
away from what is identified as two political projects: the first one follows a top-down, 
State-centred strategic logic of social democracy, which I propose to call State of Buen 
Vivir. The second project follows a bottom-up, society-centred vision of insubordination 
which I propose to call the Social Movement of Buen Vivir. Theoretically, the thesis 
develops a productive relationship between Latin American Marxist theory of the State 
and a Weberian version of the construction of rebellious solidarities pursuing a historical 
and sociological analysis to understand the dilemmas of a necessary relationship between 
the State and social movements. Methodologically, it follows a qualitative research 
design and draws mainly on case study analysis (the CONAIE and the government of 
Rafael Correa). The research design uses in depth interviewing with the elites within each 
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     In Ecuador, the government of the Citizen’s Revolution, 
     collecting the proposals of Andean peoples, 
     raises the question of Buen Vivir 
     as the central objective of State policy1. 
 
 
i. Researching Contentious Politics: the State and Social Movements in Latin 
America 
 
This thesis carries out a socio-political analysis on the relationship between the 
indigenous movement and the State in the context of rise of Buen Vivir2 in institutional 
politics (being the State the locus and target of action of agents3) in contemporary 
Ecuador. The thesis is concerned with exposing the political nature of the struggle over 
the meaning and implementation of Buen Vivir. It argues that the political process of 
Buen Vivir moves from a first moment of articulation to a second moment of 
differentiation, fragmentation and concentration of power that redefines political 
boundaries between and within these two actors in a process of renewal of political 
settlements. This process of renewal is characterised by an increasing power of the State 
to hold more control and regulation over market forces whilst at the same time increasing 
the State’s decision making power over public policy. This study contributes to the debate 
on social transformation involving active tensions between political structure (State) and 
insubordination (social movements), which in turn points to the process of construction 
of post-neoliberal alternatives in the Latin American region.  
 
It provides an interpretation of the relationship between State and social movements away 
from essentialist or static understandings, highlighting key aspects of a complex dynamic 
                                                 
1 SENPLADES, 2013: 23 (Spanish in the original. Author’s translation).   
2 Buen Vivir is commonly translated into English as “the good way of living” (Ecuador’s National 
Constitution).  
3 Offe (1985) makes a distinction between on the one hand, ‘institutional politics’ in which actors’ 
concerns are principally directed to the State, and on the other, ‘noninstitutional politics’, where civil 
society becomes both the locus and target of action of social movements in order to defend their values 
(identity, autonomy and the creation of democratic spaces). Cohen and Arato (1997) term this as ‘self-
limiting radicalism’ in order to emphasise the rejection by new social movements of the need or purpose 
to seize power. The focus of this thesis is placed on institutional politics, and therefore in the interaction 
between social movements and the State.  
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of change that encompasses as many ruptures as continuities. This study moves away 
from the interpretation of co-optation, which dominates debates on the relationship 
between structure (the State) and insubordination (social movements). It argues that 
interpretations of co-optation depart from a top-down approach of social and political 
dynamic without fully accounting for the ambivalent but mutual relations between social 
agents and the State. Theoretically, it develops a productive relationship between a 
Marxist theory of the State and a Weberian version of the construction of rebellious 
solidarities pursuing a historical and sociological analysis. It sets up the main conceptual 
coordinates to understand the dilemmas of a necessary relationship between the State and 
social movements. Highly organised social movements are conceived here as inevitably 
political. Their actions impact heavily on State structure participating in and shaping 
national development. In addition, it argues in favour of a conceptualisation of the State 
as relational and as a platform where social conflicts are inscribed and processed by State 
machinery, which in turn is transformed by the process. In this way, this study proposes 
going beyond dichotomous thinking in the relationship between insubordination vis-à-
vis structure (co-optation vs. emancipation; institutional power vs. communitarian 
autonomy) in order to capture the ambiguities and complexities of relational processes 
of social transformation.  
 
This thesis is temporally focused on the transition from neoliberalism to the construction 
of a post-neoliberal order in Ecuador, focusing particularly in the period extending from 
2005 to 2015. The context of the research, however, extends further, from the mid-1930s 
(with the emergence of the first syndicates in Ecuador which were crucial to the 
consolidation of indigenous organisations and their form of protest) up to the present 
(Chapter 1). Key aspects of the dynamic of contentious politics (between the indigenous 
movement and the State), as well as of the formation of the State, are located within this 
extended timeframe. As explained in Chapter 1, this long period of time is subdivided 
into three sub-periods: from the 1930s to the first agrarian reform in 1964 (from 
huasipungueros to peasants); from the 1964 agrarian reform to 1990 (formalising 
collective action: the return of the “Indian”); and from 1990 up to the present time 
(leadership, crises, and Buen Vivir). It is argued that the historical context of the 
relationship between the indigenous movement and the State is fundamental to 
understanding the position of the agents involved, as well as key aspects currently defined 
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and mobilised in the competing discourses of Buen Vivir. The historical context plays a 
constitutive role rather than an anecdotal one in the trajectory of Buen Vivir.  
  
ii. Rationale: The Rise of Buen Vivir to Politics 
Ten years ago, a popular uprising put Ecuador in the spotlight. After a decade of popular 
revolts, streets blockades, and elected presidents overthrown from their positions, the last 
of the popular uprisings brought the ‘forajidos’ (the outlaws) into the Ecuadorian political 
and social scene. They represented the majority of people in Ecuador regardless of their 
political, social, class, ethnic, or cultural membership. The forajidos proclaimed the end 
of the neoliberal era in the country. More than a decade of structural adjustments, 
privatisations, dollarization of the economy, the rise of poverty and inequality, and a 
massive wave of migration had left the country in a profound crisis. As in many countries 
of the region, in Ecuador neoliberal economic policies were implemented with little 
consideration of social costs (Abouharb and Cingranelli, 2006). Whilst for more than a 
decade people protested on the streets (mainly led by the indigenous movement), in 2005 
a vast majority of Ecuadorian population proclaimed the end of the legitimacy of the 
neoliberal model of governance in the country.  
 
I argue that the main reason for this proclamation of the end of the neoliberal model at 
this particular point was that popular mobilisations converged with the emergence of a 
new political leader, Rafael Correa (elected in 2007), and a new political movement, 
Alianza Pais (Country Alliance). Although a newcomer to the Ecuadorian political scene, 
Correa promised radical economic and political transformations. These included 
declaring Ecuador’s national debt illegitimate, promoting social investment and State 
control of the economy (by 2007 Ecuador’s national debt was USD 10 billion), refusing 
to sign free trade treaties, denying permission to the US to use the airbase of Manta, and 
calling for a Constituent Assembly. These measures were sufficient to gained popular 
support precisely because had been the demands set out by different collectives in the 
country for more than a decade (Becker, 2011).  
 
In 2007 a national referendum approved by 80 per cent of Ecuadorian voters finally led 
to the call for the Constituent Assembly. Those calling for a Constituent Assembly 
included a plurality of social and political organisations. Notwithstanding the fact that up 
to that point in time Ecuador had already had 20 national constitutions (SENPLADES, 
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2010: 27), the writing of a new constitution was seen both by Correa’s government and 
civil society actors as a historic moment marking the possibility of re-founding the State 
(Acosta, 2008; Gudynas, 2009). The Constituent Assembly summoned 130 delegates. 
Alianza Pais obtained 74 seats whilst leftist parties (included indigenous party 
Pachakutik) only obtained 13 seats. Even though indigenous and leftist organisations 
secured minimum representation in the Assembly, their demands overwhelmingly set the 
agenda of the assembly, reflecting the ability of these sectors to elaborate coherent 
demands and alternative projects to neoliberal governance. These demands became in 
turn part of the agenda of Alianza Pais, including the acknowledgement of Ecuador as 
Plurinational, the control, regulation and restriction of the extractive economy, and the 
implementation of land redistribution, among others.  
 
In the 1998-constitutional reform the indigenous movement had fought for the 
recognition of collective rights and the implementation of already obtained social rights 
(Van Cott, 2005). In 2007-2008 the main dispute was related to the radical transformation 
of the country’s development model. Groups of intellectuals, grassroots activists, 
indigenous organisations, civil society organisations, international networks of 
academics and members of political parties were among the multiplicity of social agents 
re-designing the principles, nature and meanings of Buen Vivir4. For the first time an idea 
rooted in indigenous knowledge facilitated the convergence of multiple debates 
(stemming from indigenous cosmologies, competing academic models of development, 
and so on) in the production of an alternative discourse challenging the dominant 
neoliberal model of wealth creation and political governance (Cortez, 2011; Radcliffe, 
2012). An alternative model to neoliberalism competed against it on equal footing 
(Ferrero, 2014). It is argued here that this moment represents an instance of political 
articulation and authentic democratic deliberation.  However, the nature of this debate 
soon revealed a power struggle making in turn the relationship between the elected 
government and the indigenous organisations, particularly the CONAIE5, tense. It was in 
this context of both participation and confrontation that the idea and meaning of Buen 
Vivir became radically disputed. This dispute, I argue, reveals a contentious process that 
                                                 
4 Alberto Acosta (economist and politician) was the president of the Constituent Assembly and one of 
those responsible for the articulation and inclusion of Buen Vivir in the national constitution. Close to the 
indigenous movement, Acosta put himself forward as presidential candidate for the 2013 elections.  
5 Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador, Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of 
Ecuador.  
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ultimately has led to the strategic differentiation of political actors such as a sector of the 
indigenous movement and the government of Rafael Correa. This opens a new moment 
within the political process dominated by political differentiation and fragmentation.  
 
This is the scenario in which Buen Vivir became the disputed symbol of an alternative to 
the neoliberal mainstream sought by the Ecuadorian people. Since then, Buen Vivir has 
been used to represent the alternative to the dominant model of development built upon 
economic growth and the capitalist order (Escobar, 2010; Walsh, 2010; Houtart, 2010; 
Gudynas and Acosta, 2011; Hidalgo Flor, 2011; Misoczky, 2011; Thomson, 2011; 
Dávalos, 2012). In this way Buen Vivir emerged as a socio-political concept (Altmann, 
2015). Whilst its existence can be traced back before the Constituent Assembly in 
different publications written mainly by indigenous intellectuals (GTZ, 2002; Viteri, 
2002; Acosta, 2002; Sarayaku, 2003), it is at the Constituent Assembly that this idea 
becomes the representative of broad demands for change, and a central political concept 
around which different discourses have been interwoven (Hidalgo-Capitan and Cubillo-
Guevara, 2014). Even though Buen Vivir is regarded as forming part of an ancestral 
cosmovision (worldview) organising indigenous communitarian practices even before 
European colonisation, little attention was paid to this subject until the beginning of the 
21st century.  
 
I argue that in order to understand the process of the emergence of the idea of Buen Vivir 
into the political realm, as well as the power struggle over its definition and 
implementation, it is necessary to understand the dynamic of contentious politics in 
contemporary Ecuador. In brief, contentious politics involves interaction between 
organised collective actors who put forward elaborated demands and the State. Among 
organised collective actors, this research is principally focused on the indigenous 
movement and, more specifically, on the main indigenous organisation in Ecuador, 
CONAIE. The main reasons for this election are that this indigenous organisation was 
able to first articulate the movement at the national level; second, to mark its political 
direction articulating a coherent vision of a plurinational State; third, to achieve important 
political goals; and fourth, to establish itself as one of the most important social 
movement organisation in the Latin American region (Van Cott, 2005; Yashar, 2005; 
Becker, 2008; Andolina et al, 2009). For these reasons, CONAIE has been able to 
establish itself as a national and regional political actor.  
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My thesis is concerned with exposing the political nature of the struggle over the meaning 
and implementation of Buen Vivir. The argument is that the political process opened since 
its emergence moves from a first moment of political articulation to a second moment of 
differentiation, fragmentation and concentration of power that redefines political 
boundaries in a process of renewal of political settlements. This process of renewal is 
primarily characterised by an increasing power of the State to hold greater control and 
regulation over market forces, whilst at the same time increasing the State’s decision-
making power over public policy. In relation to the first moment of articulation, the 
emergence of Buen Vivir as a political project representing a radical alternative (of and 
to) development, the paradigm of a possible alternative society, a radical paradigm of 
social justice, and so on, can only be thought of in Ecuador as the result of the confluence 
of two interrelated processes: (i) the cumulative struggles of highly organised indigenous 
social movements, not only but particularly since the 1990s, against the implementation 
of neoliberal policies, articulating in turn an alternative political project (the construction 
of a Plurinational state); and (ii) the emergence of new political leaders on the left and a 
popular centre-left government implementing public policies through State institutions. 
The latter cannot be thought of as independent from the former and vice versa, and both 
processes resulted in the rise of Buen Vivir as a political project. In other words, the 
emergence and rise of Buen Vivir as political discourse, carried out and highly contested 
by the above mentioned actors, has been the result, on the one hand, of a particular 
permeability of the State forced by demands, including the ones enacted by indigenous 
social movements, and on the other, of the contingent opening of the political structure. 
That is to say, it has been the result of political action. Both the indigenous movement 
and the government of Rafael Correa have been fundamental for the rise and 
consolidation of Buen Vivir as the proxy upon which different socio-political agents in 
Ecuador define their position within the post-neoliberal turn in the country and the region. 
 
In relation to the second moment of differentiation and fragmentation, the struggle 
deployed around the idea of Buen Vivir can be thought of as a power struggle over 
meaning and the imposition of a dominant discourse (Altman, 2015). The moment of 
differentiation and fragmentation is marked primarily by a process of strategic 
rationalisation of Buen Vivir in which each actor claimed a certain type of Buen Vivir 
associated with their interest in access to power. By process of rationalisation I refer to 
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actions that make definitions of Buen Vivir consistent with the political objectives of the 
groups supporting them. The process of rationalisation points to the expansion of the 
instrumental and strategic rationality at the expense of normative and moral 
considerations (Habermas, 1986; Domingues, 2000; Gane, 2002). This in turn led to the 
antagonisation of different notions of Buen Vivir, mainly between the government, on the 
one hand, and the indigenous organisation CONAIE, on the other. Each of them defines 
the concept in different ways according to their own interests, goals, and political battles, 
defending the legitimacy of the discourse they mobilise whilst discrediting the discourses 
held by political opponents. In this way, the definition and mobilisation of the discourses 
on Buen Vivir become a powerful tool to create and openly redefine subjective positions 
in the political and social arena in Ecuador. My thesis proposes an original 
conceptualisation of competing discourses of Buen Vivir through the study of the 
constitutive dynamic of the different framings in dispute. It is argued that the tensions 
between the different stakeholders involved have opened a new phase of the political 
process, which is named here as the political process of Buen Vivir. 
 
This process of differentiation and fragmentation does not only refer to the relationship 
between the indigenous movement and the government, but also points to divisions 
within the indigenous movement. The diversity within the movement was apparent from 
its formation until the creation of CONAIE, the most important indigenous organisation 
in Ecuador, which was able to unify a fragmented indigenous population into one sole 
movement. This was achieved via the articulation of a coherent political project 
representing the diversity within the movement (explained in Chapter 1). The rise of 
Rafael Correa to power, the inclusion of Buen Vivir in institutional politics (which brings 
together social movements and the State) and the strategic negotiation between leaders 
of indigenous organisations such as FEINE, FENOCIN and FEI (discussed in Chapter 5) 
and the government have exacerbated the original divisions within the movement. This 
study based its analysis of the indigenous movement positionality vis-à-vis these 
moments of articulation and fragmentation focusing primarily on the CONAIE because 
of, first, its importance on the political organisation of the indigenous movement, and 
second, because the CONAIE is the indigenous organisation that most clearly stands in 
opposition to the government of Rafael Correa. The second moment of differentiation 
and fragmentation will be analysed both within the indigenous movement and between 
the movement and the government.  
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The question of the State is crucial in the debate and the power struggle that has unfolded 
since Buen Vivir was first mobilised and included in the national constitution. The 
struggle not only occupies a place in the State but defines the very foundations of it. 
While this debate is not new, the emergence of Buen Vivir as a political project certainly 
revives it, as well as produces new insights in the matter. The particular relationship of 
social indigenous movements vis-à-vis the State in the context of the rise of Buen Vivir 
has given place so far to a dichotomous position and reductive representations: either 
Buen Vivir represents the celebration of radical emancipation, or it represents the co-
optation by the government and the State in order to maintain the status quo (resembling 
old discussions within the left on ‘revolution or reform’). I argue that Buen Vivir is neither 
only politically co-optation nor only essentially liberating. On the contrary, it embodies 
an ambivalent meaning in which power relations between indigenous social movements 
and the State are put into practice in a way that is transforming the political process in 
Ecuador. A number of authors6  working on indigenous social movements in Latin 
America, and more specifically, in Ecuador argue that it is at the level of the State that 
movements wage their principal struggles, and where the “Indian” Question is played 
out. I follow Postero and Zamosc (2004: 5) in the definition of the “Indian” Question as 
‘the crucial issue of what kinds of rights indigenous people should be granted as citizens 
of democratic nation-states’. In negotiating their positionality, both the indigenous 
movement and the government deploy strategies, construct solidarities and alliances, and 
negotiate meaning. This is what, I argue, constitutes the political process of Buen Vivir.  
 
iii. Research Questions:  
This all leads us to the questions this study aims to answer: 
 
 In what ways is the idea of Buen Vivir defined and contested? How are these 
definitions used and what for? 
 What are the strategies deployed by competing socio-political forces to impose 
their own definition of Buen Vivir?   
                                                 
6 Radcliffe, 2001; Gerlach, 2003; Otero, 2003; Postero and Zamosc, 2004; Andolina et al, 2005; Pallares, 2007; 
Clark and Becker, 2007; Lucero, 2008; Becker, 2011; Perreault and Valdivia, 2010. 
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 How is this contestation expressed at the institutional level? Which definition is 
becoming dominant at the State level and what are the consequences of this? 
 
In order to answer these questions, I adopt a case study design, using qualitative methods. 
I carry out the analysis of the interaction of the State and the indigenous movement 
represented by CONAIE and their political positions exploring three interrelated 
categories. The first one points to the strategic definition of Buen Vivir in order to create 
political differentiations (us and them) between competing forces. This strategic 
definition allows each force to establish its position in the political process. This category 
is called Framing Buen Vivir and is analysed in Chapter 4. The second category is called 
the Mobilising Structure of Buen Vivir and points to the main resources and strategies 
deployed by these competing socio-political forces in order to impose a particular 
definition of Buen Vivir. Its analysis in Chapter 5 shows the importance of political 
leadership and alliances to make dominant a particular definition of Buen Vivir. Finally, 
the last category is called Mainstreaming Buen Vivir. It is analysed in Chapter 6, and 
analysed the political opportunities created from below and from above to allow the 
expression of such a dispute at the institutional level.  
 
The qualitative analysis of these three interrelated categories allows the identification of 
two distinct political projects, which I propose to call in this thesis the State of Buen Vivir 
and the Social Movement of Buen Vivir (analysed in Chapter 6). The configuration of 
these projects comes from the interplay between the agents involved – mainly the 
government of Rafael Correa and the indigenous movement opposing it. Both agents 
construct ideal conceptions of the State and of society (and their interaction) within their 
own definitions of Buen Vivir. Their actions, in turn, battle to get closer to these 
definitions, and denounce the actions of their political opponents as moving away from 
them. In this sense, it is argued here that these two political projects coming from above 
and from below are the two principal organising axes of the political process in 
contemporary Ecuador. Following Wright’s typology on the logics of resistance to anti-
capitalism (2015; 2014), I argue that the State of Buen Vivir aims at taming capitalism, 
whilst the Social Movement of Buen Vivir aims at eroding capitalism. The first political 
project follows a top-down, State-centred strategic logic of social democracy. The second 
one follows a bottom-up, society-centred vision of insubordination.  
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The project elaborated from above is the State of Buen Vivir (analysed in Chapter 6). It 
is related to the definition of structures and institutions linked to welfare provision, 
decision-making processes, public administration, resource management, and 
governance. This definition contributes to the configuration of the nature, institutions, 
functions and responsibilities of the State. Following Wright’s typology, I argue that this 
political project mobilised from above by the government of Rafael Correa corresponds 
to a logic of resistance that aims at taming capitalism. Taming capitalism (Wright, 
2015:8) points to the construction of counteracting institutions and public policies 
capable of significantly neutralising the harms produced by capitalism through regulation 
and redistribution (widespread poverty, unemployment, inequality, precariousness of 
labour forces, and environmental degradation).   
 
The project elaborated from below is named in this thesis as the Social Movement of Buen 
Vivir and refers to the positions, actions and participation of socially and politically 
organised agents in processes of societal transformation. These agents maintain a relative 
autonomy from the institutions of the State while at the same time participating in its 
shaping. Questions of autonomy and self-determination, popular mobilization, political 
leadership, resources, popular participation in decision-making processes, the 
recognition of multiple nationalities in the same territory, and radical democracy belong 
to this political project (Chapter 6). In this case, the political project mobilised from 
below by social movements corresponds to a logic of resistance that aims at eroding 
capitalism. It points to emancipatory experiences based on more democratic, egalitarian, 
participatory relations in spaces and cracks within capitalism (Wright, 2015: 14).   
 
These two political projects are not in diametric opposition. There are moments of 
articulation and moments of differentiation between them. They ultimately set a horizon 
in relation to which the agents involved define their positions and interpret events. This 
process of articulation and fragmentation places key episodes involving contentious 
interaction between agents in a closer or more distant relation to and between these 
projects. Tilly and Tarrow (2007: 36) define episodes as ‘bounded sequences of 
continuous interaction, usually produced by an investigator’s chopping up longer streams 
of contention into segments’. This study identifies four key episodes which are analysed 
throughout the thesis:  
 1) The Constituent Assembly (2006-2008) – analysed in Chapter 1; 
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 2) The Yasuni-ITT Proposal (first phase: 2007; second phase: 2014) – 
 analysed in Chapter 4; 
 3) New Wave of Mass Demonstrations (2010 onwards) – analysed in Chapter 
 5; 
 4) State Social Provision via Neo-extractivism (2006 onwards) – analysed in 
 Chapter 6. 
A process of transformation entails a complex dynamic (Figure 1) that seeks to change 
in medium and long-term power relations forged and established over time. I argue that 
the analysis of these two projects and the four episodes mentioned above allows the 
tracing of that transformation in its own dynamic without falling into essentialisms or 
closed/preconceived positions.  
 
Figure 1: Dynamic Political Process of Buen Vivir  
 
 
iv. Structure of the thesis 
This thesis argues that the struggle over the meaning and implementation of Buen Vivir 
is political and moves from a first moment of political articulation to a second moment 
of political differentiation and fragmentation that redefines political boundaries in a 
process of renewal of political settlements. The argument is organised in seven chapters.  
Chapter 1 contributes a thorough exploration of the main agents involved: the indigenous 
movement and the government of Rafael Correa. It argued that the rise of Buen Vivir in 
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institutional politics is the result of the confluence of these two forces, and that the drivers 
of this change can be traced in their organisational, political and cultural history. It shows 
(i) the process of construction of their political subjectivities; (ii) that indigenous 
populations did not exist passively outside the political processes but contributed to shape 
processes of national development; and (iii) how the rise of Buen Vivir in institutional 
politics cannot be thought of without the articulation of these two main forces. 
 
Chapter 2 is dedicated to the discussion, on the one hand, of the main approaches to social 
organisation and, on the other hand, to literature on the State, its main role and 
responsibilities, as well as its specificities in the Latin American context. I particularly 
argue in favour of the (selective and pragmatic) application of the approach developed by 
Tilly and Tarrow called Political Process, which brings together social movements and 
the State. I acknowledge the importance of the proposals put forward by the decoloniality 
approach, which shed light on alternative epistemologies and ontologies that are typically 
excluded due to the dominance of modernist and colonialist logics. However, I point to 
the limitations of this perspective, which can obscure the understanding of the indigenous 
movement as a highly organised political and social agent and its role in contemporary 
Ecuador. Finally, I set up the main conceptual coordinates for understanding the 
specificities of the State in Latin America. 
 
Chapter 3 contributes to making explicit how epistemological concerns regarding the 
political agency of constituencies in contemporary Ecuador have shaped the methods I 
chose, as well as my position as a researcher. It explained the decisions made about the 
design of the qualitative research approach. 
 
Chapter 4 deals with the rationalisation and the strategic use of Buen Vivir to create 
differentiations between different political forces (primarily the indigenous movement 
and the government). In this chapter, a number of definitions are identified, stressing and 
highlighting different aspects according to the interests, goals, and visions of the actors 
supporting them. The analysis of competing frames shows not only that there is not one 
homogenous, monolithic and essentialising notion of Buen Vivir, but that it is constructed 
and re-constructed in the process of power struggles between different forces. 
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Chapter 5 identifies the effects that the emergence of Buen Vivir in the political realm 
has had on the organisation of contentious politics in Ecuador in order to impose a 
particular understanding on Buen Vivir. The focus is centred on the mobilising structure 
of the indigenous movement and the government. The chapter discusses the importance 
of leadership within these two competing sectors. It also discusses the strategies and 
tactical repertoires deployed by these two forces since the Constituent Assembly was 
established in order to show how they are competing for the same resources, but not 
willing to cooperate in a conjunct project, which is leading to the stagnation of the 
transformative potential represented by the idea of Buen Vivir.   
 
Chapter 6 analyses the institutional impact the struggle over the ownership of Buen Vivir 
has had since its incorporation into the national Constitution. First, it draws the two 
projects related to the State and social agents in order to define the dynamic of social 
transformation in contemporary Ecuador involving active tensions between political 
structure (State) and insubordination (social movements). The one related to the 
definition of the State is called the State of Buen Vivir. The other, related to the positions, 
actions and participation of socially and politically organised agents in processes of 
societal transformation, is called the Social Movement of Buen Vivir. It is argued that 
these two projects function as the organising axes of the Political Process of Buen Vivir. 
 
In relation to the mainstreaming of Buen Vivir at State level, two factors are analysed. 
The first one is related to the role played by the State in welfare provision. The second 
element is related to Ecuador’s extractive activities. The analysis indicates that these two 
factors have allowed the government’s definition of Buen Vivir to become dominant at 
State level. It also indicates a concentration of power in the State that, it is argued, is not 
accompanied by inclusive processes of empowerment and political participation. These 
two elements lie at the very heart of the conflict between the State and the indigenous 
movement. The final part of the chapter discussed how this conflict has helped to shape 
a particular form of post-neoliberalism in Ecuador at the expense of other alternatives. 
 
Finally, Chapter 7 summarises the main findings of this thesis and their implications for 
the understanding of the relationship between social movements and the State in contexts 









…an ever-present fear exists, both within the movements as well as among political elites, of 
seeing them as under the control of someone else’s agenda. When the right takes such a position it 
becomes a way to discredit a movement, but when indigenous activists believe this charge it also has the 
intended consequence of weakening and undermining their efforts 
Becker, 2011: 311 
 
 Introduction 
This chapter has two main objectives. The first one is to explore the historical context 
that explains the emergence of Buen Vivir in politics. Chapter 1 traces the making of the 
indigenous movement as well as the rise of Rafael Correa and Alianza Pais to power in 
order to start the work of reconstructing the competing understandings on Buen Vivir and 
their evolution. In doing so, it is possible to explain how discourses about Buen Vivir 
were developed, as well as how historical demands are encompassed in them. It is argued 
that the rise of Buen Vivir in institutional politics is the result of the confluence of these 
two forces, and the drivers of this change have to be traced in their organisational, 
political and cultural history. In doing so, I aim to expose (i) the process of construction 
of their political subjectivities; (ii) that indigenous populations did not exist passively 
outside the political processes but contributed to shaping processes of national 
development; and (iii) how the rise of Buen Vivir in institutional politics cannot be 
considered without the articulation of these two main forces.  
 
The second objective is to analyse the definitions of Buen Vivir / Sumak Kawsay 
(Kichwa) as elaborated after Buen Vivir’s inclusion in the national Constitution (2008). 
I divide the publications on Buen Vivir into two clusters. The first cluster of publications7 
                                                 
7 Acosta (2008); Medina (2008); Tortosa (2009); Fernandez (2009); Albó (2009); 
Hernandez (2009); Gudynas (2009); Chiroque Solano and Mutuberria Lazarini (2009); Salgado (2010); 
Walsh (2010). 
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(from approximately 2008 to 2010) reflects the novelty and the radical otherness of this 
idea that draws on indigenous philosophy. The publications outline the proposals of 
change arising from Buen Vivir and the importance of its unprecedented inclusion in legal 
and policy documents. Most of these publications follow the reasoning proposed by the 
cluster of authors working from the so called modernity / coloniality approach. The 
emergence of Buen Vivir makes apparent the significance of alternative knowledges in 
the production of political discourses, as well as making visible the political relevance of 
agents such as the indigenous movement. This production coming from the South 
demands a critical review of the dominant knowledge on the matter, which has origins 
rooted in the North (Europe and the US). The dominance of frameworks coming from 
the North have to a great extent excluded alternative understandings of social 
transformation, as the ones proposed by the modernity / coloniality approach. The 
contribution of this approach, as well as its particular limitations, are analysed in this 
chapter.  
 
However, I argue that although important for the presentation of an idea that aims to 
break with a capitalist and modernist dominant logic, the main flaw of these works is that 
they put forward a unified and essentialising understanding of Buen Vivir. This 
essentialising understanding of Buen Vivir refers to its definition as fundamentally 
indigenous, holding radical distinctive values and primordial purity. Little consideration 
is paid to the organisational, political and cultural history of those agents responsible for 
the mobilisation of this new idea. It becomes apparent that there is a gap between, on the 
one hand, the discourse of Buen Vivir as defined by these first publications, and on the 
other, the practices, materialities and agency of the actors involved.  
 
In contrast to the publications mentioned above, which were only centred on 
philosophical and legal definitions of Buen Vivir, the second cluster of publications has 
moved the debate on the matter to acknowledge the existence of competing 
understandings of it (Cortez, 2010; 2011; Radcliffe, 2012; Hidalgo-Capitán and Cubillo-
Guevara, 2014; Gudynas, 2014; Oviedo, 2014; Viola Recasens, 2014). This thesis builds 
upon these studies and adds the sociological analysis missing from them. This cluster of 
publications avoids essentialising the concept of Buen Vivir by presenting a typology of 
definitions. My contribution is based on the socio-political analysis on the stakeholders 
supporting and using them arguing that the discourses on Buen Vivir cannot be thought 
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of independently from the actors who support them. It is argued here that the political 
process is in constant transformation due to the practices of agents who define and 
negotiate their political and subjective positions in the process. I argue that both an 
essentialising and a decontextualised understanding of Buen Vivir neglect the nuances 
and the dynamic of a political process defined in relation to the rationalisation of Buen 
Vivir, which in turn determines its ‘use’ in relation to gaining access to power in Ecuador. 
 
1.1 Mapping indigenous peoples and nationalities of Ecuador 
In 1986 the UN Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities defined the term ‘indigenous’ as follow:   
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity 
with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, considered 
themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or 
parts of them. They form at present nondominant sectors of society and are determined to 
preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their 
ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their 
own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems (United Nations, 1986, para. 379). 
 
In 1989 the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention 169 was passed. This 
convention elaborated and passed what is today the most important international law on 
indigenous rights. In 1998 Ecuador reformed its national Constitution ratifying ILO 
Convention 169 (Van Cott, 2005). With it, and for the first time in its history, Ecuadorian 
pueblos y nacionalidades were legally recognised.  
 
However, it was not until 2001 that Ecuador incorporated ethnicity into the national 
census. According to the 2010 census8, the proportion of the total population self-
identified as indigenous is 7 per cent, whereas 77 per cent identified themselves as 
mestizo (a category denoting the mixture of white and indigenous identities). In sharp 
contrast, CONAIE - the largest indigenous organisation in Ecuador - claims that the 
percentage of the indigenous population is 45 per cent9. The reasons for such a disparity 
can be traced to the dynamic construction of identity markers and the power relations 
underpinning such a construction (Kuper, 2005; Canessa, 2007). As will be explained in 
the following section, colonial domination imposed an ‘Indian tribute’ during the early 
                                                 
8 According to the 2010 National Census, the total population in Ecuador is 14.483.499. The percentage 
of people self-identifying as Montubio is 7.4%; as Afro-descendant is 7.2%; as White is 6.1%; and as 
Other is 0.4% (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Censos- INEC- http://www.inec.gob.ec/inec/) 
[Accessed August 2012].  
9 http://www.conaie.org/ [Accessed August 2012].  
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stages of the Ecuadorian modern state. Indigenous people were not only treated as slave 
labour but were forced to pay a tax due to their ‘ethnic status’. Becoming a mestizo 
therefore entailed fewer economic burdens as well as greater social possibilities. With 
the Liberal Revolution of 1895, mestizaje was legitimated and incorporated into the 
narrative of national identity (Roitman, 2008: 3-4), and mestizos were perceived as 
acculturated indigenous peoples.  
 
Ecuador is divided into three main geographical regions: coast (lowlands), Andean 
highlands and the Amazon. Indigenous groups are divided following the same 
geographical distribution. From the total indigenous population, 78 per cent live in rural 
areas. The geographical place in which each indigenous community is located has 
functioned as a powerful factor, not only in the construction of their identity as peoples 
from the highlands, the Amazon and the coast, but also in their political organisation 
(Table 1). 
 














Source: Lucero 2008: 12. 
 
Largest Indigenous Groups Highlands: Quichua [Kichwa] (85-
90% of total Indian population)  
 
Lowlands: Shuar, Quichua [Kichwa] 
(10 smaller groups)  
 
Non-Indian Elite Regional 
Cleavages  
Coast (Guayaquil)   /  Highland 
(Quito) 
Indian Regional Cleavages Lowlands /  Highlands  
(Coastal groups weak) 
Timing of Indigenous Political 
Organising 
1. Lowlands (1960s)  
2. Highlands (1970s)  
3. National (1980s)  
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Indigenous groups identify themselves and are legally recognised according to two 
interrelated categories: nacionalidades (nationalities) and pueblos (peoples)10. There are 
14 nacionalidades and 18 pueblos in Ecuador11. Nacionalidad refers to the legal 
recognition of a territory (nation) with distinctive institutional, social, economic, legal 
and political forms of organisation. Pueblo refers to subgroups of collectives or 
communities sharing the same language and/or cultural costumes. One nationality 
usually encompasses several pueblos. The largest nacionalidad in Ecuador is Kichwa (or 
Quichua) which is located in the highlands. As will be explained later, indigenous 
peoples’ demands to be recognised as both pueblos and nacionalidades correspond, on 
the one hand, to their political strategy to be closely connected with local spaces 
(pueblos), and on the other hand, being recognised as nacionalidades which is 
intrinsically related to the indigenous political project: Plurinacionalidad, or, the 
acknowledgement of Ecuador as a plurinational country (Lucero, 2003; Zamosc, 2004; 
Radcliffe, 2012).  
 
1.1.2 The “Indian”12 Question 
 
…the Indigenous problem was one of class in the sense that it was a result of the agricultural 
exploitation of rural populations that were overwhelmingly ethnically Indian. It was this double 
exploitation that placed them at a particular disadvantage. 
Becker, 2008:15 
 
As in the rest of America, indigenous history in Ecuador has been marked by long-lasting 
oppression and marginalisation. European colonization meant for these groups brutal 
domination and exclusion from an incipient model of society organised on the basis of 
modern epistemologies. During colonial rule they were labelled as Indios (“Indians”). A 
derogatory term to homogenise already enslaved ethnic groups and at the same time to 
mark a clear division between the Spanish and the criollo (Creole). This homogenising 
                                                 
10 Even though Ecuador was not declared a plurinational country as demanded by indigenous 
organisations, the constitutional reform of 1998 recognised for the first time the existence of indigenous 
nacionalidades and pueblos.   
11 14 nacionalidades: Andoa, Awa, Siona, Espera, Chachi, Secoya, Shiwiar, Achuar, Huaorani, Zápara, 
Tsachila, Shuar, Kichwa Amazonia, Cofán. 
18 pueblos: Huancavilca, Manta, Palta, Saraguro, Kañari, Pastos, Puruwa, Waranka, Kitu Kara, Salasaka, 
Panzaleo, Kisapincha, Chibuleo, Kayambi, Otavalo, Natabuela, Karanki, Tomabela 
(http://www.codenpe.gob.ec/) [Accessed August 2012).  
12 The term ‘Indian’ (Indio) refers to the arrival of Christopher Columbus to the ‘new continent’ in 1492. 
Convinced that going to the West would be a faster route to get to the East Indies, Columbus arrived at 
what later was called the Americas. Without truly admitting the arrival at a different destination 
Columbus named its original inhabitants ‘Indians’.  
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model of exclusion continued after independence from Spain in 182213 and throughout 
the republican period. Inhabiting mainly rural areas, indigenous peoples were 
dispossessed of their lands, used as cheap labour, forced to pay tributes (the Indian 
tribute), and their values and customs were socially and culturally neglected (Lucero 
2008; Harten, 2011). Used in a derogatory way for centuries, the term “Indian” has been 
with time appropriated and its meaning subverted by indigenous peoples (Albó, 1991). 
 
Paradoxically, “Indians” received much more legislative attention14 than other minority 
groups (afro-descendants for instance) who sat at the bottom of the racial pyramid 
(Roitman, 2008:3). In fact, indigenous populations did not exist passively outside of the 
political processes but contributed into shaping processes of national development 
(Becker, 2008). During colonial rule, indigenous levantamientos (uprisings) against 
colonial authorities, tribute payments and labour exploitation forced the abolition of 
abusive labour systems. After independence, protests carried on against a regime that 
continued to exclude indigenous peoples. The 1920s and 1930s witnessed the emergence 
of syndicates in Ecuador, which were crucial to the consolidation of indigenous 
organisations and their forms of protest. Scholars studying indigenous movements in 
Latin America argue that their history should be thought of as intrinsically linked to the 
history of land15. In this sense, it can be argued that what today is called ‘indigenous 
politics’ (Yashar, 1998; Brysk, 2000; Radcliffe, 2001; Van Cott, 2005) cannot be 
separated from forms of peasant politics. In other words, the emergence and development 
of indigenous movements cannot be explained only in terms of the politicization of ethnic 
or cultural cleavages but are equally as important as class and popular struggles.  
 
…Ecuador reveals a different story: Indian struggles have not been limited to cultural affirmation 
or the securing of ethnic rights. While these goals have been important, the Indian movement has 
transcended them, involving itself in broader battles over social issues and becoming a player in 
the contest for political power (Zamosc, 2004: 132).  
 
                                                 
13 After independence from Spain, Ecuador became part of Great Colombia, from which it gained 
independence in 1830.   
14 Reforma de la Ley de Jornaleros (1918- Reform of the Day Labourer Law) and Ley de Comunas 
(1937- Communes Law) are some examples of the agrarian legislation through which the State tried to 
regulate the Indian problem (Becker, 2008).   
15 Bebbington, 2000; Rubenstein, 2001; Lucero, 2003, 2006; Perreault, 2003; Postero and Zamosc, 2004; 
Becker, 2008, 2011; Schaefer, 2009; Postero, 2010.  
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In this sense, the ‘Indian question’ is not only a cultural one but also an economic and 
political one (Schaefer, 2009). Lucero (2003) explains that the hacienda (landed estate) 
systems during colonial and republican regimes, as well as the agrarian reforms taking 
place in the 1960s and 1970s, are at the foundation of contemporary indigenous 
movements:  
Agrarian reforms helped move the ‘Indian problem’ from the semiprivate sphere of ethnic 
administration to a national public sphere in which national development plans were debated 
and nationwide protests were planned. In the 1990s…concerns over the land were no longer 
restricted to familiar ones of subsistence and production…but also linked to political 
questions of the autonomy of indigenous ‘territories’ (Lucero, 2003: 26-27).  
 
Acknowledging the importance that both class (peasant struggle) and identity 
(indigenous struggle) have in relation to the ‘Indian question’, the role that these two 
factors have played in the organisation of indigenous political action will be examined 
in the next section. 
 
 
1.2 The Making of Modern Indigenous Social Movements in Ecuador 
 
…in the Ecuador of the 1930s and 1940s, an autonomous Indian project was literally 
unthinkable. This would only become publicly thinkable, rupturing widespread images of Ecuadorian 
Indians as passive elements of the nation, in the 1990s 
Lucero, 2003: 31. 
 
Some scholars (Glave, 1999; Gerlach, 2003) consider that the origins of modern16 
indigenous movements in Ecuador are located in the 1980s with the formation of what is 
in their view the first truly indigenous organisation, CONAIE. Undoubtedly the 
formation of such an organisation constitutes a milestone in the history of the Ecuadorian 
indigenous movement. However, other authors argue that the roots of this movement 
have to be traced back further than the 1980s (Guerrero Cazar and Ospina Peralta, 2003; 
Lucero, 2003; Becker, 2008; Simbaña, 2009). Following the arguments of the latter 
group, I divide the emergence and development of the indigenous movement into three 
periods. Each period is constructed upon the specific interaction of four fundamental 
factors: (i) different political openings to collective action; (ii) specific national, regional 
and international contexts; (iii) ways of framing collective action; and (iv) organisational 
forms. Whilst every periodization of history is arbitrary, I aim with this division to show, 
first, how the dynamic inter-relation of these factors has affected the organisational 
                                                 
16 By ‘modern’ I refer to present or recent times.  
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processes of indigenous movements in Ecuador; and second, how the demands elaborated 
in these periods are fundamentally connected and included in the definition of Sumak 
Kawsay currently mobilised by the movement (Chapter 4). The articulation of these 
factors at a particular point in time shaped different processes, which in turn influenced 
the development of the modern indigenous movement in Ecuador.   
 
This section is therefore divided into three parts, each corresponding to a specific 
historical period:  
 
1. from the 1930s to the first agrarian reform in 1964: From Huasipungueros to Peasants; 
2. from the 1964 agrarian reform to 1990: Formalising Collective Action: the return of 
the “Indian”;  
3. from 1990 up to the present time: Neoliberal times, leadership and crises 
 
 1.2.1 From Huasipungueros17 to Peasants (1930-1964) 
Following independence from Spain in 1822 and from Gran Colombia in 1830, and the 
foundation of Ecuador as a Republic, the communitarian forms of collective property 
legally disappeared. According to the first national Constitution (1830), every individual 
living on Ecuadorian soil could be considered a full citizen if they were legally and 
financially independent; owned estates valued at 3000 pesos minimum; and could read 
and write in Spanish, even if at that time 85 per cent of the population only spoke Kichwa 
(Simbaña, 2009). Indigenous peoples, afro-descendants and women did not fulfil any of 
these requirements and therefore did not enjoy civil and political rights. Their legal 
representation was taken either by landowners or the church.  
 
The economy of the country was primarily based on agrarian production (exporting 
mainly cocoa and coffee, with the United States as the principal destination), and the 
main model of development was the hacienda system, under which land as well as 
economic and political power were concentrated in the hands of the agrarian elite or 
hacendados. In this context, indigenous peoples were integrated into the economy as 
                                                 
17 Huasipungo (concertaje in Spanish) is the Kichwa word referring to the servile relationship between 
the owner of the hacienda (landed estate; also called latifundio) and “Indians”. The latter were granted a 
salary and a piece of land on the hacienda but only by contracting a debt for life with the landowner. In 
this way, indigenous peoples became huasipungueros (Becker, 2008).   
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huasipungueros. The republican system and the Liberal Revolution led by Eloy Alfaro 
(1895), however, did not change the main colonial institutions of domination and 
exploitation of indigenous peoples. Huasipungos were only formally abolished by 
establishing a minimum wage.  Local landowners increased their power by becoming the 
political leaders of cantons18 and parroquias (civil parishes), increasing in turn the 
presence of the State locally. According to Lucero (2003), the hacienda became “a 
political institution that provided the incipient Ecuadorian state with the answer to a 
vexing problem: how to keep a colonial political economy functioning in ostensibly 
republican and liberal times” (2003: 26).  
 
During this period the main authority to be challenged by indigenous peasants were the 
landowners and the system of haciendas. The ‘feudal’ elite (located in the highlands) 
faced both increasing rural conflicts and the emergence of export-sector elites on the 
coast who not only challenged feudal political power but also demanded the 
modernisation of the economy. By the end of the 19th century there were two 
economically and politically powerful elites: one located in the coastal areas (export-
sector) and one in the highlands (landed class) (Figueroa, 1996-1997). The modernisation 
of the economy required the liberation of indios from the haciendas. Free indios would 
then be available to be employed as cheap labour in coastal industries19. Coastal elites 
became, therefore, staunch ‘defenders’ of the indigenous populations, promoting 
legislative protection for them (the 1937 Ley de Comunas20, for example) (Clark, 1997).  
 
There were several crude indigenous levantamientos21 in this period, but it was not until 
the 1920s and mainly the 1930s that collective action started to be more systematically 
organised, as indigenous huasipungueros forged alliances with leftist parties and 
agricultural trade unions22. Their first and biggest ally was the Partido Socialista 
                                                 
18 Ecuador is administratively divided in 24 provinces subdivided in 226 cantons, which are in turn 
divided into 1500 parishes.  
19 This led to a demographic shift: indigenous huasipungueros moved to a predominantly mestizo coastal 
area.  
20 The Ley de Comunas (Communes Law) recognised the legal existence of communities (they had to be 
formed by at least 50 people). Communities were allowed to have their own form of political (cabildos) 
and economic organisation (cooperatives). Even though the recognition of the comunas implied a more 
autonomous existence for indigenous peoples, communities remained under the control of the state 
(Lucero, 2003; Van Cott, 2005). 
21 Until the 1920s most indigenous uprisings were locally confined: within haciendas and against 
landowners and/or church representatives.  
22 The first workers’ uprising in Ecuador was in 1922.  
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Ecuatoriano23 (PSE, Ecuadorian Socialist Party). The first indigenous-peasant trade 
unions were formed in 1926. The PSE welcomed indigenous leaders starting a long (and 
sometimes troubled) relationship between rural communities and urban activists. The 
joint struggle was mainly triggered by concrete and immediate demands: better working 
and living conditions, abolition of imprisonment for debts, abolition of huasipungos and 
huasicamias24, and direct cash payment. Strikes (back then a new form of protest for 
indigenous groups) and violent mass protests appeared throughout Ecuador especially in 
the highland areas (Guerrero Cazar and Ospina Peralta, 2003). The unrest was increased 
by the fall of international prices of raw materials, throwing the national economy into 
depression in the1930s. 
 
Sawyer (2004: 87) notices that ‘…there was nothing inevitable about an indigenous 
politics of opposition; it had to be produced’. Jesús Gualavisí, Dolores Cacuango and 
Tránsito Amaguaña became important indigenous leaders (and with time, national 
figures) in close connection with the Ecuadorian Communist Party. As Foweraker (1993) 
and Sawyer (2004) explain, it was the class element that gave the indigenous struggle its 
strength and organisation. However, Ramos (2003) argues that, although the joint 
struggle brought together Marxist activists and indigenous peasants, neither class nor 
ethnic identity completely merged into the other. Over time, the indigenous movement 
strategically stressed one or the other.  
 
In May 1944 a massive popular uprising (known as the May Revolution) overthrew the 
president Arroyo del Rio, 1940-1944. In that same year, two organisations, crucial for 
the cohesion of urban workers and indigenous-peasant movements, were founded: the 
Confederación de Trabajadores del Ecuador (CTE - Confederation of Ecuadorian 
Workers) and the Federación Ecuatoriana de Indios (FEI - Ecuadorian Federation of 
Indians). By this time indigenous demands were not only related to work conditions but 
went beyond the haciendas. They principally claimed economic emancipation, land 
reform, and political and social rights (Becker, 2008). Powerful rural uprisings followed 
the May Revolution in a period of relative political stability in Ecuador (three democratic 
governments took power between 1948 and 1960). In this context, both the FEI and the 
                                                 
23 The PSE was formed in 1925 after the Revolución Juliana (July Revolution).  
24 Huasicamias: the Kichwa word referring to the compulsory domestic service of huasipungueros’ 
wives and daughters in the haciendas.  
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CTE consolidated their positions. Both organisations organised several conferences in 
which participants designed the document of their agrarian reform proposal. This 
proposal included demands specific to indigenous peoples (the recognition of Kichwa as 
an official language, for instance). Large-scale mobilisations coordinated by both FEI 
and CTE in December 1961 and August 1962 pressured the government to approve the 
agrarian reform.  
 
 1.2.2 Formalising Collective Action: the return of the “Indian” (1964-1990) 
Through organizational and agitational activity, indigenous organizations like CONAIE succeeded in 
changing the political culture of Ecuador from one in which Indians literally had to ride in the back of the 
buses to a pluricultural one in which Indians occupy public office at every level 
Lucero, 2001: 67. 
 
In 1963 a military coup overthrew president Arosemena (1961-1963) and installed a 
military junta. In 1964 and by decree25, the junta (1963-1966) passed the Ley de Reforma 
Agraria y Colonización (Agrarian Reform and Colonization Law). In this context, leftist 
parties and trade unions were silenced. The agrarian reform was a top-down program 
mainly benefiting agrarian capitalists. Whilst the hacienda system was abolished, the 
land tenure system was not affected. The land distributed among indigenous-peasants 
was mainly owned by the State and was of low quality with no access to irrigation. 
Authors such as Barsky (1988) and Simbaña (2009) argue that the 1964 agrarian reform 
did not aim to democratise land, but to modernise the agrarian production system in order 
to insert Ecuadorian products in increasingly competitive international markets. 
Secondly, it aimed to provide institutional channels to control escalating rural conflicts26.  
 
Nonetheless, with the agrarian reform, indigenous peasants were free of the huasipungo 
system and for the first time, became owners of land which they organised according to 
their communal customs (Zamosc and Postero, 2004). Land became the focal point 
around which different indigenous communities built cultural, social and political 
cohesion. By the 1970s the indigenous movement started changing strategies and 
                                                 
25 The second agrarian reform was also decreed by a military government in 1973. This time indigenous 
peoples’ needs were completely neglected. Rodriguez Lara, the dictator in power, claimed “There is no 
more Indian problem…We all become white when we accept the goals of the national culture” (Whitten, 
1976; cited in Becker, 2008: 142-143).  
26 After the Cuban revolution (1959), Kennedy’s government implemented the Alliance for Progress 
program. Ecuador was one of the eleven countries to implement agrarian reforms under this program 
(Becker, 2008).  
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discourse, highlighting in particular their ethnic identity. Jesuit anthropologist Xavier 
Albó (1991) names this phase as ‘the return of the Indian’. 
 
Ending the hacienda system forced racism into the public arena, thus leading to heightened 
political mobilizations. New issues gained dominance, including a defence of native cultures 
and languages…Growing educational and economic opportunities provided Indigenous 
peoples with less incentive to discard their ethnic identities (Becker, 2008: 145).   
 
In turn, the 1970s witnessed the transformation of the national model of development 
from agrarian production to import-substitution industrialization strategies (ISI). In brief, 
the ISI model was based on state-led development, which focused firstly on the expansion 
and modernization of the internal market via local production, and secondly on the 
creation of state-owned enterprises in control, in the case of Ecuador, of the natural 
resources, both primary goods (cocoa, coffee, bananas) and non-renewable goods (oil) 
(SENPLADES, 2010; Kingstone, 2011). In 1967 the first significant petroleum reserve 
in Amazonian territory was discovered. Since then, the Ecuadorian economy has been 
primarily based on extractive activities. As a petro-nation, Ecuador attracted foreign 
investment, and several multinational companies began operations in the country.  
By 1970 – three years after the discovery of the first significant oilfield – some thirty 
concessions comprising nearly ten million hectares were granted throughout the Ecuadorian 
Amazon, attracting heavy investment from multiple hydrocarbon exploration and production 
companies (Perreault and Valdivia, 2010: 692).  
 
However, during the 1970s, national debate centred on the ownership of such resources. 
Increasing foreign investments triggered unrest within the nationalist sector leading to 
the 1972 military coup27. The military government in power28 declared natural resources 
patrimonio nacional (national property), reviewed contracts with private companies, and 
created the Ecuadorian Petroleum State Corporation (Perrault and Valdivia, 2010). The 
first national refinery – Refinería Estatal Esmeraldas – was opened in 1977. The ISI 
model led, first, to a period of rapid economic growth in urban areas, and second, to the 
rise of an urban middle and working class. National governments used petro-dollars to 
finance health and educational programmes, subsidies and tax controls, benefiting urban 
classes. These transformations sharpened social and economic inequalities between rural 
                                                 
27 Constitutionally elected president Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra (1968-1972) was overthrown and 
replaced by General Rodriguez Lara (1972-1976). Velasco Ibarra was elected to the presidency five 
times: 1934-1935; 1944-1947; 1952-1956; 1960-1961; 1968-1972. He never completed a full term of 
presidency (Gerlach, 2003).  
28 It is important to remark here that, unlike many dictatorships in Latin American countries, military 
governments in Ecuador carried out progressive and non-violent reforms (Andolina, 2003).  
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and urban sectors. The exclusionary dynamic opened up by the new model of 
development, however, was not only based on geographical divisions (urban/rural), but 
also on gender, race and ethnicity (Schech and Haggis, 2000).  
 
It is in this context that most of Ecuador’s indigenous organisations were founded. In 
1972 ECUARUNARI (Confederacion de Pueblos de la Nacionalidad Kichwa del 
Ecuador – Confederation of Peoples of Kichwa Nationality) was established. The unrest 
following the agrarian reforms, the persistence of structural economic and social 
problems, and escalating tensions within the FEI between indigenous leaders and 
members of the Ecuadorian Communist Party, led indigenous groups to seek new 
alliances (Simbaña, 2009). Pallares (2002: 152) explains that ‘ECUARUNARI 
distinguished itself from other campesino (peasant) organizations by stressing the need 
to combat racial and cultural discrimination and by allowing indigenous leaders to serve 
in top leadership positions’. The creation of this new organisation which attracted 
indigenous pueblos from the Andean highlands was the result of the convergence of three 
political and organisational forces:  
1) New forms of organisation sponsored by leftist parties (Ecuadorian Socialist and 
Communist Parties) such as the Movimiento Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (MRT 
– Revolutionary Workers Movement) and Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria 
(MIR – Revolutionary Left Movement). These organisations emerged mainly in the 
sierra (highlands) and on the coast.  
2) Organisations linked to progressive sectors of the Catholic Church (associated with 
the Liberation Theology movement).  
3) Autonomous processes of political organisation within indigenous communities.  
 
In 1968, with the help of the Catholic Church and the peasant movement, another 
peasant-indigenous federation was organised in the highlands: FENOC (National 
Federation of Peasant Organisations). The organisation’s leaders stressed from the very 
beginning that their exploitation was based on both class and ethnic status, and worked 
mainly with rural communities demanding agrarian reform. The organisation grew at a 
national level, having strong connections with La Via Campesina29. Finally, in 1999, it 
adopted the name FENOCIN – Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas 
                                                 
29 La Via Campesina is an international peasant movement founded in 1993. 
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Indigenas y Negras (National Confederation of Indigenous, Peasant, and Black 
Organisations) to emphasise that it is the only federation in Ecuador representing 
indigenous, peasants and black peoples (Becker, 2008).  
In 1980, with the financial support of international Evangelical organisations, FEINE 
(Federación Ecuatoriana de Indigenas Evangélicos – Ecuadorian Federation of 
Evangelical Indigenous) was founded. Lucero explains that  
 [a] history of abuse on the part of hacendados and the traditional Catholic clergy made 
 Evangelicalism seem like a promising option for many former  huasipungueros hacienda 
 workers…the translation of the Bible in the 1950s and the start of Quichua radio 
 broadcast in the 1960s made the conversion to Protestantism a viable avenue to defend an 
 indigenous cultural identity (Lucero, 2006: 36-37; italics in the original).  
Currently, FEINE represents 5000 churches in Ecuador and 2.5 million indigenous 
Evangelicals located mostly in the highland area.  
 
In 1980, a regional congress attended by the representatives of the different indigenous 
pueblos (peoples) was organised. The result was the foundation of CONFENIAE 
(Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana – 
Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon), which brings 
together indigenous pueblos and nacionalidades from the Amazon. The relation between 
ECUARUNARI and CONFENIAE was further consolidated via the exchange of 
resources, mutual support in demonstrations, and the organisation of workshops and 
congresses (Simbaña, 2009). From this relationship grew the idea of a national 
indigenous confederation that could unify the different indigenous organisations of 
Ecuador. In 1984 the Consejo de Coordinación de las Nacionalidades Indigenas del 
Ecuador30 (CONACNIE- National Coordinating Council of Indigenous Nationalities of 
Ecuador) was formed. That same year the first regional indigenous organisation, COICA 
(Coordinadora de las Organizaciones Indígenas de la Cuenca Amazónica – Coordinator 
of Indigenous Organisations of the Amazon Basin) was founded. This organisation 
comprises nine indigenous organisations of the Amazon region31, including 
CONFENIAE from Ecuador.  
                                                 
30 FEI and FENOCIN did not integrate into this organisation.  
31 From Peru: AIDESEF (Association for the Development of the Peruvian Amazon); Guyana: APA 
(Association of Amerindian People); Bolivia: CIDOB (Confederation of Indigenous People of East and 
Amazon of Bolivia); Brazil: COIAB (Organisation Coordinator of Indigenous People of the Brazilian 
Amazon); French Guyana: FOAG (Federation of Autonomous Organisations of French Guyana); 
Surinam:  OIS (Organisation of Indigenous of Surinam); Venezuela: ORPIA (Regional Organisation of 
Indigenous People of the Amazon); Colombia: OPIAC (Organisation of Indigenous People of the 




Finally, in 1986 the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE 
- Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador) was founded bringing together 
indigenous organisations from the Andean highlands, the Amazonian lowlands and the 
coast. Its member organisations are: ECUARUNARI (Highlands), CONFENIAE 
(Amazon) and CONAICE (Coast). CONAIE was formed as a distinctive indigenous 
organisation trying explicitly to differentiate itself from political parties (Andolina, 
2003). Ethnic identity was placed at the core of its discourse, and its primary goal was to 
unify a fragmented indigenous population into one sole movement. In order to achieve 
such cohesion, CONAIE constructed a framework around the notion of nacionalidades 
(nationalities) (Jameson, 2011). Lucero (2003) and Becker (2008) point out that while 
indigenous groups could have organised under different concepts (pueblos, cooperatives, 
comunas, and so forth), it was nacionalidades which became the discursive vehicle for 
their political project; in other words, the acknowledgement of Ecuador as a Plurinational 
State. Radcliffe (2012: 244) explains that 
 [a]t its broadest, plurinationalism commits the state to a broader agenda than poverty 
 alleviation, as it encompasses the recognition of indigenous and black territories and 
 indigenous forms of justice, treating indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorians as subjects of 
 rights, granting citizenship to frontier populations, establishing SK [Sumak Kawsay – 
 Buen Vivir] as the core development objective, and amplifying collective rights, 
 strengthening intercultural education, and recognising Spanish, Kichwa and Shuar as 
 official languages.  
 
1.2.3 Neoliberal times, leadership and crises 
 (from 1990 up to the present)   
The 1980s and the return of democracy presented political and economic challenges. In 
relation to the political context, Ecuador has been characterised by a profound volatility. 
Like many Latin American countries, Ecuador has a long tradition of unstable (civil and 
military) governments. Traditional political parties32 have controlled the political scene 
since the return of democracy in 1979. Based on individual personalities, the political 
party system is highly fragmented, constructing its power mainly on clientelist practices 
(Postero and Zamosc, 2004; Van Cott, 2005; Machado Puertas, 2007; Prevost et al., 
2012). Traditional political parties, together with the National Congress and the Judicial 
System, have been discredited after various corruption scandals.  
                                                 
32 Ecuadorian traditional political parties: Partido Social Cristiano (PSC); Izquierda Democrática (ID); 
Democracia Popular – Unión Demócrata Cristiana (DP-UDC); Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano (PRE).  
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According to 1999 polling data, only 6 percent have faith in the Congress. Ecuador’s 
multiparty system is one of the weakest in Latin America. Perhaps more disturbing only 28 
percent of Ecuadorians believe that democracy is able to solve their problems (Lucero, 2001: 
60). 
 
In relation to the economic challenges of this period, there was a global fall in oil prices. 
On the other hand, the way by which national governments financed ISI strategies - 
printing money, borrowing abroad - led the economy to a state of hyper-inflation and 
growing debt. The debt crisis marked the end for the ISI model in Latin America, leading 
to profound institutional transformations and the beginning of the ‘neoliberal turn’ 
(Kingstone, 2011).   
 
a) The neoliberal turn: defining neoliberalism 
Harvey (2005) explains that  
…neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes 
that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial 
freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private 
property rights, free markets, and free trade (2005: 2) 
 
Authors such as Castree (2006), Mudge (2008), Clarke (2008), and Boas and Gans-Morse 
(2009) argue that the term neoliberalism has a multidimensional nature and strong 
normative connotations. Boas and Gans-Morse (2009) and Venugopal (2015) follow the 
historical transformation of the term since first coined by the German Freiberg School in 
the 1930s until the present. The first use of neoliberalism between the 1930s and 1960s, 
mainly by economists, was to denote a new philosophy different to classic liberalism in 
its rejection of laissez-faire and the focus on humanistic values. From the 1980s onwards, 
after the Chicago School and the Chile’s Chicago Boys, the meaning of the term started 
to expand. Since then, neoliberalism has been used not only to refer to a set of economic 
policies to deregulate markets, privatise and withdraw the State of the economic realm. 
It has also been applied to analyse broad social, political and cultural phenomena as long 
as is associated with free markets, for example, neoliberalism as a normative ideology or 
academic paradigm (explained below).  
 
One consequence of this expansion has been that the meaning of the term has become 
ambiguous and contested. This contestation and the multiplicity of usages of the term to 
analyse different phenomena has led to the lack of a consistent and precise theoretical 
and empirical characterisation of what neoliberalism means. For this reason, Venugopal 
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(2015) questions the current analytical value of the term. Molyneux (2008) argues that 
neoliberalism is too broad and abstract a concept to explain dynamic, complex and 
concrete processes. The risk that the author perceives is given by the fact that  
…totalizing conceptions of neoliberalism as imposing inexorable market logic with 
predetermined social and political outcomes, fail to capture the variant modalities, 
adaptations and indeed resistance to the global diffusion of the structural reforms (Molyneux, 
2008: 775).  
 
In addition, Boas and Gans-Morse (2009) show the uneven use of the term across 
ideological divides. Neoliberalism is rarely used positively. More frequently, it is used 
with a negative connotation by those authors who are critical to free market economy 
(Ferrero, 2014). Those in favour of the latter use different terminology, for example, 
consensus, adjustment and orthodoxy.  
 
Boas and Gans-Morse (2009) distinguish four main patterns of usage of the term 
neoliberalism across a wide range of social science literature. According to their 
typology, neoliberalism is used to refer to a set of economic policies, a development 
model, a normative ideology, and an academic paradigm. These distinctive uses of the 
term neoliberalism are not exclusive as very often they overlap. The first use of the term 
refers to economic reform policies (Aminzade, 2003). Within these set of policies are 
encompassed those that liberalise the economy, those that reduce the role of the State in 
the economy, and those that contribute to fiscal austerity and macroeconomic 
stabilisation (Boas and Gans-Morse, 2009: 143). The second use of neoliberalism denotes 
a development model, that is, this definition gives the coordinates of how the economy 
and society will be organised. As a development strategy neoliberalism defines recipes 
for modernisation, the role of labour, capital and the State. These prescriptions are 
included in a coherent political project guiding their implementation (Kurtz, 1999). The 
third use defines neoliberalism as ideology. At the core of this definition there are 
normative considerations of the role of individuals over collectivities as well as the 
primacy of individual freedom (Carruthers, 2001). Finally, the use of neoliberalism to 
refer to an academic paradigm ‘consists of positive assumptions about how markets 
operate’ (Boas and Gans-Morse, 2009: 144). In this sense, producers and consumers are 
thought to behave rationally and efficiently to correct market signals (Brohman, 1995).  
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The implementation of neoliberal policies in Latin America has also been assessed in 
different ways. Margheritis and Pereira (2007) note that appraisals significantly differ 
according to which facts are taken into consideration (see Biersteker, 1992; Huber and 
Solt, 2004; and Walton, 2004). Scholars such as Haarstad and Anderson (2009) argue 
that, in macroeconomic terms, these transformations were necessary to first, control 
inflation and second, to attract foreign investment in order to improve the relationship 
between national economies and global markets. Scholars such as Yashar (1999), Sieder 
(2002), Van Cott (2005), Kohl and Farthing (2009), Escobar (2010), and Harten (2011), 
agree in conceiving neoliberalism as a framework for macroeconomic and State reforms 
with dire social and economic consequences.  
 
In the case of Ecuador, the meaning of neoliberalism has been strategically fixed in one 
understanding of the term. Many authors analysing the shape neoliberalism has taken in 
the country, all of them critical to it (Silva, 2016; Mazzolini, 2015; Arsel, 2012; Andolina 
et al, 2009; Lucero, 2003; Acosta, 2002), agree in conceiving it as a set of economic 
policies mainly identified with the Washington Consensus. In this sense, neoliberalism 
in Ecuador has been defined as a set of macroeconomic policies ‘through which the 
political economy came into a forced alignment around market democratization, the 
withdrawal of the state from service sectors, trade liberalization, and the codification of 
a high-liberal property-rights regime that extended legal inequalities into new areas like 
intellectual property and biogenetics’ (Goodale and Postero, 2013: 2). As it will be shown 
in following chapters, the agents under study in this thesis, both the indigenous 
movement represented by CONAIE and the government of Rafael Correa, replicate this 
understanding of the term. Neoliberal policies are negatively evaluated due to the role 
given to the State primarily in the economic realm, and due to their dire social and 
economic consequences. As further explained below, one aspect that is positively 
assessed is the opening of spaces for deliberation and political organisation happened 
during the 1990s. This aspect is connected to Moulynex (2008) explanation of the two 
phases of the neoliberal turn. 
 
Molyneux (2008) divides the ‘neoliberal turn’ and the consequent transformations which 
took place in Latin America, into two phases: market fundamentalism and reactive 
neoliberalism. The first phase started in the 1970s and was dominated by structural 
adjustments attached to loans, the retreat of the State, privatizations of public assets and 
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a list of austerity measures, which involved cuts in social investments. In Ecuador, the 
Ecuadorian Petroleum State Corporation was re-structured as Petroecuador in 1989, and 
came directly under the control of private companies. In this period, the Ecuadorian 
national debt went from US$324 million to US$8.4 billion (Davidov, 2012: 13).  
 
The Ecuadorian government facilitated… penetration into the national soil, as it auctioned 
off oil block concessions to foreign oil companies. Beyond oil, World Bank-sponsored 
initiatives… pressured the Ecuadorian state to locate, map, and open up to investment new 
sectors of extractable natural resources (Davidov, 2012: 13). 
 
Economic policies were implemented with little consideration for social costs (Abouharb 
and Cingranelli, 2006). Following the recipes established by the Washington Consensus 
and Structural Adjustments Programmes - both designed by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and agreed by national governments - Latin America 
became part of what Mignolo (2005) calls the neoliberal global order. By the end of the 
1980s, poverty proved to be not a transitional phenomenon as many experts from the 
World Bank considered it, but a structural problem that urgently needed to be addressed.  
 
By 1990, 70 per cent of Ecuadorians lived below the poverty line (Postero and Zamosc, 
2004). The 1995 World Bank’s poverty assessment in Ecuador found a strong correlation 
between being indigenous and being poor (Van Nieuwkoop and Uquillas, 2000: 5). 
Social protests and international awareness of the social effects of economic policies led 
to the second phase of neoliberal policies described by Molyneux (2008) as reactive 
neoliberalism. The premise was to tackle social problems without affecting economic 
growth (Birdsall and de la Torre, 2001). Hence the post-Washington Consensus phase 
did not show substantive changes in macro-economic policies but introduced significant 
modifications to adjustments programmes: first, ‘good governance’ gave the State a place 
in development policy and planning; second, social policy recovered importance; and 
third, poverty became the principal problem to be addressed by social policies 
(Molyneux, 2008: 780).  
If in the 1980s policy attention focused on ‘getting the economy right’, in the 1990s there were 
attempts to attend to the hitherto neglected social realm and to build appropriate institutions, all 
in a context of ever-deepening inequality… (Molyneux, 2008: 780). 
 
Participation, empowerment, accountability, decentralization, ethnodevelopment, 
development with identity, and multiculturalism all form part of the new lexicon 
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dominating this phase33 (Andolina et al, 2009; Pearce and Eade, 2000). The inclusion of 
these ideas into the dominant discourse can be thought of both as the result of their co-
optation by the neoliberal discourse, and as a top-down attempt to deal with those 
challenges posed by social confrontation from below. During the 1980s there was a 
proliferation of local and international (mainly Northern) non-governmental 
organisations in the region (Petras, 1997; Bebbington, 1997; Pearce, 2000).   
 
Hale (2004) and Albó (2008) call the period of multicultural reforms la era del Indio 
permitido. The authors were referring to attempts to assimilate the impoverished 
indigenous population by granting them cultural and social rights. These attempts created 
a division between the ‘good Indians’ (those who accepted the terms and conditions of 
assimilation) and the ‘bad Indians’ (considered thenceforth as ‘radicals’).  
The Indio permitido has passed the test of modernity, substituted ‘protest’ with ‘proposal’, 
and learned to be both authentic and fully conversant with the dominant milieu. Its Other is 
unruly, vindictive and conflict prone. These latter traits trouble elites who have pledged 
allegiance to cultural equality, seeding fears about what empowerment of these Other Indians 
would portend (Hale, 2004: 19).  
 
These sets of neoliberal reforms also promoted the participation of ‘good Indians’ in 
municipal decision-making processes. Scholars such as Postero (2010) regard 
multicultural reforms as attempts at co-optation and fragmentation of indigenous 
movements: ‘[neoliberal multiculturalism] was a top-down effort by the neoliberal state 
to incorporate indigenous peoples into the national project as responsible and docile 
neoliberal subjects’ (2010: 22). 
 
However, uprisings in Ecuador since the 1990s show that the neoliberal period in Latin 
America should be considered both as ‘lost and won’ decades. Lucero (2009) and Oxhorn 
(2009) argue that the neoliberal transformation not only imposed economic pressures on 
the population, but also opened spaces for political organisation. Indigenous movements 
found a revitalising impulse to rearticulate their demands and consolidate their 
organisation. Lucero notes that ‘the responses of Indigenous people to neoliberal projects 
have been complex and varied’ (2009: 66) implying both resistance and negotiation. It 
can be said that in the case of Ecuadorian indigenous movements, neoliberalism has 
simultaneously threatened and provided opportunities.  
                                                 
33 The United Nations declared 1995-2004 the International Decade of the World’s Indigenous Peoples 
(Van Nieuwkoop and Uquillas, 2000).  
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 b) Leadership 
With CONAIE, the indigenous movement became the main protagonist and 
representative of the ‘anti-neoliberal’ struggle (Lucero, 2006; Yashar, 1999; Van Cott, 
2005; Becker, 2008; Ospina Peralta, 2009). In 1990, the organisation led a nine-day 
nationwide uprising, blocking roads and cutting food supplies to the main cities. The 
main demands were for land, a new agrarian reform, and the recognition of nationalities 
and their cultural and political rights. Becker (2010: 292) explains that “...it represented 
the emergence of indigenous peoples as one of the most powerful social-movement actors 
in the Americas”. The massive 1990 roadblock was the first demonstration of power by 
indigenous organisations, which was followed by roadblocks and mobilizations in 
199234, 1994, 1997, 1999, 2000 and 2001 (Van Cott, 2005).  
 
As illustrated in Table 2, polling data showed that by 1999 Ecuadorians had more faith 
in CONAIE than in most of the traditional and dominant institutions (except from the 
church and the military). The frame of the struggle was constructed around the idea of a 
plurinational State. CONAIE articulated a discourse in which local, regional and national 
dimensions were intertwined and shaped by the idea of ‘indigenous nationalities’, which 
resulted in a discourse defending Ecuador as a plurinational country (Lucero, 2003). 
Andolina (2003) explains that  
 
Drawing on beliefs about the positive aspects of pre-Columbian societies and contemporary 
criticisms of colonial rule expressed by anticolonial movements, indigenous organisations 
prioritised ethnic identities of ‘nationalities’ while retaining traditions of class and popular 
struggles. Indigenous movement ideology has operated around a principle of self-
determination that seeks autonomy, access, and participation in social and political life 










                                                 
34 The 1992 march was linked to ‘500 years of Resistance’, a campaign against official celebrations of 
the 500th anniversary of the ‘discovery’ of the Americas (Andolina, 2003).    
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Source: El Hoy (newspaper Quito, January 1999) quoted in Lucero, 2001: 65 
 
The idea of nacionalidades facilitated the construction of alliances between indigenous 
and non-indigenous organisations (church, environmentalists, leftists and human rights 
organisations, among others). As a result, in 1994 the Coordinadora Agraria (Agrarian 
Coordinator) was formed and in 1995 the Coordinadora de Movimientos Sociales (Social 
Movements Coordinator). In this context, CONAIE became the main representative of 
the popular struggle demanding the creation of a Constituent Assembly. In the political 
project published in 1994, CONAIE explained the main goal of their struggle.  
...is a frontal assault on the repressive national and international hegemonic economic, 
political, and ideological capitalistic system that hinders the self-determination and economic 
and political independence of Indigenous peoples and nationalities and other social sectors… 
The goal is the transformation of the nature of the current power of the hegemonic uni-
national state that is exclusionary, anti-democratic, and repressive…activist would construct 
a humanistic, plurinational new society (CONAIE Proyecto Politico, 1994; quoted in Becker, 
2008: 193) 
 
In 1994 (during the presidency of Durán Ballén 1992-1996) a new agrarian reform law 
was passed. CONAIE rejected its content, demanding popular participation in the 
process. It called for a new national levantamiento and road-blocks in the main cities of 
Ecuador. The result of the struggle was the constitution of a special commission (half of 
its members were indigenous representatives), and finally, the reform of the law. 
CONAIE achieved ‘credit for small farmers who produce for the local market, state 
control of water resources, development of indigenous agricultural knowledge, and a 
two-thirds majority vote requirement for indigenous people to sell their community land’ 
(Andolina, 2003: 729-730).  











In 1996 CONAIE and the Coordinadora de Movimientos Sociales formed their own 
political party: the Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik - Nuevo Pais 
(MUPP-NP, Pachakutik Movement for Plurinational Unity – New Country). Pachakutik 
marked the entry of indigenous peoples into electoral politics. By this time, CONAIE 
and Pachakutik counted on a level of 80 per cent support from the indigenous population 
(Van Cott, 2005: 54).  
 
 c) Crises 
After (the extremely unpopular) President Abdalá Bucaram was evicted from power in 
199735 facing a severe crisis of legitimacy and social unrest, the government called for a 
Constituent Assembly. In May 1998, a new national Constitution was passed. By this 
time it was clear that the indigenous movement in Ecuador ‘view[ed] political institutions 
and procedures as sites of their political action’ (Andolina, 2003: 723). Social movements 
interpreted this moment as a popular revolution and drafted (via multiple local assemblies 
throughout Ecuador) what was called the ‘People’s Mandate’. The mandate was mainly 
based on CONAIE’s plurinational project. Conversely, centre and right-wing political 
parties interpreted the call for a constituent assembly as the call for reform and drafted 
what was called the ‘Congressional Resolution’. The former put forward a radical anti-
neoliberal agenda; the latter a pro-neoliberal one. Alliances between traditional political 
parties to secure seats on the assembly and to vote for particular reforms proved that the 
participation of civil organisations would be constrained by elite alliances.  
 
The last coup of the 20th century in Ecuador was against President Jamil Mahuad 36 
(1998-2000) in the early days of 2000, in a period of intense crisis:  
…GNP shrank 7.3 percent, foreign investment fell by 34.7 percent, imports declined by 38.4 
percent, and the value of the dollar against the sucre [national currency until 2000] rose by 
362 percent…almost 10 percent of the country’s 12 million inhabitants emigrated…In 1998 
there were 42 banks in Ecuador; by 2000 there were only 26 (Lucero, 2001: 60). 
 
                                                 
35 In the same year a 10-year project financed by the World Bank, IFAD (International Fund for 
Agricultural Development) and the Ecuadorian government was implemented. The name of the project 
was PRODEPINE (Proyecto de Desarrollo para los Pueblos Indigenas y Negros – Development Project 
for Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian Peoples). The project was worth USD 50 million 
(http://www.ifad.org/evaluation/public_html/eksyst/doc/prj/region/pl/ecuador/ec_PRODEPINE.htm) 
[Accessed June 2012).  
36 Under Mahuad’s presidency the Consejo para el Desarrollo de las Nacionalidades y Pueblos del 
Ecuador –CODENPE (Council for the Development of Ecuadorian Nationalities and Peoples) was 
created by decree, and CONAIE was given a central role in its structure and administration. 
 50 
Mahuad dollarized the economy in order to halt the dramatic rise of inflation, and attract 
foreign investment (Walsh, 2001). This was interpreted as a loss of national sovereignty, 
which consequently triggered social protests and finally, Mahuad’s ousting. The coup 
was characterised by an unusual alliance between lower-ranked military officials and 
CONAIE leaders (Becker, 2008). Together, they formed the government of National 
Salvation which lasted only one day. Under international pressure, power was handed to 
vice-president Gustavo Noboa (2000-2003). Lucero (2001) explains that ‘what [was] 
striking about the events of January 2000 [was] the shift from CONAIE’s usual strategy 
of broad-based organizing, protest, and negotiation to one of palace revolutions and elite 
pacts’ (Lucero, 2001: 67).  
 
During Noboa’s presidency, unpopular measures (rises in gas and transport prices, 
privatization and land concessions to private companies that deepened the extraction of 
natural resources) led to violent public demonstrations. As in the past, conflicts were 
solved by agreements signed between the national government and representatives of 
indigenous movements. With President Lucio Gutierrez (2003-2005) in power, 
CONAIE’s leaders (Luis Macas and Nina Pacari) were assigned posts in the ministries 
of agriculture and foreign affairs (Becker, 2008). In 2005, Ecuador started negotiations 
with the USA to sign a Free Trade Agreement. This triggered popular uprisings across 
the country. Due to the support it offered to Gutierrez and its participation in socially 
discredited State institutions, CONAIE faced widespread social discredit and internal 
fragmentation. For the first time, the indigenous movement was unable to articulate and 
represent popular demands (Walsh, 2001).  
 
In 2005, a third coup in ten years overthrew President Gutierrez. While CONAIE was 
involved in the mobilizations against the President, this time the main protagonist was 
not the indigenous movement, but middle class urban citizens (self-identified as the 
forajidos – i.e., the outlaws) who did not ally themselves with any organisational or 
political structure (Acosta, 2005; Philip and Panizza, 2011). As in Argentina in 2001, the 
people’s motto was Que se vayan todos! - all of them out! (Ramirez Gallegos, 2010). By 
this time, an unknown politician, Rafael Correa, was gaining popularity by representing 
popular unrest against traditional political parties. 
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 1.3 Political Leadership and the Return of the State: Rafael Correa, 
 Revolución Ciudadana and Buen Vivir - a Post-neoliberal era? 
 
In 2007 Correa was elected president of Ecuador. Throughout Latin America in the new 
millennium widespread disillusionment with the perceived failings of neoliberal policies 
to solve issues of poverty and inequality (and in some cases economic instability) 
contributed to political changes. A new generation of centre-left leaders (such as Chavez, 
Morales and Correa) won power by suggesting the possibility of a new dynamic in the 
region (Arditi, 2008; Luna and Filgueira, 2009; Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012). They put 
forward a provocative anti-neoliberal discourse: Socialismo del Siglo 21 (21st Century 
Socialism). Coined by the German Marxist scholar Dietrich, 21st Century Socialism aims 
to go beyond the limitations and mistakes of both neoliberalism and the Soviet model or 
20th Century Socialism (Kennemore and Weeks, 2011). While neither rejecting 
capitalism nor promoting a collectivist system, its goal is the re-foundation of the State 
as a central institution responsible for the regulation of the economy and distribution of 
resources in a democratic and egalitarian way (Harnecker, 2010; Pomar, 2010). In 
addition, new schemes of regional integration were formed: ALBA, MERCOSUR, 
UNASUR37 (Gardini, 2010). The new leaders led unprecedented transformations: 
nationalization of natural resources – in the case of Ecuador the nationalisation of 
Petroecuador – redistribution of wealth and land, and the rewriting of national 
constitutions in their respective countries. Nevertheless, increasing socio-political 
conflicts have raised doubts about the viability and future of such transformations. In this 
respect, Kennemore and Weeks (2011: 267) argue that  
…a volatile economic climate, poorly implemented reforms, increased opposition, and low 
political tolerance all indicate limitations to the viability of twenty-first-century socialism as 
a post-neoliberal development model.  
 
In Ecuador, the rise of Rafael Correa and new social forces seeking to reorganise the 
political arena accompanied an apparent decline in the fortunes of the indigenous 
movement. Some scholars argue that this decline was due to the lack of 
representativeness of indigenous discourse in a new political and social situation (Becker, 
2008; Simbaña, 2009; Ospina Peralta, 2009). CONAIE’s political and organisational 
fragmentation and its increasingly narrow focus on ethnic issues, plus the low electoral 
                                                 
37 ALBA: Alternativa Bolivariana para las Americas (2004). MERCOSUR: Mercado Común del Sur 
(1991). UNASUR: Union de Naciones Suramericanas (2008).  
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performance of Pachakutik led to public discredit and loss of leadership in the public 
arena. Conversely, Correa and Alianza Pais put forward the idea of a Revolución 
Ciudadana (citizen’s revolution), placing emphasis on individual and universal rights. 
The idea of the government was that the so called revolution would be carried out by 
general citizens, that is, with no political affiliation to traditional institutions such as 
political parties or corporatist organisations (unions and social movement organisations). 
Ospina Peralta (2009) explains that Correa’s strategy here was to draw on a discourse 
that represents universalism instead of corporatism. Conversely, indigenous 
organisations demonstrated their opposition to an idea which has a homogenizing and 
universalizing effect. Their main argument against the idea of a Revolución Ciudadana 
was that it can end up erasing political conquests that organised sectors have achieved 
after decades of struggle (Becker, 2010). That is, they can end up losing the places they 
conquered in the State. This is going to be analysed in depth in Chapter 6.  
 
Davidov (2012) argues that Correa’s strategy to differentiate his government from 
previous neoliberal ones is based on the articulation of the idea of a ‘new moral 
economy’, an economy which contrasts with the predominant market logic. This new 
moral economy praises the environment, collective action and intergenerational 
cooperation (Davidov, 2012: 13). Natural resources are not regarded as commodities but 
as a source of value (Rival, 2010). Based on indigenous ancestral knowledge, the idea of 
Sumak Kawsay (Buen Vivir) fits well with Correa’s intention. It has been raised by 
Correa’s government as an anti-neoliberal discourse, the alternative to previous 
economic and development models. In a speech at the UN Assembly, Correa argued: 
Market prices are linked to the production of commodities. The market economy 
compensates for commodities. There are things which have a high value, but no price. Some 
things have very little value, yet fetch high prices; and things with great value may be 
priceless. Like friendship, happiness and security, the environment is priceless. In our 
wellbeing approach to the economy, an economy geared to generate wellbeing for all, we 
seek to generate value, to preserve value, and to compensate for the generation of value. This 
means changing the market logic through collective action and seeking other logics beyond 
the profit logic through agreement, justice and responsibility. This means not relying 
exclusively on a monetary scale of values. Things that do not have a price can be assessed in 
value terms. Biodiversity has multiple values. The environment is not just natural resources, 
it’s not just another factor of production along labour and capital. To conserve nature for 
future generations can be an end in itself. We need nature to live (Rafael Correa, Speech at a 
High Level Meeting on Climate Change at the UN Assembly in New York, 2007; quoted in 
Rival, 2010: 358). 
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 1.4 Buen Vivir regime38: the Constituent Assembly and Ecuador’s 
 national Constitution 
 
In 2007, a national referendum (approved by 80 per cent of Ecuadorian voters) finally 
led to the organisation of the Constituent Assembly. The writing of a new constitution 
was seen both by Correa’s government and civil society actors as a historic moment 
marking the possibility of re-founding the State (Acosta, 2008; Gudynas, 2009). The 
Constituent Assembly was established in the city of Montecristi (Manabí province). A 
plurality of socially and politically organised agents participated in the debate, 
indigenous and Afro-American organisations, leftist political parties, environmental and 
feminist organisations were among the most notorious (Cortez, 2010). Each of these 
agents presented documents that directly or indirectly alluded to Buen Vivir or Sumak 
Kawsay (Kichwa). Previous to the Constituent Assembly there were a small number of 
publications presenting the idea of Buen Vivir39 (GTZ, 2002; Viteri, 2002; Acosta, 2002; 
Sarayaku, 2003), which served as inspiration for the documents presented at the 
Assembly. They all converged in their critique of the dominant model of development.  
 
The Constituent Assembly comprises ten spaces of discussion: 1) fundamental rights and 
constitutional guarantees; 2) organisation, social and civic participation; 3) State 
structure and institutions; 4) territorial organisation and allocation of competences; 5) 
natural resources and biodiversity; 6) labour, production, and social inclusion; 7) model 
of development; 8) justice and the fight against corruption; 9) sovereignty, international 
and regional relations; and 10) legislation and audit (Cartuche Vacacela, 2015). The 
participation of different collectives that brought their own proposals to be discussed in 
the ten spaces of deliberation opened up during the Assembly implied the mobilisation 
of people and resources, the negotiation of proposals and the establishment of alliances. 
For social movements, the mobilisation of proposals implied the establishment of a link 
between the proposals worked out at the community level and the dynamic of the 
Assembly.  
 
                                                 
38 The Constitution of Montecristi introduces the Buen Vivir regime (2008: 199) as ‘...the articulated and 
coordinated set of systems, institutions, policies, norms, programs and services ensuring the exercise, 
guarantee and enforceability of the rights recognized in the constitution’ (Spanish in the original. 
Author’s translation).  
39 These publications referred to Buen Vivir, Sumak Kawsay (Kichwa) and Suma Qamaña (Aymara).  
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The Constituent Assembly represents a space of deliberation with the participation of a 
heterogeneous group of agents seeking to integrate their demands in the constitution. In 
doing so, they defined their visions on the State and society. This process of articulation 
between different sectors forced them to negotiate in order to reach to a common 
definition of State institutions, decentralisation, environmental issues, popular 
participation, rights, and so on. It was in the Constituent Assembly where the 
consolidation of Buen Vivir as the proxy upon which different socio-political agents 
defined their position within the post-neoliberal turn dominating the country and the 
region took place.  
 
It can be defined as the most important political opportunity of the period studied here 
(from the beginning of the 2000s to the present). The Constituent Assembly appears to 
be the greatest possibility provided by an unprecedented dynamic between 
institutionalised politics and social movements. The call for the openness of this space of 
deliberation was the result of first, the confluence of historic demands mobilised mainly 
by the indigenous movement; and second, the emergence of a leftist movement with 
political will and power to call for the closure of the parliament and the openness of this 
new space of deliberation to write the new Constitution. Therefore, this political 
opportunity was actively made by both sectors. Both social movements and the 
government of Rafael Correa had the power to change and shape their political context.  
 
In this process, the definitions of relevant matters to be included in the final document 
(rights of nature, the declaration of the country as plurinational, the rights of Buen Vivir) 
needed of the consensus and approval of those participating. This means that in the case 
of the Constituent Assembly the struggle over meaning and the imposition of a dominant 
interpretation took place during the deliberation process. This implied conflict between 
competing forces that framed matters in different ways according to their own visions, 
objectives and interests. The result, however, was the consensual definition of the articles 
included in the Constitution. As will be explained in Chapter 4, the tensions of this 
deliberative process increased after the Constituent Assembly, shaping competing 
visions of Buen Vivir and its implementation.  
 
Finally, in 2008 Ecuador’s national Constitution was approved. It presented Buen Vivir 
as the guiding principal and the main goal of development. Ecuador gained regional and 
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international recognition for this (Escobar, 2010; Walsh, 2010; Santos, 2010). For the 
first time ever, nature was considered to be the subject of rights in a national constitution. 
And for the first time in Ecuador, a concept based on indigenous cosmology was taken 
as the guiding principle. 
Article 275. The development structure is the organised, sustainable and dynamic group of 
economic, political, socio-cultural and environmental systems which underpin the 
achievement of the good way of living (sumak kawsay)…The good way of living shall require 
persons, communities, peoples and nationalities to effectively exercise their rights and fulfil 
their responsibilities within the framework of interculturalism, respect for their diversity, and 
harmonious coexistence with nature (Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador, Title VI, 
chapter I; italics in the original).  
 
The Buen Vivir regime introduced by the Constitution has two main components: the first 
one is the Socio-Political (articles 340-394) related to issues of inclusion and equity. This 
component resonates in areas such as health, education, social security, culture, leisure, 
social communication, local knowledge, and human security (article 340). The second is 
the Environmental component (articles 395-415) related to biodiversity and natural 
resources: nature and the environment, biodiversity, natural assets and ecosystems, 
natural resources, soil, water, natural heritage, urban ecology, alternative energy (Cortez, 
2009; Gudynas, 2011).  
Article 395…The State shall guarantee a sustainable model of development, one that is 
environmentally balanced and respectful of cultural diversity, conserves biodiversity and the 
natural regeneration capacity of ecosystems, and ensures meeting the needs of present and 
future generations (Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador, 2008, Title VII, Chapter II, 
Section I).  
 
The Constitution specifies the ‘rights of the good way of living’: water and food; a 
healthy environment (‘Energy sovereignty shall not be achieved to the detriment of food 
sovereignty nor shall it affect the right to water’40); information and communication; 
culture and science; education; habitat and housing; health; and labour and social 
security41.  
 
In relation to the environment, the Constitution assumes a biocentric perspective: nature 
is thus conceived as the subject of rights. The legal recognition of Pachamama (mother 
nature) has been generally regarded as an unprecedented advance.  
Article 71. Nature, or Pacha Mama, where life is reproduced and occurs, has the right to 
integral respect for its existence and for the maintenance and regeneration of its life cycles, 
structure, functions, and evolutionary process (…) 
Article 72. Nature has the right to be restored (…)  
                                                 
40 Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador, 2008, Title II, Chapter II, Article 15.  
41 Ibid.  
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Article 73. The State shall apply preventive and restrictive measures on activities that might 
lead to the extinction of species, the destruction of ecosystems and the permanent alteration 
of natural cycles (…) 
Article 74. Persons, communities, peoples, and nations shall have the right to benefit from 
the environment and the natural wealth enabling them to enjoy the good way of living (…)42 
 
In relation to the acknowledgment of Ecuador as a plurinational country there were 
important disputes over the definition of ‘plurinational’. As explained before, the 
declaration of Ecuador as a plurinational State had been the primary demand of the 
indigenous movement (Lupien, 2011; Jameson, 2011). This demand was based on the 
assumption that a more inclusive political system implies the recognition of its 
plurinational nature. Conversely, representatives of Alianza Pais ‘wished to leave the 
term vaguely defined; essentially ensuring that it would remain on the level of rhetoric 
without any significant substance or concrete implications’ (Becker, 2011: 54).  
 
In 2010 the Plan Nacional para el Buen Vivir, Construyendo un Estado Plurinacional e 
Intercultural 2009-2013 (National Plan for Good Living, Building a Plurinational and 
Intercultural State 2009-2013)43 was approved (SENPLADES44, 2010). Buen Vivir is 
represented in the National Plan as conceptual rupture; a new paradigm of development 
‘post-petroleum’; a radical change; a new social contract; and as the basis of social, 
economic and democratic justice. Buen Vivir is transformed into a set of policies, e.g., 
‘[t]o promote a sustainable and territorially balanced endogenous economy for Good 
Living to guarantee rights. This economic system must seek productive transformation, 
diversification and specialization, based on the promotion of diverse forms of production’ 
(SENPLADES, 2010: 86); and goals, e.g., ‘[t]o reduce chronic malnutrition by 45% by 
2013’ (SENPLADES, 2010: 78). Radcliffe (2012) argues that with the inclusion of Buen 
Vivir as guiding principle of the national development plan the intention is to establish a 
welfare regime system in Ecuador. 
Ecuador…historically failed to provide systematic support for poor citizens, relying instead on 
informal-familialist systems where low levels of social spending compounded  families’ 
reliance on extended unpaid hours of household labour, informal sector work and international 
migration…Against this background of inadequate public social policies, SK [Sumak Kawsay] 
                                                 
42 Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador, 2008, Title I, Chapter 7.  
43 The second development plan Plan Nacional para el Buen Vivir 2013-2017 (National Plan for Buen 
Vivir) will be analysed in Chapters 4 and 6.  
44 SENPLADES: Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo (Secretary of National Planning and 
Development).  
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implies that a distinctive welfare regime might be created, although the programmatic and 
institutional bases are not yet completely in place (Radcliffe, 2012: 243). 
 
Since the creation of the Constituent Assembly and the rise of Buen Vivir in politics, the 
Revolución Ciudadana brought important changes: national tax collection reached its 
highest peak in 2011 (USD 9561 million)45, and the renegotiation of contracts with 
multinational companies operating on Ecuadorian soil has boosted the State budget. 
There is increasing public investment in areas such as health and education. Poverty rates 
based on income have fallen from 71.3 per cent to 50.9 per cent in rural areas, from 49.8 
per cent to 28.6 per cent at a national level, and from 38.7 per cent to 17.4 per cent in 
urban areas46 (from 2003 to 2011). The effect of these socio-economic indicators is 
intrinsic and not external to the production of the political process of Buen Vivir in 
Ecuador.  
 
Many contradictions and disagreements on the definition and implementation of these 
transformations guided by the idea of Buen Vivir have been made apparent. The most 
controversial ones are related to the extractive activities, on which the Ecuadorian 
economy is still heavily dependent. Critics of the economic policies of the government 
have labelled this as progressive neo-extractivism (Gudynas, 2010), pointing to the 
important reforms made in terms of the new role of the State in the economy and greater 
fiscal pressure on the wealthy, whilst maintaining at the same time the traditional model 
of development based mainly on extractive activities. The lack of diversification of the 
economy, the negative socio and environmental impacts of natural resource extraction, 
and the resultant high dependency on the global fluctuations of commodity prices are 
among the strongest critiques made mainly by social and environmental movements. On 
the other hand, the controversy over the limited popular participation in decision-making 
processes and the tense relationship between the government of Rafael Correa and 
historical actors (such as parts of the indigenous movement) has also been a source of 
new conflicts. 
 
The first moment of articulation of different political forces and heterogeneous demands 
represented by the Constituent Assembly as well as the second moment of tensions and 
                                                 
45 SENPLADES (2010).  
46 Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INEC).   
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fragmentation between these forces is reflected on the academic publications on Buen 
Vivir. I divide the publications on Buen Vivir in two clusters. The first cluster of 
publications (from 2008 to 2010 approximately) reflects the novelty and the radical 
otherness of this idea that draws on indigenous philosophy. They outline the proposals 
of change arising from Buen Vivir and the importance of its unprecedented inclusion in 
legal and policy documents. The second cluster of publications (from 2010 to the present) 
moves the debate on the matter to acknowledge the existence of competing 
understandings of Buen Vivir. 
 
1.5 First and Second Cluster of Publications on Buen Vivir:  
the Decoloniality Approach 
The publications on Buen Vivir and Sumak Kawsay during the 2000s are mainly focused 
on the meanings of Buen Vivir given by indigenous leaders and intellectuals, and on the 
ones elaborated for their inclusion in legal documents such as the national constitutions, 
and the first national plan of Buen Vivir47. The latter reflects the contribution not only of 
the indigenous movement but also the heterogeneous collective of agents participating in 
the process opened up by the Constituent Assembly. As explained in the introduction of 
this chapter, these publications tend to present a homogeneous and essentialising view 
on the matter, with little consideration for the organisational, cultural and political history 
of the groups mobilising these ideas. From 2010 to the present it is possible to find 
academic work that acknowledges the existence of competing understandings of Buen 
Vivir, and also provides an interesting critique of its origins. This thesis builds upon this 
second wave of publications adding the sociological and political analysis of the actors 
involved.  
 
The main focus of the first definitions published on Buen Vivir is placed on the meaning 
of the concept according to the indigenous cosmovision emphasising it as an alternative 
epistemology and ontology to the one underpinning Western civilisation. In most of these 
publications it is more common to find the concept of Sumak Kawsay (in original Kichwa 
language) instead of Buen Vivir (its Spanish translation). These analyses work on the 
meaning of Sumak Kawsay as having a strong normative component. A unified and single 
                                                 
47 Acosta (2008); Medina (2008); Tortosa (2009); Fernandez (2009); Albó (2009); Hernandez (2009); 
Gudynas (2009); Chiroque Solano and Mutuberria Lazarini (2009); Salgado (2010); 
Walsh (2010). 
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definition tends to be presented (although it is acknowledged that the idea of the ‘good 
life’ can be found in different indigenous cosmologies – Guarani, Ashuar, Mapuche). 
Sumak (Kichwa) means ‘beautiful’, ‘good’, ‘tenderness’, and ‘perfect’. The meaning of 
‘Kawsay’ is ‘to dwell’ and ‘to live with others’ (Albó, 2009, Salgado, 2010). Its antonym 
is Waqcha (Kichwa) meaning ‘orphan’ or ‘abandoned’. These terms denote a strong 
relational component. Analysts explain that the ‘good life’ can only be reached with 
others through the praxis of solidarity, reciprocity and communion. ‘Living better’ is 
rejected as a common goal as ‘better’ implies ‘in comparison with others’ and, most of 
the time, at the expense of others (Medina, 2008). Buen Vivir expresses a harmonious 
relationship between humans on the one hand, and humans and nature on the other. It 
forms part of a cosmology that interrelates ‘beings, knowledges, logics, and rationalities 
of thought, action, existence, and living’ (Walsh 2010: 18). The multiple dimensions of 
life cannot be conceived in any other way than intertwined; therefore, Buen Vivir 
encompasses all, without hierarchies. Salgado (2010) explains that ‘according to the 
Andean view of culture, the final objective of human activity is not power or money 
accumulation, but the nurturing of a tender, harmonious and vigorous life – a Sumak 
Kawsay – both for humanity and Mother Earth: the Pachamama’ (Salgado, 2010: 200-
201).  
 
The idea of the ‘good life’ can be found not only in Kichwa cosmologies. In Aymara it 
is refer to as Suma Qamaña (translated in Spanish as vivir bien). In Guarani the name is 
Ñande Reko (harmonious life) and encompasses ideas of the good life (teko kavi), the 
land without evil (yvy mara’y), and the path to the noble life (qhapaj ñan) (Gudynas, 
2011: 442-443). In Ashuar the term is ‘Shiir Waras’; and in Mapuche is ‘Kume Mongen’. 
Thomson (2011) explains that while these concepts are not synonymous they share roots 
and meanings.  
 
Notions such as plurality, quality of life, equilibrium and circular time, synergy with 
nature, communal economy, intercultural and inter-generational coexistence, local and 
direct democracy are the bases of Buen Vivir. Reaching Buen Vivir does not assume the 
existence of a previous stage of underdevelopment (Escobar 2010) as notions such as 
evolution, linear time, and progress do not apply in this indigenous world vision. 
According to the indigenous cosmology, the future is behind us, representing the 
unknown. What is in front of us is the past, that is to say, the lived experience that guides 
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new developments. At the same time, economic growth is not rejected in itself. What 
indigenous peoples reject is, to paraphrase Habermas (1987), the colonisation of their 
lifeworld (guided by a relational rationality) by the instrumental rationality of the 
economy at the expense of their own values. 
 
Mainstream publications on Buen Vivir followed the reasoning proposed by the cluster 
of authors working from the so-called decoloniality approach. A group of authors 
including Coronil (1993), Dussel (1994), Mignolo (2000, 2003), Quijano (2000), Escobar 
(2007, 2010), Grosfoguel (2007), Walsh (2008), Blaser (2009), and de la Cadena (2010) 
have been working on the idea of decoloniality or modernity / coloniality to understand 
and explain changes, social and political transformations and future horizons in Latin 
America. The primary premise here is that coloniality and the capitalist system are 
constitutive elements of modernity in Latin America (Blaser, 2009). Walsh (2008) 
explains this in terms of a ‘coloniality matrix’ formed by four dimensions: (i) coloniality 
of power: race and ethnicity used as instruments for control and domination, determining 
in turn the construction, distribution and power hierarchy of social identities (white at the 
top, indigenous at the bottom); (ii) coloniality of knowledge: imposition of one sole 
source of knowledge (Eurocentrism) excluding alternative epistemologies (Santos, 
2008); (iii) coloniality of being: discrimination, inferiorization and dehumanization of 
the Other considered thereafter as salvaje (savage), bárbaro (barbarian) and primitivo 
(primitive); and (iv) coloniality of nature: based on the binary division of nature-culture 
excluding Other forms of conceptualizing such a relationship (see Maturana and Varela, 
1987; Latour, 1993; de la Cadena, 2010). The result of the application of the ‘coloniality 
matrix’ in Latin America provided a capitalist, Christian, colonial and modern framework 
of society at the expense of alternative worldviews and cultural models.  
 
The State is conceived as the most important instrument of colonization in the region. Its 
formation following the European model helped the development and maintenance of 
internal colonialism (Bonetto, 2012). Whilst State formation engendered political 
independence, cultural and economic dependence from Europe remained unaffected, 
with the consequent cultural homogenization and exclusion of vast majority of the 
population (mainly indigenous, black and mestizos). The knowledges, languages, and 
worldviews of excluded groups were ignored, suppressed or subordinated. The 
Eurocentric construction of knowledge determined universal categories and concepts 
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based on normative propositions. Other knowledges became archaic, primitive and pre-
modern (Lander, 2003).  
 
Here, the focus is placed on the interaction between the local and the global (Mignolo, 
2000), i.e., how local histories become privileged spaces where global designs ‘are 
adapted, rejected, integrated or ignored, and the confrontation of two kinds of histories 
occurs’ (Domingues, 2009: 117). The cluster of authors working on the concept of 
decoloniality, or modernity / coloniality, propose situating the analysis on the borders of 
modern epistemology, what Mignolo (2000, 2005) calls ‘border thinking’ as a re-
articulation of the colonial difference from a position of exteriority and against any form 
of totality. The modernity / coloniality approach advocates a pluriversal epistemology of 
the future, locating itself ‘in the very borders of systems of thought reaching towards the 
possibility of non-Eurocentric modes of thinking, and counter to the great modernist 
narratives (Christianity, liberalism, and Marxism)’ (Escobar, 2007: 180). In this sense, it 
questions the social sciences, arguing for a surpassing of the humanities, which are 
regarded as complicit with modernity.   
 
Congruent with the work of Fanon (1967), Wallerstein (1974), Dussel (1977) and the 
dependency theory, these authors interpret the transformations at stake in many Latin 
American countries (both at the level of the State and social movements, with new 
political projects such as the ones represented by Revolución Ciudadana and Buen Vivir) 
as presenting the possibility of breaking with the coloniality matrix, whilst putting 
forward alternatives to modernity and with it, alternatives to development in the region. 
Development is understood here as defined by Radcliffe (2015: 5): ‘[d]evelopment 
consists of a “will to improve”, an impulse to governmentality and pastoral interventions 
that seek to ameliorate the living conditions or social attributes of a population’. 
Traditional discourses defining it as based on economic growth, the expansion of material 
wealth and industrialization has been scrutinized and questioned in the last decades 
(Max-Neef, 1991; Escobar, 1992; Grillo and Stirrat, 1997; Chambers, 1997; Sen, 1999; 
Kliksberg, 2004; Nussbaum, 2011). As a consequence, alternative paradigms of 
development have incorporated social inclusion, cultural difference, environmental 
protection, gender equality, and popular participation among their main concerns 
(Andolina et al, 2009: 9).  
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Authors working within the decoloniality approach study the interrelation of knowledge 
coming both from the center and the periphery to expose the history of past and present 
domination, and to construct social, political, ethical and epistemic alternatives to the 
dominant capitalist and modern order (Santos, 2010). Proposed here is a deconstruction 
of colonized subjects and the devices of power that have determined the ways reality has 
been constructed.   
 
Authors such as Albó (2009) and Galindo (2010) formulate this in terms of the 
constitution of ‘Indigenous Modernities’ based on ancestral knowledge, communal 
practices, inter-culturality and an interrelation between humans and nature. However, 
Escobar (2010) makes a distinction between alternative modernizations and decoloniality 
projects. The former is  
 …based on an anti-neoliberal development model, in the direction of a post-capitalist 
economy and an alternative form of modernity…but does not engage significantly with 
the…hegemony of Euro-modernity (…) The decolonial project is based on a different set of 
practices (e.g. communal, indigenous, hybrid, and above all, pluriversal and intercultural), 
leading to a post-liberal society… (Escobar, 2010: 11, italics in the original) 
 
Escobar (2010) identifies the first project (alternative modernizations) as dominating at 
State level, and the decoloniality project as mainly mobilized by social movements. I 
agree with Escobar in identifying two projects operating at two different levels: the State 
and civil society, particularly in countries such as Ecuador and Bolivia where the Buen 
Vivir discourse is played out by different actors. I argue that these two projects are the 
core of the political process in Ecuador (analysed in Chapter 6). However, Escobar’s 
analysis of the projects point to a lack of interaction between them, which is contrary to 
the argument of this thesis. The analysis of key events in the political process allows me 
to show that there are moments of articulation and moments of differentiation between 
the two projects mobilised by the State and by indigenous social movements.  
 
While I acknowledge the importance and innovation of this school of thought in 
understanding the current situation in Latin America, and the ‘decolonial move’ at stake 
in countries such as Ecuador, my point of departure is slightly different. I argue that the 
modernity / coloniality approach presents a number of limitations. The first is related to 
a certain tendency among advocates to conceptualize ‘the indigenous’ as a homogenous 
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unity and indigenous knowledge as preserved in a state of ‘purity’ (not contaminated by 
modernity). As shown in Chapter 1, behind the construction of ‘the indigenous’ in the 
case of Ecuador there are political parties of the left, indigenous organisations working 
in partnership with international NGOs, religious organisations, and peasant trade unions 
that feel that they do belong to the West (and modernity). The reactions to this ambivalent 
and contradictory position are varied (but do not exclusively imply the rejection of 
modernity).  
 
Furthermore, this approach leads to an abstract construction of ‘the indigenous’ with a 
strong normative component, neglecting the organisational and political trajectory of 
these groups. The indigenous movement and its social organisations have a political and 
social trajectory that enables them to be considered a highly organised social (and 
political) movement that has participated in and shaped national development. Its 
political and social salience put the movement into an advantaged position in comparison 
with other movements. They have developed discourses, forged alliances, moved up and 
down scales strategically, obtained and disputed resources, and occupied places in State 
institutions. 
 
According to the decoloniality approach, in order to be valid, the decolonial stance has 
to be not only peripheral but also ethnically based (Mignolo, 2000: 103). In addition, this 
approach works with a dichotomous thinking (good / bad, liberation / domination; 
modernity = bad + domination), which treats the complexity at stake in a reductive 
manner. Following this logic, if projects of change do not represent an epistemic break 
with modernity then they are, at least, deemed complicit in coloniality. I consider that 
placing indigenous social movements outside modernity is misguided, as their struggles 
are formed from a plurality and mixture of positionalities that bring them both closer to 
and away from modernity (Cheah, 2006; Domingues, 2009). This tension has to be 
acknowledged but not reduced. 
 
In later years, analysts have acknowledged the existence of multiple and contested 
understandings of Buen Vivir that points to the lack of consensus about the meaning of 
this idea (Cortez, 2011; Stefanoni, 2011; Radcliffe, 2012; Hidalgo-Capitán and Cubillo-
Guevara, 2014; Hidalgo-Capitán et al, 2014; Gudynas, 2014; Breton et al, 2014; Oviedo 
Freire, 2013, 2014; Viola Recasens, 2014). These analyses mainly refer to the intellectual 
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traditions behind each definition. In that way, these publications distinguish between (i) 
an indigenista48 definition of Buen Vivir; (ii) a neo-Marxist definition of Buen Vivir 
mainly blended with contributions such as 21st Century Socialism; and (iii) a post-
development definition of Buen Vivir. This thesis builds upon these studies adding the 
sociological and political analysis. These competing definitions will be analysed in depth 
in Chapter 4 in order to show how they are used to trace boundaries (us and them) 
between political forces.   
 
In addition, some of the publications of this second cluster argue against understandings 
of Buen Vivir that defines it as essentially indigenous. The work of Breton, Cortez and 
Garcia (2014) and Viola Recasens (2014), for instance, consider that Buen Vivir has been 
treated as forming part of an idealized indigenous philosophy able to remain out of the 
influence of Western culture, which in turn has helped to construct an archetypical, 
decontextualised and mythical image of “the Andean civilisation” (Breton et al, 2014: 
12. Spanish in the original. Author’s translation). Viola Recasens (2014) is radical in his 
critique. The author argues that Buen Vivir’s idealisation actually refers to, using the term 
coined by Hobsbawm (1983), an ‘invented tradition’. An invented tradition refers to 
symbolic practices that force their connection with the past in order to inculcate norms 
and values in the present. In the case of invented traditions, the continuity with the past 
is fictitious. They are actually new responses to new situations that adopt the form of past 
traditions.  
 
The analysis of Viola Recasens (2014) is provocative. I would add that, invented or not, 
the consequences of an idealisation of Buen Vivir are that little attention is paid to the 
current living conditions of indigenous and peasants communities, the omission of the 
indigenous presence in the cities, the homogenisation of indigenous peoples, and the 
neglecting of their political interests. Furthermore, such idealisation assumes the intrinsic 
ownership of Buen Vivir by indigenous peoples and therefore, their ‘natural’ leadership 
over a process of transformation guided by this idea. In Chapter 4 I show that competing 
definitions of Buen Vivir should be conceived as strategically constructed and 
                                                 
48 Indigenista is historically defined as a political ideology that recognises the specificity of the 
Indigenous Question and the right of indigenous peoples to receive special and favourable treatment in 
compensation of their long-standing discrimination and marginalisation (Lucero, 2008; Luis Hidalgo-
Capitan et al., 2014). 
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reconstructed through power struggles between different forces. In Chapter 5 and 6 I 
show how the indigenous movement is disputing (and losing) the leadership of a process 
that is currently in the hands of the government of Rafael Correa.   
 
 
 1.6 Towards the interrogation of Buen Vivir as contentious politics 
 
In this chapter, the main organisational, political and cultural features of two agents, the 
indigenous movement and the government of Rafael Correa, were outlined in order to 
show the importance of linking discourses with the practices, agency and materialities of 
those who mobilise them.  
 
In the case of the indigenous movement, this chapter traced how the indigenous discourse 
developed from (i) material demands related to land, to (ii) ethnic-based claims linked to 
territory, to (iii) the development of the idea of nationalities which enabled their 
unification in one sole movement, to finally, (iv) the configuration of the idea of 
plurinationality. Land, territory, nationality, plurinationality and Buen Vivir have acted 
as discursive vehicles for the indigenous political project. The evolution of these 
demands from materiality to the claim for a pluralist system has been facilitated by the 
articulation of alliances, different political openings to collective action, specific 
national, regional and international contexts, and organisational forms. The final 
configuration of the indigenous movement’s political project based on the construction 
of Ecuador as plurinational is directly linked to their idea of Buen Vivir. As will be 
analysed in depth in Chapter 4, the construction of a Plurinational State is conceived by 
the indigenous movement as the main mechanism to achieve Buen Vivir. 
 
In the case of the rise of Rafael Correa to power and the emergence of Alianza Pais as a 
political movement, their ability to bring together historical popular demands and frame 
them as Revolución Ciudadana is going to be analysed in Chapter 4. This process of 
articulating a plurality of demands and including them in institutional politics opens a 
new dynamic. In doing so, the government installed the idea of universality vs. 
corporatism (targeting historic agents such as the indigenous movement). The idea of a 
Revolución Ciudadana has been blended with the 21st Century Socialism and the idea of 
Buen Vivir. This strategy has enabled Correa’s government to establish itself in an anti-
neoliberal position differentiated from previous Ecuadorian governments. As will be 
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shown in Chapter 4, these are all bold ideas with ambiguous meanings that have triggered 
positive and negative reactions among both the population and commentators on the 
country’s development. The apparent contradictions between a robust rhetoric and the 
actual implementation of policies, presenting (so far) mixed results and contrary to the 
principles of Buen Vivir as laid out in official policies have triggered increasing unrest 
among particular sectors of the population. Correa’s statement naming protesters as 
terrorists, qualifying environmentalists as romantic and leftists as infantile has become 
representative of his style of confronting those who oppose or express dissent with the 
government’s decisions (Bebbington and Humphreys Bebbington, 2011). Among these 
sectors, one culprit is the indigenous movement, mainly represented by CONAIE.  
 
The rise of Buen Vivir in politics and the process of reconfiguring the political settlement 
have triggered the challenge of existing understandings of the relationship between social 
movements vis-à-vis the State. In the following chapter, the main theoretical debates on 
this relationship are discussed in order to delineate the principal conceptual lines 
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The situation in contemporary Ecuador since the rise of Buen Vivir provides a fascinating 
case to explore the dynamics of the tension between the State and social movements as 
both have been fundamental in the rise of Buen Vivir in politics. Both have also entered a 
new phase of the political process marked by a central role of the State in planning and 
controlling the economy, which has led to a more control and regulation of market forces 
whilst at the same time increasing the State’s decision-making power over public policy, 
the fall of traditional political parties, the rise of popular political leaders and the 
articulation of an anti-neoliberal political project represented by Buen Vivir.  
 
The overall argument of this thesis is that the political process in contemporary Ecuador 
encompasses two moments. The first moment is marked by the articulation between the 
indigenous movement and the government of Rafael Correa. This articulation enables the 
rise of Buen Vivir as a political project and its inclusion in institutional politics. The 
second moment reflects the differentiation and fragmentation between these two sectors. 
In both moments, the agents involved strategically define the meaning of Buen Vivir 
according to their own political interests (Research Question 1), deploy strategies, dispute 
resources and the leadership of the political process (Research Question 2). The main goal 
is to legitimise their own understanding of Buen Vivir and impose it for its implementation 
through State policies (Research Question 3).  
 
This new situation enables the re-examination of what has been written on the relationship 
between political structure (State) and insubordination (social movements). The key idea 
 68 
binding the thesis together is the construction of strategic positioning in the light of the 
rise of Buen Vivir in institutional politics, and its effects on the relationship between the 
indigenous movement and the State in Ecuador. Therefore, the principal conceptual lines 
underpinning the research point to the relationship between social movements and the 
State, between collective organised action and political structure. Within the New Social 
Movements Theory, the political process approach (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007) provides a 
pertinent analytical framework to grasp the complexities of this relationship in the 
Ecuadorian context because it brings together contention, collective action and politics 
connecting micro and macro processes and the institutionalised contexts of mobilisation 
(Diani and McAdam, 2003). This theoretical approach pays attention to the relationship 
between agency and structure focusing in the relationship of three categories that refers 
to the construction of meaning (framing processes), organisational forms (mobilising 
structures) and political structures (political opportunities structure). They are an initial 
framework for the analysis of contentious politics in contemporary Ecuador that helps me 
to explore how collective action affects the political structure and vice versa in a particular 
moment of the history of Ecuador when the agents studied in this thesis aim at the 
construction of a postneoliberal turn in the country.   
 
The indigenous movement and its social organisations have a political and social 
trajectory that enables them to be considered a highly organised social (and political) 
movement that has participated in and shaped national development. This is why the 
indigenous movement in Ecuador is considered here a rational actor (goal-oriented). Its 
political and social salience put the movement into an advantaged position in comparison 
with other movements. It have developed discourses, forged alliances, moved up and 
down scales strategically, obtained and disputed resources, and occupied places in State 
institutions. For this reason, I consider that New Social Movements theory is a good 
framework for the study of the indigenous movement vis-à-vis the State. As mentioned 
before, within New Social Movements theory, the political process approach is 
particularly relevant as it provides useful analytical tools. The articulation of three 
distinctive but interconnected categories is used in this thesis as main analytical 
framework: (a) framing processes ; (b) mobilizing structures, and (c) political 
opportunities (McAdam et al, 1996; Diani and McAdam, 2003; Tilly and Tarrow, 2007). 
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However, I consider that the political process approach provides a limited understanding 
of the nature of the State in the Latin American context. New Social Movement theory, 
and particularly the political process approach used in this thesis, helps me to understand 
the dynamics and interactions between the State and social movements but less so to 
assess the changing nature of the State as a result of it. This last aspect is key because part 
of the argument of this thesis is that the political process of Buen Vivir has produced a 
renewal of political settlements that is expressed in a new role of the State in the political 
and economic realm. Therefore, in this chapter I work with the definition of the State 
given by Latin American Marxist authors Lechner (1980), Aricó (1981), Zavaleta (1990) 
and Thwaites Rey (2012, 2010). These authors develop a definition of the State as having 
a contradictory and relational nature, considering the State a platform for the inscription 
of social conflicts.  In this way, the State is defined as a place where social and political 
struggles materialize. This understanding of the State allows me to discuss the 
relationship between social movements and the State, focusing on the main dilemmas of 
this, I argue, necessary relationship.   
 
This chapter is structured in two parts. The first one is dedicated to a discussion of 
the main approaches to social organisation. In the first section I review three 
approaches within the New Social Movements theory, that is: identity-based, 
resource-mobilisation and the one used in this thesis, the political process approach. 
Their principal features and limitations are highlighted, as well as their application 
in the Latin American context. I finally, develop my interpretation of these 
approaches and the pertinence of the political process approach to analyse the 
relationship between indigenous movement and the State in the context of rise to 
Buen Vivir to institutional politics. The second part of the chapter is dedicated to 
define the State and specifically to the discussion of the definition given by Lechner 
(1980), Aricó (1981), Zavaleta (1990) and Thwaites Rey (2012, 2010). 
 
2.1 Social Movements in Latin America  
Forty years after the emergence of the ‘new’ social movements in Latin America, many 
of them have consolidated their positions, not only within civil society but also in the 
political arena. In the case of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement, its agenda today 
forms part of the national government’s agenda, in turn opening up new conflicts and 
struggles for this movement. In this context, a critical revision of the literature on social 
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movements, as well as a redefinition of the most appropriate criteria for their analysis, is 
needed.  
 
There is no general agreement on how to define social movements. Authors such as Jelin 
(1986), Cardoso (1987) and Touraine (1988) argue that social movements are ultimately 
the construction of the researcher who conceives them as a collective of action: 
‘movements form a unity only when we look at them from the outside looking for 
similarities… if we prioritize their differences they cease to form a uniform object’ 
(Cardoso, 1987: 32). Theoretical divisions between ‘old’ and ‘new’ movements, as well 
as between ‘identity-based’ and ‘resource-mobilization’ approaches, represent attempts 
to set the boundaries of such categories. In any case, there is general agreement that social 
movements are a dynamic component of civil society (Cohen and Arato, 1997; Pearce, 
2010), challenging the boundaries of what has been traditionally perceived as ‘politics’, 
as well as the actors associated with it.  
 
Two of the most important approaches to social movements, namely identity-based 
(commonly identified as new social movements theory) and resource-mobilisation 
theories have emerged in Europe (the former) and in the US (the latter). Their distinct 
theoretical approaches to collective action have been determined for the most part by the 
different processes of transformation in these two geopolitical contexts after the 1960s 
(Cohen, 1985). Theoretically, the European approach emerged in reaction to the 
structural analysis offered by Marxism. Resource mobilisation theory represented a 
response to the psychological analysis of collective action predominating in the US. A 
third approach to social movements, the political process approach, also developed in the 
US, attempted to synthesize the identity-based and resource-mobilisation approaches. 
This is the approach adopted in this thesis to analyse the political process of Buen Vivir 
in contemporary Ecuador.  
 
New social movements theory, particularly the identity-based approach, was initially 
well-received by scholars studying contentious action in Latin America (Jelin, 1985; 
Slater, 1985). The emergence of new social phenomena challenging classic 
interpretations of social conflict as class contradiction led to initial enthusiasm for the 
new theory. Some scholars (Foweraker, 1995; Reiter, 2011) have warned about the 
implications of uncritically applying these approaches to the Latin American context. 
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Foweraker (1995) argues that they might best be applied in a ‘selective and pragmatic 
fashion’ (1995: 7). However, the identity-based perspective has been largely (and most 
of the time uncritically) applied to analyse collective action in Latin America, whereas 
resource-mobilisation and political process theories have been partly neglected.49 The 
result has been the proliferation of disparate associations labelled as ‘new social 
movements’, making it a catch-all category. Differences between the Latin American and 
European context, however, show that even though the core points of these theories are 
relevant in the analysis of contentious action in Latin America, a critical revision that 
acknowledges political, cultural and economic differences, as well as the geopolitical 
dynamic of knowledge, is needed for a more accurate interpretation (Reiter, 2011).  
 
The first difference is related to the class composition of new social movements. 
European new social movements are principally composed of the educated middle-class, 
which in turn is mainly employed in service occupations (Offe, 1985). This explains in 
part the fact that their actions are not principally driven by economic demands. The 
assumption here is that activists have already achieved (more than) basic conditions of 
living. Conversely, new social movements in Latin America have mostly emerged from 
the margins and in contexts of material deprivation. Their social bases are still struggling 
to survive, popular classes are their main components, and material demands are still of 
paramount importance (Escobar and Alvarez, 1992; Foweraker, 1995; Stahler-Sholk et 
al., 2007). In this context, members of social movements are mainly peasants, workers, 
indigenous peoples, the landless, students and the unemployed (Biekart, 2005). In this 
sense, it can be argued that the composition of Latin American social movements partly 
questions the ‘newness’ of the identities supposedly expressed by new social movements. 
Zamosc (2007: 28) argues that “indigenous struggles in Latin America falsify the basic 
tenets of the new social movements”.  
 
The relation between movements and the State in Latin America constitutes another 
important difference. The novelty of European social movements is partly explained by 
the fact that they neither target the State nor aim to take political power. Instead, it is 
democratization and the expansion of civil society that normally constitute their main 
                                                 
49 Yashar (2005, 2007) and Van Cott (2005) are exceptions as both authors analyse social movements in 
Latin America from a resource-mobilization perspective.  
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objective. By making this distinction in relation to old movements’ aims, new social 
movement theory presupposed an already consolidated, modern and unrestricted civil 
society framed by a liberal democratic regime (Foweraker, 1995; Cohen and Arato, 
1997). On the contrary, Latin American new social movements emerged in a context of 
repression and authoritarian rule. In this context, Reiter (2011) explains that  
[a] U.S. focus on combating the spread of communism in Latin America provided 
opportunities for some local civic organisations while severely restricting the chances for 
institutional survival of others… what emerged in these years [1980s] was not “new” but a 
response to new political opportunities and a new environment… (2011: 162). 
 
Under an authoritarian regime, Latin American traditional political actors and 
organisations, such as trade unions and (mainly leftist) political parties, to a great extent 
lost their capacity to mediate and influence in the political arena. During the 1970s and 
especially the 1980s, the emergence of human rights movements (such as the Mothers of 
the Disappeared in Argentina), ecological movements (such as those in Brazil against the 
destruction of the Amazonian rain forest), women’s movements (such as women 
organizing themselves in Chile to demand political participation) and indigenous 
movements (such as can be found in Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador and Colombia) were quickly 
labeled as new social movements (Calderon et al., 1992). Strategies were different (they 
did not target the State), and their demands were shaped in a different way. As such, it 
was thought that they easily fitted the new category of ‘new social movements’. 
However, it can be argued that if these movements did not initially direct their demands 
towards the State it was to a great extent because in this context there was no (or little) 
possibility to do so. In an authoritarian and repressive context, actors found alternative 
ways of coming together for collective action. As the social and political trajectory of the 
indigenous movement during the 1990s show, the State is considered an important 
interlocutor for social movements. This is in line with Tilly and Tarrow’s (2007) analysis, 
which argues that the repertoire and performance of contentious action is highly 
influenced by the political regimes under which they operate; that is to say, the broader 
structural context. In this respect, Calderon, Piscitelli and Reyna (1992) state that 
When society is suffocated by the state, it seeks a mechanism of defense and different ways 
of coming together; in the process, it makes actors of those who try to affirm themselves, to 
define their identities apart from and in spite of the state (Calderon et al., 1992: 24). 
 
In turn, the mid-1980s witnessed a return to democracy in most Latin American 
countries, as well as the development of the neoliberal model of governance (with the 
concomitant aggravation of the economic crisis). In this context, what constituted a 
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novelty for social movements was the proliferation of local, national and international 
(mainly Northern) non-governmental and development organizations throughout the 
region (Bebbington, 1997; Pearce, 1997; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Reiter, 2011). Debates 
on the complexities of NGO-social movement relationships in Latin America abound, 
pointing to both the benefits as well as the constraints (Petras, 1997; Hulme and Edwards, 
1997; Pearce, 2000). Despite this, it can be argued that the relationships established 
between these types of organisations have helped social movements to open up new 
opportunities, secure new resources, and – in the case of indigenous movements – place 
‘identity’ at the core of their struggle.   
 
Having considered these important differences between social movements in the Latin 
American and European context, in what follows I briefly review each approach within 
the new social movement theory highlighting the main reasons to choose the one 
developed by Tilly and Tarrow, which is called the political process approach.  
 
 2.2 Identity-based approach 
Briefly, the identity-based approach explains the emergence of new social movements as 
the result of the reaction to a deep societal transformation. Touraine (1988) explains this 
structural transformation as the transition from industrial to post-industrial society. 
Castell (1983) describes the transformation as one from production to reproduction, while 
Habermas (1973) describes it as one from liberal to late capitalism. In addition, Touraine 
(1988) and Melucci (1980) explain this shift by referring to citizens’ capacity for 
‘reflexivity’. It is this capacity that puts ‘identity’ at the core of ‘new’ movements. The 
construction and mobilization of a common identity provides meaning that reinforces 
solidarity between a movement’s participants. However, it is not only a question of the 
expression of an identity and a set of values, but about their politicization. In this respect, 
Cohen (1985) states 
…the salient feature of the NSMs [new social movements] is not that they engage in 
expressive action or assert their identities but that they involve actors who have become 
aware of their capacity to create identities and of power relations involved in their social 
construction…Contemporary collective actors see, in other words, that the creation of 
identity involves social contestation around the reinterpretation of norms, the creation of 
new meanings, and a challenge to the social construction of the very boundaries between 
public, private, and political domains of action (Cohen, 1985: 694).  
 
Habermas (1973, 1987), a key author within the new social movement theory, 
conceptualises society as formed both by the interrelation of lifeworld and system. The 
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emergence of social movements is characterised by him as a reaction against the 
colonization of their lifeworld by the system. Lifeworld is understood as a socially and 
culturally transmitted background of knowledge that reflects and determines people’s 
interpretation of the world; an interconnection of meanings that enable, on the one hand, 
the formation of bonds of solidarity, and on the other, the establishment of a social order 
aimed at the reproduction of the same lifeworld. People’s lifeworlds are moved by a 
relational rationality. The system, in turn, is represented, according to Habermas, by State 
and economic institutions, (bureaucracy and market forces). These institutions, however, 
follow an instrumental rationality. Habermas further argues that in current capitalist 
societies, the system has gained autonomy from areas of everyday life, resulting first in 
the uncoupling of system from lifeworld and second, in the penetration of instrumental 
rationality into the latter. This is what Habermas calls the ‘colonization of the lifeworld’. 
As stated earlier, social mobilization emerges as a defence against such colonization 
(Blaug, 1997; Edwards, 2008). Movements are located by Habermas within the socio-
cultural sphere.  
 
According to Offe (1985), these new social movements become political when they claim 
that their “means of action can be recognised as legitimate and the ends of that action can 
become binding for the wider community” (1985: 826). Hence, movements go from 
social to political when their values, practices and world visions are legitimately 
mobilised50 in order to challenge hegemonic norms. Their actions are principally driven 
by cultural, symbolic and strongly normative oriented demands (Snow et al., 1986) which 
are in turn non-negotiable (Scott, 1990). 
 
Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) conception of social movements points to the discursive 
construction of identity mobilised by new actors. According to the authors, identity is not 
fixed but formed by the intersection of different subject positions brought by the plurality 
of actors forming the (always open) unity of the social movement. They argue that identity 
is ultimately constructed in the process of mobilization. Identity is therefore constitutive 
of and resulting from political struggle, which traces the boundaries delimiting the 
movement. These boundaries determine an ‘us’ and ‘them’ with a consequent inclusion / 
exclusion dynamic.  
                                                 
50 Examples of illegitimate forms of mobilisation are terrorist acts and private crimes (Offe, 1985).  
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The identity-based approach is mainly centred on why social movements emerge; the 
processes by which people construct and mobilise their identity for collective action 
(Dalton et al., 1990). This approach stresses that it is the mobilisation of identity which 
constitutes the novelty of new social movements. 
…autonomous, voluntary, and indigenous associations within civil society using and 
expanding public discourse and public spaces for discourse are the differentia specifica of 
contemporary social movements (Cohen and Arato, 1997: 507). 
 
This approach emerges as an attempt to explain the effects of societal transformation at 
stake in Europe since the 1970s, and the diversity of demands triggered by these changes 
that could no longer be explained by classic Marxist theory; that is to say, in class terms. 
However, one of the main critiques directed at this approach is precisely related to this 
structural view (Della Porta and Diani, 2006). By explaining the formation of movements 
as a reaction to structural societal changes and emphasising informality, spontaneity, and 
non-negotiability of their demands, the approach not only narrows analysis to the 
movements’ initial phase of emergence but also confuses this initial stage with the 
movement as a whole (Scott, 1990). Once social movements have already been formed 
and gained position as political actors within civil and political society (as is the case of 
indigenous movements in Latin America), the adoption of strategies to achieve goals 
makes movements face organisational challenges which could bring them closer to 
‘conventional political forms’ (Scott, 1990; Mueller, 1992). Furthermore, when this 
happens, part of their demands in effect become negotiable.  
Were goals to remain non-negotiable movements, we would be left with little more than the 
hope for a cultural revolution in values. To build non-negotiability and indifference towards 
the state into the definition of new social movements is to define them as exclusively cultural 
movements (Scott, 1990: 154).  
 
It can be argued that the identity-based theory lacks the analytical tools to understand 
movements’ organisational challenges and the strategic alliances they establish with other 
actors (e.g. NGOs, political parties). I consider that this flaw of the identity-based 
approach makes it not suitable for the analysis of the political process of Buen Vivir as 
organisational factors are important to understand the contentious interaction with the 
State. In analysing the struggle of contemporary indigenous movements in cases such as 
Ecuador, where they are already consolidated and recognised as political actors, the focus 
must be placed on the organizational challenges they face.  Finally, critics of this approach 
also point to the lack of analysis of the political conditions in which social movements 
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emerge (hindering or facilitating movement formation). These points are precisely the 
main focus of analysis of the resource-mobilisation paradigm.  
  
 2.3 Resource-mobilisation approach 
The resource-mobilisation approach aims to explain, first, how actors become involved 
in collective action, and second, how they coordinate efforts into a common and sustained 
action (Tarrow, 1994: 9). This theory emerged in the 1970s mainly as a response to the 
limitations presented by the then dominant psychological explanation of collective action 
(collective-behaviour paradigm). According to the latter (Kornhauser, 1959; Smelser, 
1962), the discontent and frustration (interpreted as psychological reactions), triggered by 
the breakdown of social control organisations and economic crisis, act as a powerful 
catalyst for non-institutional collective action. The crowd, which for this paradigm forms 
the basis of any social movement, is conceived as irrational, unorganised and anomic, 
emerging via mechanisms of contagion and diffusion.  
 
Conversely, resource-mobilization theory (Olson, 1965; Costain, 1992) emphasises 
organisation, resources51, opportunities, strategies and the participation of rational actors 
as key factors in social mobilization. By doing so, the paradigm has developed a robust 
empirical-analytical framework. The formation of a movement is based on the assumption 
of conflicting relationships between groups with different interests (power relations). 
What accounts for their formation is the availability of resources and political 
opportunities. Movements are therefore conceived of as goal-oriented, and the State is 
normally seen as their main target. Actors follow a utilitarian (cost-benefit) logic for 
participating in collective action.  
 
The main criticisms of this approach focus precisely on the instrumental and 
individualistic understanding of action, which to a great extent underestimates cultural 
and historical factors. For the resource-mobilisation approach, the construction and 
mobilization of new identities, meanings and values are assumed as obvious parts of the 
process (preconditions) and are therefore not worth analysis. On the contrary, Melucci 
(1988) argues that actors’ capacity to evaluate opportunities and establish strategies is 
                                                 
51 Relevant resources for social mobilization include energy, ideas, practices, and material objects (Tilly 
and Tarrow, 2007: 206).  
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highly dependent on the construction of their identity as a collective, which in turn is 
influenced by contextual factors. Furthermore, the resource-mobilization approach 
develops a static understanding of social movements’ strategies and interests without 
giving consideration to how these strategies might change in the process of mobilization. 
In relation to this point, the resource-mobilization approach places a strong emphasis on 
leadership as responsible for developing strategies, whereas membership is mainly seen 
as mere resource for implementation (Hannigan, 1985). As it will be explained in 
following sections, leadership is a key aspect in this thesis but is conceived in a relational 
way. These are important points that the resource-mobilisation approach does not deal 
with appropriately. The following approach is the political process approach. It focuses 
on the interaction between collective action and political structure overcoming the 
weakness of the previous two approaches, and it is, therefore, the approach used in this 
thesis.  
  
 2.4 Political Process Approach 
Following these initial critiques, there have been further theoretical developments aimed 
at overcoming weaknesses, as well as narrowing the distance with the identity-based 
approach. I argue that in analysing the struggle of contemporary indigenous movements 
in cases such as Ecuador, where they are already consolidated and recognised as political 
actors, the focus must be placed on the organizational challenges they face in this new 
phase that I call the political process of Buen Vivir. Emphasis is placed on the political 
and social terrain which nurtures the emergence of social movements (McCarthy and 
Zald, 1977; Tilly, 1978; Tarrow, 1994; Tilly and Tarrow, 2007), as well as on the links 
between micro and macro processes and the institutionalised contexts of mobilization 
(Diani and McAdam, 2003). These developments have led to a third approach known as 
the political process approach (Foweraker, 1995), which is the one applied in this thesis.  
 
Tilly (1978, 1985), Tarrow (1989, 1994), Diani and McAdam (2003) are key references 
within this approach. As stated before, the main objective of this perspective is to connect 
collective action to political processes more explicitly. By doing so, this approach 
maintains a State-centric and interest-oriented perspective; that is to say, the State is still 
the main political authority challenged by social movements. Therefore, power, inclusion 
and expansion of political society are the main areas of analytical focus of this 
perspective. McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow’s (McAdam et al., 2001; Tilly and Tarrow, 
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2007) work on contentious politics bring together three aspects: contention (making 
claims to another party), collective action (joint struggles) and politics (defined by 
interaction with State power). In relation to this last point, Tilly and Tarrow (2007) 
acknowledge that it is not a sine qua non condition of contentious politics; struggles may 
arise between non-governmental actors without government involvement. However, they 
argue that eventually these struggles will bring local or/and national governments into 
play. Taken together, these three dimensions compose what they call contentious politics.  
 Contentious politics involves interactions in which actors make claims bearing on 
 someone else’s interests, leading to coordinated efforts on behalf of shared interest or 
 programs, in which governments are involved as targets, initiators of claims, of third 
 parties. Contentious politics thus brings together three familiar features of social life: 
 contention, collective action and politics (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007: 4, italics in original). 
 
McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1988) work on mobilization networks. They define social 
movements as heterogeneous structures of networks, and their work represents an attempt 
to link micro and macro processes of mobilization, placing the focus on a meso-level of 
analysis. This in turn facilitates the examination of the relationship between structure and 
agency. The authors analyse how networks enable individual involvement and 
participation in social movement activities. Likewise, the interconnections established 
between organisations are analysed to identify how this dynamic shapes the orientations 
of social movements (Diani, 2003). Micromobilization contexts are formed both by 
networks of individuals52 (participating in the same social/collective activities), and by 
organisations of all kinds (e.g. churches and union brunches). These groups or ‘cell 
structures’ (McAdam et al., 1987) provide solidarity, as well as rudimentary bases for 
broader and complex processes of mobilization. This differentiation helps to overcome 
the individualistic analysis of the resource-mobilisation approach (especially Olson’s 
narrow understanding of the ‘free rider’ problem) because all individuals need to be 
considered as embedded in networks which work as preconditions for movement 
formation. 
 
An important point highlighted by this perspective is that networks not only facilitate the 
circulation of resources but also the circulation of meaning, which in turn helps to link 
what otherwise could be considered as independent or disconnected protest events.  
 Networks undoubtedly facilitate mechanisms like the mobilization of allocation of resources 
across an organisation field, the negotiation of agreed goals, the production and circulation 
                                                 
52 This may entail face-to-face interactions (participation in public/local community events), as well as 
participation in virtual social networks (see Oliver and Myers, 2002).  
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of information…at the same time, however, they also may – or may not – facilitate the 
circulation of meaning and mutual recognition. It is the definition of a shared identity which 
qualifies a movement network vis-à-vis a coalition network, and draws its boundaries (Diani, 
2003: 10).  
 
It is this circulation of meaning that enables movements to consolidate a shared identity 
establishing in turn their very boundaries (them/us, analysed in Chapter 4). This 
understanding of networks avoids a narrow instrumental analysis of what otherwise 
would be coalition alliances and brings culture back to the study of contentious politics. 
However, the boundaries set by a shared identity should not be thought of as permanent 
but flexible and unstable. In this sense, looking at network patterns facilitates the 
identification of those processes of segmentation within movements (as it is currently 
happening within the indigenous movement, analysed in Chapter 5), as well as processes 
of centralization (Diani, 2003). Likewise, it enables the identification of alliances 
(ephemeral, ad hoc or permanent) which groups and organisations establish in the cycle 
of contentious politics. Routledge (2003) explains that 
 …differential power relations exist within the functioning of the networks that are created. 
Particular actors are often dominant within networks, due to their control of key political, 
economic, technological resources…thus contradictions and tensions remain –either tied to 
the militant particularisms of particular movements or in the placing of specific actors within 
the network (Routledge, 2003: 337). 
 
In relation to the main critiques directed towards the political process approach, I want to 
highlight two that are of considerable relevance to the Latin American context. The first 
one is related to the approach’s main focus on ‘politics as usual’. While the identity-based 
approach provides a good analysis of disrupting politics and of unpredictable forms of 
collective action, it is limited in its ability to explain how movements function once 
consolidated. In the case of the political process approach, this limitation is inverted. 
Here, the stress is placed on ‘normal or routine politics’, an approach which hinders the 
analysis of new, violent and/or open struggles: 
Once it is assumed that ordinary people are able to pursue their goals through ‘normal politics’ 
the theory comes close to the idea of a generic social movement, always motivated by the same 
kind of grievance, always seeking a similar degree of change (Foweraker, 1995: 26).  
 
Limiting the analysis of contentious politics as only (or mainly) directed towards the State 
constitutes a significant flaw of the approach, especially considering how globalization 
processes have redefined power relations beyond the State in the last forty years. Authors 
such as Hellman (1995), Davis (1999), and Armstrong and Bernstein (2008) argue that 
political process theory offers a structural and therefore narrow approach, which primarily 
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focuses on one source of power, the State. These authors argue in favor of an alternative 
approach that can incorporate the analysis of multiple sources of power ‘as it manifests 
itself in the state, other institutions [as for instance, corporations], or culture’ (Armstrong 
and Bernstein, 2008: 76). In a similar vein, and in close relation to social movements in 
Latin America, Escobar (2010) puts forward the idea of a post-statist form of social power 
distribution. While this constitutes a good point, it is arguable that these critiques apply 
to all social movements in the Latin American context where the State still retains a 
prominent role and continues to be a significant interlocutor for social movements 
(Radcliffe, 2001; Yashar, 2007). Furthermore, the incorporation of the idea of Buen Vivir 
as a State policy framework in Ecuador can be thought as an attempt to strengthen State 
positionality vis-à-vis the challenges of indigenous movements.  
 
Thus, by analyzing Ecuadorian indigenous movements, the context of their emergence 
and their current political organization in the context of Buen Vivir as political project, I 
will argue that at the core of new social movements we can find four interconnected 
phenomena: (i) alliances established both with national and international actors and 
States; (ii) the support (material and ideological resources) received from them, (iii) 
framing processes (the strategic production of meaning and mobilization of ideas) and 
(iv) political opportunities (e.g. State decentralization, constitutional reforms) presented 
first by democratization processes, and second by the deep crisis of the neoliberal model. 
Furthermore, strategic networking plays a crucial role both in the consolidation and 
current political organization of locally originated movements at local, national and 
transnational levels (Andolina et al., 2005).  
 
In order to analyze the political process of Buen Vivir this thesis pays great attention 
to the dynamic interaction between social movements and State institutions. 
However, the political process approach neither provide further specifications of the 
State nor helps to understand the particularities of this institution in the Latin 
American context. Considering that demands of transformation in Latin America in 
the 21st century, including Ecuador, have predominately targeted the State after 
decades of social and political (anti-neoliberal) struggles, it is important to reflect on 
the main characteristics of the State in the Latin American context. In this sense, 
many analysts define contemporary transformations as the ‘return of the State’ 
(Ruckert and Macdonald, 2010; Castaneda, 2006), whilst others consider that the 
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State has always been central in the Latin American political, economic and social 
scene although the changes taking place in the last decade allow us to think of it as 
having a new role and responsibilities (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012, 2007; Almeida 
and Johnston, 2006; Keck and Neara, 2006). I agree with the latter. Even in neoliberal 
times, when the State lost its welfarist or social responsibility, it played an important 
political role in the implementation of neoliberal reforms. Nonetheless, in the 1980s 
and 1990s this was accompanied by theoretical debates more focused on the 
transition to democracy, governance and political stability. Little attention was paid 
to the transformations of the State taking place during dictatorships and democratic 
governments. The 21st century, however, has brought in Latin America and 
particularly in Ecuador since the inclusion of Buen Vivir in the national constitution, 
a renewed debate on the nature, role and responsibilities of the State. These are 
discussed in the following section. 
 
2.5 The State: conceptualisation, role, and responsibilities 
The decoloniality approach (discussed in Chapter 1) considers the State as the most 
important instrument of colonisation. The orthodox Marxist theory of State Monopoly 
Capitalism (Afansyev, 1974) conceives the State as an instrument of the reproduction of 
capitalism, a concentration of power only at the service of the elite’s interests. As will be 
explained in the next section, proposals arising from this understanding of the nature and 
role of the State are mainly related to withdrawal from institutions, the rejection of the 
State as a significant interlocutor and the proclaiming of local and autonomous forms of 
political, social and economic organisations. My point of departure is different and is 
mainly connected with the theoretical development put forward by Latin American 
Marxist authors such as Lechner (1980), Aricó (1981), Zavaleta (1990) and Thwaites Rey 
(2010, 2012). The definition of the State developed by these authors points to its 
contradictory nature as both a concentration of power and the result of the inscription of 
social struggles. This will be analysed in depth in the next section.  
 
Orthodox Marxist definitions of the State characterise it as the monolithic expression of 
the power of the ruling class, serving the reproduction of global capitalism (Afansyev, 
1974). This definition implies the rejection of the State as a political instrument and the 
obligation of dismantling it in order to reach a post-capitalist order. Contrary to these 
definitions I agree with Marxist authors such as Wright (2015, 2014), Thwaites Rey 
 82 
(2012, 2010) and Clarke (1991), who indeed recognise the State as the place for the 
reproduction of the capitalist order, but also as the place where social and political 
struggles materialize. In this sense, the State deploys its contradictory nature in two 
dimensions: 1) on the one hand, as a concentration of power but on the other, a privileged 
arena for first the unfolding of disagreements and struggles between dominant and 
subaltern forces, and second for the construction of hegemony and counter-hegemony; 
and 2) on the one hand, the recognition and inclusion of subaltern forces’ demands. With 
these (always partial) achievements, the State improves the living conditions of the 
demanding forces. On the other hand, these institutionalised achievements also make 
acceptable and legitimate the domination and reproduction of the capitalist order by the 
State.  
 
The contradictory nature of the State shows the complex relationship between State and 
capital dynamic. But this contradiction also expresses the impact on State institutions of 
the intense battles forged by subaltern groups for the improvement of living conditions. 
Therefore, the achievements obtained in these struggles cannot be conceived only as 
mere reproductions of capital and colonialism (as defined by the decoloniality approach). 
They can also serve to strengthen the position of those demanding, as well as to sharpen 
their confrontation with those in power. This dynamic, therefore, can impose limits on 
the reproduction of capitalist society and colonialism. Nevertheless, this depends on 
political struggle and the results of that struggle are not guaranteed but open to a process 
with ebbs and flows.  
 
The State is conceived here, therefore, as the inscription of struggles between forces, a 
specific way of processing and institutionalising social contradictions (Lechner, 1980; 
Aricó, 1981; Zavaleta, 1990; Thwaites Rey, 2010, 2012). Every State institution reveals 
the trace of the conflict that generated it. In this way, the process of transformation of the 
State has to be thought of in relation to social conflict; that is, in a relational and dynamic 
way. Using a Gramscian understanding of power as correlation of forces, it is argued here 
that power and the State are two inseparable categories. Whilst the former surpasses the 
limits of the latter, unfolding its effects in a wider social and political sphere, the State 
still represents a fundamental space for political articulation.  
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The State has, therefore, a relational nature. It is defined here as a set of relationships 
disputing and denoting the concentration of power (Poulantzas, 1991; Thwaites Rey, 
2012; Garcia Linera, 2010). Its relational nature explains institutional reforms as the 
effect of transformations at the social level; that is to say, institutional changes are the 
way the State processes transformations at the social level. Even in cases where socio-
political struggles do not have State transformation as a primary goal, this transformation 
is always the corollary of previous struggles.  
  
 2.5.1 The specificities of the State in Latin America 
Lechner (1980), Zavaleta (1990) and Aricó (1981) are Latin American Marxist authors 
who, notwithstanding the region’s heterogeneity, tried to articulate universal Marxist 
categories within local contexts in order to understand the specificity of the State in the 
region. In these works, the productive character of the State in Latin America, its 
foundational role in the configuration of Latin American societies, is emphasised. These 
authors explained that contrary to what happened in other parts of the world, the State in 
Latin America did not constitute itself as a superstructure product of the capitalist 
economic base. Both the market and the nation are produced by the State (Zavaleta, 
1990). The State is not formed as the result of class conflicts, the development of internal 
contradictions and the formation of a hegemonic bourgeoisie. It was formed with an 
assigned role dictated by a colonialist metropolis as part of the international division of 
work (Zermeño, 1981), which determined central and peripheral States. In this way the 
State became responsible for the promotion of capitalist development and the production 
of a collective identity. In terms of development, the economy was mainly based on 
agrarian activities. This marked a dependence on foreign capital and the ‘weaknesses’ of 
the economic structure of most countries of the region (Salama and Mathias, 1986).  
 
The State developed as the centre around which the idea of a nation was built. While in 
its origin this was tightly linked to the immediate benefit of dominant classes’ interests 
(structural conceptualisation), it was also linked to the opportunity to internalise the 
demands of subaltern sectors (instrumentalist conceptualisation). These two sides of the 
State are related to the debate about instrumentalist vs. structural conceptualisations of 
the State developed by Miliband and Poulantzas (Poulantzas, 1969, 1976; Miliband, 
1970, 1973). Zavaleta (1990) argues that in relation to this debate fixed positions should 
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be avoided. Both the instrumentalist and structural dimensions of the State should be 
better conceived as ‘moments’ in the history of the State in Latin America.  
 
It is the State in Latin America that gives society its unity and representation. Given the 
structural heterogeneity of the region, and the lack of a strong civil society, the State 
became crucial to achieving social cohesion (Lechner, 1981; Landi, 1981; Oszlak, 1997). 
This question is important as it points to the symbolic aspect of politics and the State in 
Latin America. Landi (1981) argues that the process of constituting political subjects 
goes through a dispute over meanings, which are settled to a great extent around the 
centrality of the State, giving unity to the heterogeneous. In this way, the State becomes 
the locus where political agents finally constitute themselves.  
 
The unity given by the State had a homogenizing effect. The ideas of ‘nation’ and 
‘citizenship’ forged by Latin American States have been built upon strong processes of 
exclusion and repression (such as imposing Spanish as official language; excluding and 
disowning ways of community organisation, local forms of authority, and collective 
decision-making processes), and by a great economic and political dependence on 
external forces. Torre Rivas explains that in this way “the State was not sovereign 
outwards and not national inwards” (Torre Rivas, 1981: 56. Spanish in the original, 
author’s translation). However, in antagonistic relationship with the State, subaltern 
groups (such as indigenous ones) also constructed their political identity as rightful 
representatives of the ‘nation’, making this in turn a disputed idea. In this way, the 
definition of citizenship was subjected to a dynamic of conflict and interaction between 
subaltern and dominant classes (Burbano de Lara, 2010).  
 
As mentioned before, this cluster of works on the State was published until the early 
1990s. With the transition to democracy, theoretical concerns were more focused on the 
democratic regime and the political stability required rather than continuing with debates 
mainly focused on the State. The 21st century and the beginning of a new cycle that many 
have named ‘post-neoliberalism’53, with new governments and leaders identifying with 
the left, have opened a new debate on the State in the region. This debate focuses on the 
                                                 
53 Margheritis and Pereira, 2007; Arditi, 2008; Roberts, 2008; Luna and Filgueira, 2009; Garcia Linera, 
2010; Philip and Panizza, 2011; Kennemore and Weeks, 2011; Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012; Ferrero, 
2014; Yates and Bakker, 2014.  
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limits and possibilities of radical transformations, and puts the State at the centre. This 
has led many authors to consider the relevance of the State in the definition of a new 
national strategy of development (Bresser-Pereira, 2007), and the design of a post-
neoliberal economic and social agenda.  
 
The cases of Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador are often taken as the most emblematic 
countries in Latin America to think postneoliberalism. The tension these governments 
pose to models of capitalism in the region, presenting a vision of emancipation, has 
mainly attracted positive analysis in their first years in power. They point to the 
transformation of the State in terms of a transition to socialism. The complexity, 
particularities, ambivalences and contradictions posed by these governments make 
apparent the necessity of thinking about the nature of that transition, if feasible: what has 
been done to start the transition and what remains to be done. Thwaites Rey and Ouviña 
(2012) defined the transition to socialism as  
 
 The substantive necessity for subaltern sectors to transform themselves in a counter-
 hegemonic political subject, inhabited by diversity and with real  capacity of self-government 
 (...) (page 53). 
 
 The establishment of a dialectic relation between everyday struggles forged by subaltern groups 
 and the final objective of complete transformation of capitalist society (...) strengthening partial 
 demands from a perspective of emancipation and counter-hegemony (2012: 73, Spanish in the 
 original, author’s translation). 
 
 
The tension these governments pose to models of capitalism in the region is linked to the 
typology proposed by Wright (2014, 2015) in relation to the logics of resistance to 
capitalism. This author elaborates four different logics of resistance according to the goal 
of anti-capitalist strategies, either transcending the structures of capitalism or neutralising 
its harms (Wright, 2014:4), and according to the target of these strategies at macro (State 
and other institutions) or micro level of the system (communities, organisations and 
individual activities). The result is the configuration of four logics of resistance to 
capitalism: taming capitalism (counteracting the worst harms via counteracting 
institutions and public policies); smashing capitalism (radical rupture with the system); 
escaping capitalism (creation of collective micro-alternatives avoiding political 
engagement); and eroding capitalism (organisation of democratic, egalitarian and 
participatory experiences within the cracks of the system). The typology put forward by 
Wright is taken in this thesis to explain the competing definitions of Buen Vivir and the 
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political projects mobilised from the top-down by the government following a State-
centred strategic logic of social democracy (State of Buen Vivir), and from the bottom-
up by the indigenous movement following a society-centred vision of insubordination 
(Social Movement of Buen Vivir). In the case of the government, the dominant logic of 
resistance is compatible to what Wright names as taming capitalism, pointing to the 
construction of counteracting institutions and public policies capable of significantly 
neutralising the harms produced by capitalism through regulation and redistribution 
(widespread poverty, unemployment, inequality, precariousness of labour forces, and 
environmental degradation). The one put forward by the indigenous movement is 
compatible with eroding capitalism, which points to emancipatory experiences based on 
more democratic, egalitarian, participatory relations in spaces and cracks within 
capitalism. The application of this typology to the study of the political process opened 
since the emergence of Buen Vivir in contemporary Ecuador allows me to avoid 
essentialist and static interpretations that reject any attempt of transformation by 
objecting that they reproduce the logic of capitalism and/or colonialism (for instance 
Gudynas, 2009, 2014).  
 
In Ecuador, the government of Rafael Correa first followed the idea of ‘21st Century 
Socialism’, used in the region mainly by Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, but later modified 
this to the ‘Socialism of Buen Vivir’. These ideas will be discussed in detail in Chapter 
4. They reflect the intention of these governments, as well as social movements, to put 
forward native post-capitalist alternatives. The competing definitions of Buen Vivir also 
show this intention. They are based in a combination of elements: centralised 
redistribution, market exchange, and communitarian reciprocity. However, as will be 
shown in Chapter 4, core elements of these definitions are vaguely defined and hold little 
relation with its actual implementation. In most cases, rhetoric conceals strategic 
rationality, which, in the case of Ecuador, gives place to accusations of betrayal, 
essentialism, childish activism, and so on.  
 
To facilitate the analysis of the State within the limits of the territory, as well as its 
position in global relations, Thwaites Rey and Ouviña (2012) propose differentiating 
between two levels: the first one relates to the State as territorially located and 
distinguishable from other nation-States, while at the same time being a specific node in 
networks linked to the global market. This level is related to the position of the State in 
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a regional and international network. The other level is related to the materiality of the 
State and the set of power relations shaping it within the territory; power relations that 
are not fixed and static but change according to social struggles. In this way, the State is 
not neutral but shapes, takes part and reproduces in itself social conflicts. This level is 
related to internal dynamics within a State’s territory and is the level in which this thesis 
focuses its analysis.  
 
In the first level, the power of manoeuvre of national States is affected by the laws and 
tendencies ruling the movement of capital at the global scale. In that way, multinational 
companies, financial networks and multilateral lending institutions interfere with and 
shape national economies and politics. Global markets determine the relevance of goods 
and services, and therefore, the productive function of national economies (main 
economic activities, its export capacity, indebtedness). A neoliberal understanding of this 
dynamic considers that States should facilitate this dynamic (Goodale and Postero, 
2013). That was the case during the 1990s when neoliberal policies attempted to adapt 
national structures to the logic of circulation of capital. For this reason, even from a 
critical perspective, analysts have posed globalisation as an unstoppable process and 
national States irrelevant as spaces of political construction. From this perspective, it is 
better to implement social and political strategies at the local level and away from the 
struggle for State power (Dinerstein, 2010; Holloway, 2005). However, as Radcliffe puts 
it ‘[t]hese analyses of transnational politics tend to reinforce a geography in which there 
are only either ‘global’ or ‘local’ actors’ (Radcliffe, 2001: 20; italics in the original). 
Conversely, authors such as Agnew and Stuart (1995), Anderson (1995), Smith and 
Guarnizo (1998), Yashar (1999, 2007), Radcliffe (2001), Arditi (2008), and Andolina et 
al. (2009) have restated the central importance of the State in shaping alternatives to 
neoliberal globalisation. Furthermore, processes of regional integration (Mercosur, Alba) 
have been driven by national States to reinforce their relative autonomy and decision-
making capacity, as well as to penetrate the global economy.  
 
The second level of analysis, the one taken in this thesis, refers to the State’s capacity to 
impose rules within its territory and on its population. It points to the exercise of 
domination by the State as well as the power struggle as correlation of forces within it; 
that is, the relation of social forces that the State both shapes and forms part of. This 
means that the State is not static but in constant metamorphosis. This level refers as well 
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to the relation (and tension) between the bureaucratic structure of the State and the 
government that represents it. Bureaucracy is a structural limit imposed on the actions of 
the government in order to ensure the reproduction of the system as such (Meier et al., 
2006; Clarke, 1991). However, that limit is not impenetrable and the government can 
affect the structures of the State with actions and policies in order to transform them. 
This possibility creates a dynamic between persistence and transformation of the ways 
to manage the common good. 
 
In this sense, the current debate on the State revises old dichotomies usually presented 
as alternative and mutually exclusive: violent or pacific takeover of power; reform or 
revolution; transformation ‘within’ capitalist society or creation ex novo after the 
conquest of power; institutional participation or anti-state antagonism. In the case of 
Ecuador, the particular relationship of indigenous movements vis-à-vis the State in the 
context of the rise of Buen Vivir has given place so far to a dichotomous position and 
reductive representations: either Buen Vivir represents the celebration of radical 
emancipation, or it represents the co-optation by the government and the State in order 
to maintain the status quo. In other words, either Buen Vivir is the vehicle for ‘indigenous 
peoples’ struggles against universal kind of oppressions, with a common agenda of 
autonomy’ (Postero and Zamosc, 2004: 3), or its political manipulation exposes the 
essential oppressive nature of the state (Basabe-Serrano 2009; Freidenberg, 2012). I do 
not see sufficient analytical depth or rigour in framing this problem as indigenous 
peoples versus or beyond the State, or resistance versus co-optation. This thesis argues 
that Buen Vivir is neither only politically co-optation nor only essentially liberating. On 
the contrary, it argues that it embodies an ambivalent meaning in which power relations 
between indigenous social movements and the State are put into practice in a way that is 
transforming the political process in Ecuador. The political process of Buen Vivir brings 
together social indigenous movements and the State, and this thesis focuses the analysis 
on the particular characteristics of this relationship in the Ecuadorian context. In the next 
section I discuss the dilemmas encompassed in this relationship.   
 
 2.5.2 The State and Social Movements: dilemmas of a necessary relationship 
Popular participation in the definition and management of collective matters is important 
in any dynamic of transformation (Becker, 2008). However, participation does not mean 
permanent mobilization and deliberation of the masses, or a direct and permanent 
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involvement on common issues (Jessop, 2008). The moments of greatest participation 
usually coincide with critical periods, when diverse demands come together precipitating 
popular involvement, as it was the case of the Constituent Assembly in Ecuador. After 
reaching its highest point, this process of participation starts to decline either because 
matters under discussion are (gradually or not) absorbed by State processes, or because 
the struggle is defeated. There is, therefore, a tension between participation and 
delegation, which becomes important for the management of common matters (Saint-
Upéry, 2004). In order to balance these two political actions, the existence of institutional 
arrangements and governmental functions that do not demean delegation as something 
that reinforces the subordination of majorities is central. For Garcia Linera (2013, 2010) 
this constitutes a challenge due to the intersection of two different logics. On the one 
hand, the State implies a concentration of decisions on the management of the public 
(monolithic power), whilst social movements put forward a practice of democratization 
of decisions and a continuous socialization of deliberations on common issues. This 
implies the intersection of vertical and horizontal dynamics.  
 
Popular participation of social movements in State institutions has been questioned 
mainly due to the danger of co-optation by the dominant sector of their leaders, political 
banners, demands and proposals (Lapegna, 2014). This assumption is based on the rigid 
division between the social and the political (the political conceived as the arrangement 
of State institutions, public policies and electoral competition). Co-optation can imply 
the loss of social movements capacity to mobilize, struggle and organise autonomously. 
Authors conceiving co-optation as an inevitable effect of a social movement’s 
participation in the State (Piven and Cloward, 1979; Zibechi, 2004; Hardt and Negri, 
2005; Holloway, 2010; Webber and Carr, 2013) advocate the political organisation of 
acting minorities, who refuse to become a majority and take government, beyond the 
State. In this way, these acting minorities oppose political power with the anti-power 
ethos of the social sphere. Hardt and Negri (2004), for instance, call these acting 
minorities ‘Multitude’, and argue that emancipation from the State comes with the 
exodus from all the places of power (Mouffe, 2013). “Radical politics is envisaged, 
according to this approach, in terms of a ‘withdrawal’ from existing institutions so as to 
foster the self-organisation of the Multitude” (Mouffe, 2013:71).  
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Conversely, a group of authors54 working on social movements in Latin America, and 
more specifically in Ecuador, argue that it is at the level of the State that movements 
wage their principal struggles. Moreover, it is argued here that total independence from 
the State does not guarantee but actually hinders the capacity of social movements to 
productively express their demands and disagreements if these are not, in some way, 
translated into State policies (Amenta, 2006; Trumpy, 2008). Ramirez (2014) argues that 
not taking the State as the main interlocutor usually reduces social movements’ demands 
and scope of action to a micro-arena, which can lead to the isolation of the movement.   
 
 2.5.3 Autonomy and self-determination 
Having said this, it is important to differentiate levels and mechanisms of autonomy. 
Whilst autonomy can be defined as the mechanism that allows legally recognised groups 
to exercise self-determination over matters relevant to the group, the State maintains its 
power over matters of common interest (Ghai, 2000; Wheatley, 2009; Kuppe, 2010). 
That is, autonomy does not necessarily mean separate government but a formal division 
of political authority within the State. The recognition of autonomy is an act of delegation 
of public functions from the State to the autonomous entity. Autonomous groups are 
predominately organised according to specific characteristics (cultural, linguistic, 
historic), and are settled in delimited areas. This marks a close relation between 
autonomy and territory. This vision of autonomy is particularly close to the one 
demanded by the indigenous movement (discussed in Chapter 4).  
 
Whilst there is no international universal right of autonomy nor a general standard 
definition, authors such as Hannikainen (1998) and Hannum and Lillich (1980) define 
the exercise of autonomy as the existence of legislative power mainly applied to local 
matters such as health, education, social welfare, local tax, local economy and trade, 
environmental protection, and the organisation and structure of local government; the 
existence of executive power in charge to apply laws and regional norms; a judicial 
power; and participation in decision-making processes at the national level.  
 
                                                 
54 Radcliffe, 2001; Gerlach, 2003; Otero, 2003; Postero and Zamosc, 2004; Andolina et al, 2005; 
Pallares, 2007; Clark and Becker, 2007; Lucero, 2008; Becker, 2011; Perreault and Valdivia, 2010.  
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The right to exercise free autonomy and self-determination has been a historical demand 
of indigenous peoples. In 2007, after more than 20 years of negotiation, the UN approved 
the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, recognising autonomy and self-
determination as human collective rights. The main objectives of the Declaration are: to 
overcome colonialist practices, protect cultural particularities (breaking with cultural 
homogeneity), to recognise indigenous institutions, and finally, to guarantee non-
discrimination towards indigenous peoples. The Declaration does not establish, however, 
the scope of responsibilities of autonomous regimes, arguing that this cannot be 
predetermined in a homogenous and definitive way (Gonzales et al., 2010). An 
indigenous autonomous regime should be adapted to the needs of indigenous peoples, 
the political context of the country and its judicial system.  
 
In the case of Ecuador, autonomy has been a historical demand of the indigenous 
movement and is included in their political project represented by Buen Vivir and the 
construction of a Plurinational State. CONAIE defines autonomy as including three 
dimensions: (i) the recognition of cultural diversity; (ii) a radical transformation of the 
State and its institutions, as well as national political, economic and cultural structures; 
and (iii) the recognition of indigenous governments and institutions (CONAIE, 2007, 
2012). Autonomy for Ecuadorian indigenous peoples means to rethink the State, its 
foundation and nature, whilst recognising the existence of nationalities within it. It does 
not imply the separation of these nationalities, but devolution of powers to their 
governments. The indigenous movement is not demanding complete independence from 
the State or refusing to participate in its institutions, but actually pointing to its 
transformation (Saint-Upéry, 2004; Ospina Peralta, 2010). In fact, the relationship 
between the movement and the State navigates between options that intersect at different 
points: opposing the power of the State, becoming the power of the State, creating relative 
autonomous spaces of power within the State (discussed in Chapter 5).  
 
In relation to the acknowledgment of Ecuador as a Plurinational country in the National 
Constitution of Montecristi, there were important disputes over the definition of 
‘Plurinational’. As explained before, the declaration of Ecuador as a Plurinational State 
has been the primary demand of the indigenous movement (Lupien, 2011; Jameson, 
2011). This demand was based on the assumption that a more inclusive political system 
implies the recognition of its Plurinational nature. Conversely, representatives of Alianza 
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Pais ‘wished to leave the term vaguely defined; essentially ensuring that it would remain 
on the level of rhetoric without any significant substance or concrete implications’ 
(Becker, 2011: 54). On the other hand, the increasing movement of indigenous peoples 
from rural to urban areas, with their consequent transformation from peasants to urban 
workers, makes it more difficult to define autonomy in a territorial sense.  
 
Therefore, relative autonomy from the State is needed in order to preserve social 
movements’ capacity to disagree, defend their interests and imagine new possibilities. 
However, autonomy does not dissolve the dilemmas of the struggle for State power, the 
institutionalisation of rules of social coexistence and public deliberation, the active 
participation on public matters, the equitable administration of resources, and citizens’ 
representation. The implementation and consolidation of transformative practices need, 
to some extent, the involvement of and collaboration with State institutions. In fact, even 
idealized experiences such as the ones of the Zapatistas in Mexico and the MST 
(Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra, the landless movement) in Brazil, 
which have been praised as successful autonomous practices,  reveal ambivalence in their 
relationship with the State (Ferrero, 2014; Saint-Upéry, 2004). This shows that social 
reality is much more complex than the division between institutional power vs. 
communitarian autonomy.  
 
It is argued here that State institutions are important in as much as they articulate the 
demands put forward by diverse collectives, converting particular demands into general 
policies (Arsel, 2012). To avoid the dangers of co-optation, the involvement of the State 
should bring together, on the one hand, officers who have the knowledge and capacity to 
manage public matters, and on the other hand, an active society that through social 
movements and organised groups not only defines demands and courses of action, but 
becomes engaged in their implementation. In any case, the question is to conquer and 
defend State institutions (a new law, a program, the creation of a specific public 
organism, for instance) that work in favour of popular interests, as well as to promote the 
existence of effective bodies of control and participation of popular forces. In order to 
move beyond the binary participation (equal co-optation) vs. autonomy, it is helpful to 
differentiate between, what Basso (1969) calls, ‘subaltern participation’ (the integration 
of popular sectors into the machinery of the capitalist State, losing, in turn, their 
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disruptive capacity), and ‘autonomous and antagonist participation’, which helps the 
social construction of the public sphere.  
 
The understanding of the State as relational and connected to social conflict allows me to 
connect political structure and collective action. In what follows, I explain the main 
categories used in this thesis to analyse the political process of Buen Vivir. These three 
categories become useful analytical tools to understand the organisation of contentious 
action, as well as the political process in contemporary Ecuador. They help to capture the 
dynamic of the political process of Buen Vivir that moves from a moment of articulation 
to a moment of fragmentation. In this process the role of the State changes. It goes from 
the domination of the neoliberal model to an attempt to construct a post-neoliberal order 
with the State attempting to subject markets to social results. The theoretical 
developments made by Lechner (1980), Aricó (1981), Zavaleta (1990), Thwaites Rey 
(2010, 2012) helps to capture how this change takes place. 
 
 2.6 Analytical Framework 
This analytical framework is based on the articulation of three distinctive but 
interconnected categories: (a)framing processes; (b) mobilizing structures, and (c) 
political opportunities (McAdam et al, 1996). In applying these three categories to the 
analysis of contentious politics in contemporary Ecuador, I change the names of these 
categories to (a) the Framing Process of Buen Vivir, (b) the Mobilising Structures of Buen 
Vivir, and (c) Mainstreaming Buen Vivir. There is a dynamic interaction linking the three 
components. They cast light on different levels of action:  mainstreaming Buen Vivir  
mainly focuses on institutionalised politics, and more specifically, actions of the State. 
Mobilising structures, as well as framing processes, emphasise the organisational 
dynamic of social movements at non-institutionalised levels. These three concepts 
become useful analytical tools to understand the organisation of contentious action, as 
well as the political process in contemporary Ecuador. They help to capture the dynamic 
of this process. My research pays close attention to the interrelation between structural 
components (State) and insubordination as I consider that this dynamic relationship is the 
key factor to explain processes of transformation and construction of alternatives to the 
neoliberal model of governance. 
 
a) Framing Processes: Framing Buen Vivir  
 94 
This category refers to the strategic production of meaning and mobilization of ideas. 
The focus in this study will be placed on three inter-related dimensions: (i) the “cultural 
tool kits” (Swidler, 1986) on which movements draw to shape strategies of action (here 
cultural tool kits are understood as resources used to define and resolve problems); (ii) 
the efforts made by the indigenous movement and the government to construct, negotiate 
and use both common understandings of the world and collective action frames (Benford 
and Snow, 2000); and (iii) frame contestation by the major parties involved in the 
political process: indigenous movements, the State, counter-movements (McAdam et al., 
1996: 19).  
 
Altmann (2015: 164) argues that ‘[t]here are few attempts to analyse discursive practices 
of social movements’. The most prominent is the approach of framing. The closer 
attention paid to the formation of meaning and contestation opened by the emergence of 
Buen Vivir makes Framing Processes a key analytical tool in grasping the process of 
contestation around this idea. In response to the critiques of the political process mainly 
related to the neglect of cultural factors in the organisation of collective action, authors 
such as Swidler (1986), Schon and Rein (1994), Zald (1996), Gamson and Meyer (1996), 
Triandafyllidou and Fotiou (1998), Benford and Snow (2000), Poletta and Jasper (2001), 
and Johnston (2002) started working on the concept of collective action frames. Their 
purpose was to go beyond the dichotomy between the prominence of either expressive 
(identity) or instrumental (interest) actions; i.e., between cultural practices on the one 
hand and political structure on the other. Conversely, the analytical purpose here is to 
identify the relationships (not opposition) between ‘interest and identity, strategy and 
identity, and politics and identity…circumstances that include cultural processes as well 
as structural ones’ (Poletta and Jasper, 2001: 285). This linkage between strategy and 
identity refers to the process of rationalisation of Buen Vivir (analysed in Chapter 4). 
Swidler (1986) understands culture as a ‘tool kit’ from which actors draw to shape 
strategies of action. In that sense, framing actions are defined as ‘the generation, 
diffusion, and functionality of mobilising and counter-mobilising ideas and meanings… 
[it] denotes an active, processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the 
level of reality construction’ (Benford and Snow, 2000: 612-614). The deployment of 
ideas, meanings and identities becomes, therefore, a political strategy.  
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Actors do not simply reflect, transport, or become determined by political and social 
realities, but are actually active agents in their construction and interpretation. These 
processes are thought of as politically strategic and, therefore, as subject to negotiation, 
contestation and modification (Matthes, 2011). Entman (1993: 53) explains that framing 
processes are about ‘selection and highlighting, and use of the highlighted elements to 
construct an argument about problems and their causation, evaluation, and/or solution’. 
The framing struggle deployed around the idea of Buen Vivir can be thought of as a 
struggle over meaning and the imposition of a dominant interpretation. Therefore, the 
objective is to identify which elements are highlighted and put at the centre of frames by 
each of the political forces in order to draw political boundaries, which can separate and 
determine us and them between political actors (Chapter 4).   
 
Benford and Snow (2000) offer a detailed description of the tasks collective actors 
perform to frame action. The main one is diagnostic framing, which refers to problem 
identification, characterisation and interpretation. In doing so, responsible, culpable and 
‘saviour’ agents are identified, as well as the source of the problem. Collective actors 
might identify themselves as victims of injustice and therefore, use an ‘injustice frame’ 
around which to organise their actions (Gamson, 1992; Klandermans et al., 1999). It was 
shown in Chapter 1 how collective actors, more specifically, indigenous movements, in 
Ecuador have used different frames throughout time, referring to how problems were 
interpreted: ‘land frame’, ‘plurinationality frame’, and the ‘Buen Vivir frame’. It is in 
relation to the latter that this study places its focus. Arguably, for the first time in 
Ecuadorian history, the same idea (Buen Vivir) has become both a frame for collective 
action as well as an institutional frame. I argue that the coexistence of these two frames, 
differently interpreted and contested by different parties, is at the core of the political 
process in contemporary Ecuador. I will come back to this in detail in Chapter 4.  
 
These framing tasks are usually performed via discursive, strategic and contested 
processes (Johnson, 1995; Steinberg, 1998; Benford and Snow, 2000). The discursive 
processes are related to speech acts (meetings, conferences, congresses, workshops, and 
so on) where frames are articulated and negotiated. The strategic processes refer to the 
objectives pursued by the articulation of a frame: ‘to recruit new members, to mobilize 
adherents, to acquire resources’ (Benford and Snow, 2000: 624). Finally, contested 
processes refer to the ‘politics of signification’, the meaning contestation intra-movement, 
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inter-movement, between the movement and the media, between the movement and 
opponents, and so on. 
 
The theoretical advances made on framing analysis have provided useful analytical tools 
that in turn bridge the instrumental rationality of the political process approach with the 
expressive logic underpinning identity-oriented theory on social movements (Poletta and 
Jasper, 2001). This is the main reason of its use in the analysis of the strategic definitions 
of Buen Vivir in contemporary Ecuador. However, as it is shown in Chapter 4, there is a 
risk of overestimating framing as a unified and consensual process, which is rarely the 
case within social movements. 
 
In relation to its application in the Latin American context, I agree with Altmann 
(2015:165-166) in that  
 [a]n approach to the study of social movements discourses in the Global South is yet to be 
 constructed, and similarly the general theoretization of social movements of the Global 
 South is heavily flawed. The most important social theorists openly declare that their work 
 is built upon the European and North-American experience and is therefore by definition 
 Eurocentric (...) social movements and their political and discursive strategies in the Global 
 South differ considerably from the situation of the Global North, especially in terms of the 
 divide between state and civil society, rurality and urbanity and the structure of social class 
 and ethnicity [I addressed this in Chapter 2] (...) however, its focus on organizational 
 aspects within social movements is relatively easily adaptable to other contexts.  
 
 
 b) Mobilizing Structures of Buen Vivir 
This category relates to the organisational dynamics of contentious action. It defines the 
ways in which formal and informal ties between people can serve as solidarity and 
communication facilitating mobilisation. Included in this category are the mobilisation 
of resources by participants (both formally and informallyr the structuring of networks 
as well as the formation of alliances (ephemeral, ad hoc or permanent) (Diani and 
McAdam, 2003), claim-making repertoires, and leadership structure. In the distinction 
between formal and informal forms of organisation I follow Tilly and Tarrow’s (2007) 
differentiation between social movements and social movement bases. These authors 
defined social movements as ‘a sustained campaign of claim making, using repeated 
performances that advertise the claim, based on organisations, networks, traditions, and 
solidarities that sustain these activities’, which form the bases of social movements (Tilly 
and Tarrow, 2007:8). Social movement bases refer, therefore, to the social background, 
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organisational resources, and cultural frameworks of contention and collective action. 
This thesis pays attention to both forms of organisation.  
 
Resources for social mobilisation include ideas, time, money, means of communication, 
transportation, alliances with actors which in turn can bring more resources to the 
movement. Claim-making repertoires refer to the learned and repeated character of 
people’s interactions when making collective claims (for example, strikes, lockouts, 
demonstrations). This means that innovations tend to occur in the margins. Most times, 
collectives’ claim-making interactions are drawn from a learned set already established 
for their place and time. The repertoires deployed are highly influenced, in turn, by the 
resources available to the organisation. 
 
In relation to the leadership structure, Morris and Staggenborg (2008: 171) define it as 
formed by ‘strategic decision-makers who inspire and organise others to participate in 
collective actions’. At the same time, leaders are also responsible to link the movement 
to the larger society and institutionalised politics. To understand the ways by which 
leaders gain legitimacy and authority, many researchers (Platt and Lilley, 1994; Melucci, 
1996) draw on Weber’s (1968) definition of different types of leadership -bureaucratic, 
traditional and specifically on his definition of charismatic leadership. In relation to the 
latter, Weber emphasises the emotional character of the collective as well as the 
interactional nature of this type of leadership in the sense that members play an important 
role attributing charisma to leaders. In this way, the extraordinary characteristics 
perceived on the leader work as inspiration to members. However, this relational aspect 
of Weber’s definition of charismatic leaders have been generally neglected as Weber’s 
category is commonly used to refer to a personality type dispossessing members of 
agency as they are viewed as giving themselves up to the charismatic leader (Morris and 
Staggenborg, 2008). In Chapter 5, I analyse the organisational structure of both the 
indigenous movement represented by CONAIE and the government of Rafael Correa. In 
relation to leadership, I use Weber’s charismatic type to emphasise the necessity of a 
positive articulation between organisation and leadership. A charismatic leadership 
proves to be of paramount important to articulate and represent members’ demands in a 
coherent political project. A strong organisational structure, in turn, is crucial to 
consolidate that political project. The particularities of the Ecuadorian case allow me to 
understand what happens when these two dimensions become disarticulated.  
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While references to macro (regional and international) organisational processes will be 
permanently incorporated into the study, as well as micro processes at a community level 
(grassroots organisations), the main focus will be on the meso organisational dynamic. 
This means looking at the organisational structure of Ecuadorian indigenous movements; 
more specifically, indigenous movements’ confederation, CONAIE – an umbrella 
organisation formed by coalitions/networks with organisations which pursue common 
objectives, and their relation to the State.  
 
c) Political Opportunities: Mainstreaming Buen Vivir  
This factor has been worked on mainly by ‘political process’ scholars (Tilly, 1978; 
McAdams, 1982; Tarrow, 1994, 1996). It principally refers to the links between 
institutionalised politics and social movements; in other words, the possibilities and 
constraints imposed by broader political structures on social movements. McAdam 
(1996), for instance, lists dimensions that can be considered political opportunities:  
[t]he openness or closure of the institutionalized political system…The stability or 
instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity…The 
presence or absence of elite allies…The state’s capacity and propensity for repression 
(McAdam, 1996: 27).  
 
The political context in which actors are embedded becomes, therefore, a key factor in 
explaining their emergence and development. The emergence of collective action can be 
explained by opportunities and constraints opened by and in the political structure, which 
in turn are often responses to changes taking place elsewhere. Examples of this changes 
on the political structure are the capacity of the State and propensity for repression, and 
unstable alignments - the changing fortunes of government and opposition parties, 
especially when signalling the possibility of new coalitions emerging (Tarrow, 1996: 55).  
 
However, this does not mean that the evolution of collective action will continue to be 
determined by the political structure in which has emerged. On the contrary, once a social 
movement consolidates, its actions impact and transform institutionalised politics. One 
of the main characteristics of the political opportunity structure is, according to Tilly and 
Tarrow (2007), its instability which makes it prone to change.  
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Tilly (1978, 1985) distinguishes defensive and reactive actions. In the case of defensive 
actions, political opportunities are not so much the outcome of collective action as of 
structural processes and political structures, which are relatively independent of 
collective action. Conversely, once a movement has emerged and consolidated its 
organisation, new opportunities and constraints for the movement result from the 
dynamic interaction between movements and political structures (McAdam et al., 1996). 
In this case, social movements have gained the power to change and shape their political 
context. In the phase of movement emergence, opportunities are there to be seized by 
social movements; in the phase of movement development and maturity, opportunities 
are actively (though not only) made by collective actors. This study will focus primarily 
on agents’ offensive actions (Tilly, 1985). Particularly, it researches the strengths and 
weaknesses of Ecuadorian indigenous movements to both shape and be shaped by 
institutionalised politics. In this sense, the thesis remarks the relational nature of the 
political opportunity structure (Figure 2). 
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à-vis other social and economic institutions and continually remake the state itself’ 
(emphasis added). Tilly and Tarrow (2007) considers that it is the involvement of the 
State what defines contentious actions as political. Tarrow (1996: 61) explains that 
‘[m]ovements arise as the result of new or expanded opportunities; they signal the 
vulnerability of the state to collective action, thereby opening up opportunities to others; 
the process lead to state responses which, in one way or another, produce a new 
opportunity structure’. I argue in favour of a conceptualisation of the State as relational 
and as a platform where social conflicts are inscribed and processed by State machinery, 
which in turn is transformed by the process (Lechner, 1980; Aricó, 1981; Zavaleta, 1990; 
Thwaites Rey, 2010, 2012). This understanding goes in line with the definition given by 
Tilly and Tarrow (2004) of the political opportunity structure. The political process of 
Buen Vivir that moves from a moment of articulation to a moment of fragmentation. In 
this process the role of the State changes. It goes from the domination of the neoliberal 
model to an attempt to construct a post-neoliberal order with the State attempting to 
subject markets to social results. 
 
 2.7 Final Remarks 
In this chapter I have critically reviewed the most salient debates on social movements 
vis-à-vis the State. I depart from the idea of the centrality of this relationship to 
considering the political process that has opened up since the emergence of Buen Vivir. 
In analysing the particularities of social movements in the context of Latin America I 
have shown the uncritical reception of the so-called identity-based approach, as well as 
the significant differences marked by the Latin American context that make this particular 
approach unsuitable to explain the current situation of the indigenous movement in 
Ecuador. I particularly argued in favour of the (selective and pragmatic) application of 
the approach developed by Tilly and Tarrow called political process, which brings 
together social movements and the State.  
 
I explained the main categories used here as analytical framework. There is a dynamic 
interaction linking the three components. They cast light on different levels of action:  
mainstreaming Buen Vivir mainly focuses on institutionalised politics, and more 
specifically, actions of the State. Mobilising structures, as well as framing processes, 
emphasise the organisational dynamic of social movements at non-institutionalised 
levels. Within framing Buen Vivir, the objects of analysis are three: the production of 
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meaning, the strategic differentiation between forces and the positioning reached as a 
resul of that differentiation. In relation to the mobilising structure of Buen Vivir, the main 
concepts used are leadership structure, repertoire of action, and alliances. Offensive 
actions, particularly institutional reforms, are analysed in relation to mainstreaming Buen 
Vivir.   
 
These three categories become useful analytical tools to understand the organisation of 
contentious action, as well as the political process in contemporary Ecuador. They help 
to capture the dynamic of the political process of Buen Vivir that moves from a moment 
of articulation to a moment of fragmentation. In this process the role of the State changes. 
It goes from the domination of the neoliberal model to an attempt to construct a post-
neoliberal order with the State attempting to subject markets to social results. The 
theoretical developments made by Lechner (1980), Aricó (1981), Zavaleta (1990), 
Thwaites Rey (2010, 2012) helps to capture how this change takes place. I argued in 
favour of a conceptualisation of the State as relational and as a platform where social 
conflicts are inscribed and processed by State machinery, which in turn is transformed by 
the process. This understanding goes in line with the definition given by Tilly and Tarrow 
(2004) of the political opportunity structure discussed in this chapter. In this way, I 
propose going beyond dichotomous thinking in the relationship between insubordination 
vis-à-vis structure (co-optation vs. emancipation; institutional power vs. communitarian 
autonomy; and so on) in order to capture the ambiguities and complexities of the 
relational processes of social transformation.These are the main conceptual lines 
underpinning the rationale of the thesis. In the following chapter I address the 
methodological features of this research: the main questions guiding it, its aims, my 













“...there is a girl at the door...she is a foreigner” 
CONAIE’s doorman, Quito 




So far, I have explored the historical context that explains the rise of Buen Vivir to 
politics. In doing so, the main organisational, political and cultural features of two agents, 
the indigenous movement and the government of Rafael Correa, were outlined in order 
to show the importance of linking discourses with the practices, agency and materialities 
of those who mobilise them. I then discussed my main conceptual perspective on the 
relationship between structure (State) and social movements (insubordination). In the 
upcoming chapters the findings of empirical research will be presented, showing that the 
struggle over the meaning and implementation of Buen Vivir is political and moves from 
a first moment of political articulation to a second moment of political differentiation, 
fragmentation and concentration of power that redefines political boundaries in a process 
of renewal of political settlements.   
 
The main objective of this chapter is to discuss the key methodological issues arising 
from the research approach taken in this study. I follow a qualitative research design and 
draw on case study analysis as my primary methodological strategy. Researching 
indigenous matters raises important questions that are also addressed here, mainly 
connected to my position as a researcher, co-participation in the process and the ultimate 
objective of the research. The contribution of this chapter is to make explicit how the 
epistemological concerns regarding the political agency of constituencies in 
contemporary Ecuador, as well as my position as a researcher, have shaped the methods 
I chose (in depth interviewing, document analysis and mass media analysis).  
  
The structure of the chapter is divided into two main parts: in the first one I explain the 
decisions made regarding the design of the qualitative research approach. The second 
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part deals with my situation as a ‘foreigner’ and the implications this had during the 
research period. I then elaborate on the researcher’s position vis-à-vis indigenous matters.  
 
3.1 Qualitative Research Approach: Case Study Design 
Social science’s scientific inquiry has been built up on a dichotomous contrast between 
two clusters of study, divided in turn into five levels of analysis: ontology, epistemology, 
approaches, methodology, and methods (Marsh and Stoker, 1995; Bryman, 2008; 
Keating and della Porta, 2010). Each cluster of study frames paradigmatically different 
world views. One of them is usually represented by the quantitative research strategy, 
whereas its ‘opposite’ is associated with qualitative research strategy. This division 
distributes to one side of the table objectivism as ontology, positivism as epistemology, 
and variable-oriented research (quantitative research). On the other side we find 
constructivism as ontology, interpretivism as epistemology, and case-oriented research 
(qualitative research). The aim of the quantitative approach is usually defined as the 
search for generalisable knowledge (inductive construction of theories) whereas 
qualitative research points to thick description of specific-case (hypothetico-deductive 
approach) (Keating and della Porta, 2010: 114). While this division is not necessarily 
consistent, and many authors have argued in favour of a pluralistic view in research 
(mixed strategic research), the dichotomy between quantitative and qualitative is still 
pervasive in the design of research strategies (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011).  
 
In this study, I follow a qualitative research design and draw on case study analysis as 
my primary methodological strategy. The rationale underpinning this choice is 
ontological and epistemological. On the one hand, I consider the political process opened 
since the emergence of Buen Vivir as socially constructed. This implies that in order to 
acquire knowledge about it the analysis needs to be mainly focused on processes and 
meanings, or in other words, with the meaningful interpretations of reality given by 
participants (Pascale, 2011) and therefore, not focused on the measurement and/or 
analysis of correlations  between variables (for which a quantitative approach would be 
suitable). On the other hand, the configuration of case studies allows me the exploration 
of different but interconnected factors at stake in a given time and place. The 
configuration of a case study is guided by the interrelation and mutual constitution of 
theoretical concepts and empirical references (Ragin, 1994).  
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‘At a minimum, every study is a case study because it is an analysis of social phenomena 
specific to time and place’ (Ragin, 1992: 2). Ragin is referring to the various usages and 
meanings the term ‘case’ has acquired within social science inquiry. Notwithstanding 
this diversity, the common understanding of the term is associated, first, with a set of 
boundaries around place and time periods, and second, with qualitative research 
strategies (Bryman, 2008). In this sense, the term ‘case’ is usually opposed to the term 
‘variable’, and therefore mirrors the traditional dichotomy between (a) in depth, 
intensive, small-N, qualitative research strategies that stress the complexity as well as the 
particularity of social phenomena (Ragin, 2000; Harvey, 2009); and (b) large-N, 
extensive, quantitative research strategies that stress the variation of social phenomena, 
seeking in turn the formulation of general laws on the matter. Several scholars have 
argued against such a dichotomy (Ragin, 1987, 1992, 2000; Becker, 1996; Harvey, 2009; 
Keating and della Porta, 2010), showing the complementary relationship between the two 
approaches.  
[the] two styles of work do place differing emphasis on the understanding of specific 
historical or ethnographic cases as opposed to general laws of social interaction. But the 
two styles also imply one another. Every analysis of a case rests, explicitly or implicitly, 
on some general laws, and every general law supposes that the investigation of particular 
cases would show that law at work (Becker, 1996: 53-54).  
However, the dichotomy persists mainly between the in-depth study of a multiplicity of 
aspects in a small number of cases (case-oriented research), and research of relatively 
few variables but on many cases (variable-oriented research) (Ragin, 2000; Bates, 2007; 
Pascale, 2011).   
 
This study mainly rests on the construction of small-N case studies within contemporary 
Ecuador. In other words, it principally follows a configurational logic, i.e., the focus is 
placed on how different factors in the case particularly interconnect in a ‘concrete 
situation delineated in terms of time and space’ forming a total picture or representation 
(Carmel, 1999: 142). Ragin explains that it is by following this logic that ‘…the 
researcher crafts an explanation embedded in his or her representation of the case that 
satisfies as many theoretical implications as possible in a coherent manner’ (Ragin, 2000: 
69).  
 
As mentioned above, the configuration of a case study is guided by the interrelation and 
mutual constitution of theoretical concepts and empirical references. In this study, the 
configuration of case studies is mainly based on the articulation of three distinctive but 
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interconnected categories: framing Buen Vivir, mobilising structures of Buen Vivir and 
mainstreaming Buen Vivir (Figure 3). This analytical framework emphasises the dynamic 
interaction linking the three components. I have explained the theoretical meaning and 
relevance of this analytical perspective in Chapter 2. Empirically, these categories are 
used in this thesis to shade light on particular objects of analysis.  
 
In the case of Framing Buen Vivir, I specifically analyse the meaning of the different 
definitions of Buen Vivir produced by different political groups by exploring the 
particular focus and distinction of these definitions. I also analyse the strategic production 
of differentiations which points to the positioning of the different political groups 
(indigenous movement and the government) in the political process opened since the 
emergence of Buen Vivir.  In the case of the Mobilising Structures of Buen Vivir, I 
particularly pay attention to two aspects. The first one is leadership pointing to the 
political importance of this asset and its consequences for the imposition of a particular 
understanding of Buen Vivir. The second aspect is related to the construction of strategic 
alliances and how they affect the political objectives of these groups. Finally, 
Mainstreaming Buen Vivir points to the expression of the dynamic interaction between 
the indigenous movement and the State on the structure of the State. I primarily analyse 
two main factors that have helped the government’s definition of Buen Vivir to become 
dominant. The first one is related to welfare provision and how it has affected both the 
organisational structure of the State and the demands put forward by the indigenous 
movement. The second one is related to the management of strategic natural resources 





















This thesis is temporally focused on the transition from neoliberalism to the construction 
of a post-neoliberal order in Ecuador, focusing particularly in the period extending from 
2005 to 2015. In relation to place, I chose Ecuador as the country to interrogate the 
relationship between the State and social movements. My original research proposal was 
actually based on the comparison between two countries, Ecuador and Bolivia. The 
selection of these countries was mainly based on the fact that they are the only two 
countries that included the idea of Buen Vivir (in the case of Bolivia is Vivir Bien) in their 
national constitutions, Ecuador in 2008 and Bolivia in 2009. In both countries this 
inclusion was the result of the confluence of two interrelated process: the cumulative 
struggles of organised indigenous social movements and the emergence of new political 
leaders (Rafael Correa in Ecuador and Evo Morales in Bolivia) implementing public 
policies through State institutions. Since then, both countries have shown power struggles 
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However, within the first year of my PhD I decided to drop the Bolivian case and continue 
studying the case of Ecuador. I based this decision on one main theoretical concern 
related to the design of a comparative approach that would have forced me to pay less 
attention to the specific context and more to the ways in which the cases can be contrasted 
(Bryman, 2008: 61). This implied in turn that from the start I would have had to adopt a 
clear and structured focus instead of a more open-ended one in order to establish the 
comparison between both countries. I decided that by choosing one country I would gain 
a more accurate and deep contextual understanding of the political process of Buen Vivir.  
Between Bolivia and Ecuador, I chose the latter mainly due to the reputation held by its 
indigenous movement and, more specifically, by the CONAIE. Expert analysts on 
indigenous social movements in Latin America such as Andolina, Laurie and Radcliffe 
(2009), Postero (2010), Becker (2008), Lucero (2006) and Van Cott (2005) agreed in 
considering the indigenous movement in Ecuador as the most highly organised political 
and social movement in Latin America and CONAIE as the most salient indigenous 
organisation.  
 
Regarding the empirical focus, I concentrate on the relationship between the leading 
indigenous confederation in Ecuador, CONAIE including its member organisations: 
ECUARUNARI (Highlands), CONFENIAE (Amazon) and CONAICE (Coast), and the 
government of Rafael Correa. The CONAIE has a national reach, integrating federations 
and grassroots organisations from the highlands, coast and Amazon areas. There are other 
two important indigenous confederations in Ecuador, FEINE and FENOCIN. These three 
confederations stress different aspects of indigenous struggles. CONAIE emphasises the 
struggle of Ecuadorian nacionalidades and pueblos. FENOCIN emphasises the struggle 
of indigenous-peasant and black people. And finally, FEINE emphasises the struggle of 
evangelic indigenous peoples in Ecuador. I decided to focus my analysis on CONAIE 
due to the important role played in the indigenous struggle particularly during the 1990s, 
because its leaders have occupied roles in State institutions and have actively participated 
in the process of writing the national Constitution, and because it currently stands in clear 






 3.2 Methods and conduct of empirical research 
The methods used in this thesis are three: in depth interviewing, document analysis and 
mass media analysis. The selection of these methods was decided primarily according to 
what I was trying to find out (Table 3). First, this thesis is mainly concerned with 
providing understanding of how an idea is disputed and contested in order to  influence 
power  between two main agents: the indigenous movement and the government. It, 
therefore, pays particularly attention to the actual definitions and experiences of the 
agents involved: how actors give meaning to the idea of Buen Vivir, its rise to politics, 
their objectives and strategies to impose one definition, and the expression of Buen Vivir 
at institutional level. Hence, in-depth interviewing became crucial to obtain first-hand 
data and became the main source of data collection. Second, Buen Vivir has been included 
in legal documents such as the national constitution and two national development plans. 
It also works as guiding principle of important laws such as the Water Law and the Land 
law which have been object of debate between the government and the indigenous 
movement. Extensive document analysis on material produced by the organisations 
themselves as well as the one deriving from the State became important to identify how 
the documents refer to the idea of Buen Vivir. Finally, content analysis on mass-media 
outputs was carried out. The dynamic opened since the emergence of Rafael Correa as 
political leader and the articulation/fragmentation with the indigenous movement has 
been well documented on the mass media. The media has not been neutral in its reflection 
of this dynamic providing in turn additional material to understand the interests at stake 
in the political process. 
 
Discourse analysis has been carried out in this thesis focusing on the role of discourse 
within contentious politics, that is, reconstructing participants’ representations and 
meaning given to the process of making claims to another party, principally the State. 
This work has been primarily done by codifying qualitative data, that is, identifying main 
subjects and themes that have central position in discourses and represent participants’ 
key demands. Taking a more open ended rather than a mechanistic approach to discourse 
analysis, the work done has enabled me to identify the articulation of already existing 
demands and the introduction of new ones; the diffusion of political discourses; and the 
relation of a given discourse with competing ones. In this way, and following Altmann’s 
(2015: 162) work on political discourse analysis, the focus is placed on ‘power effects in 
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a conflict-ridden network of social actors, institutional dispositifs, and knowledge 
stocks’.  
 
Table 3: Analytical Perspective and Methods 
 
 
Whilst in Quito interviewing (total number: 40 interviews, see Appendix) was conducted 
with the elites within each sector: the indigenous movement and the government. I carried 
out in-depth, semi-structured interviews with representatives of the most important 
indigenous movement’s confederation (CONAIE: Ecuarunari, Confeniae, Conaice). I 
also conducted interviews with governmental officials, representatives of political 
movements, environmental organisations and academics. For my study, I selected a 
number of governmental organisations that are either directly connected with indigenous 
peoples, such as the Council for the Development of the Nationalities and Peoples of 
Ecuador (CODENPE), or are involved in the articulation and implementation of Buen 
Vivir policies such as SENPLADES, the Ministry of Environment, and the National 
Secretariat of Policy Management (Secretaria Nacional de Gestión de la Política).   
 
Focus of Analysis 
 
Object of Analysis 
 
Methods 
Framing Buen Vivir 
 Meaning: focus and 
distinction 
 Strategic differentiation  
 Positioning  
* In-depth interviews 
* Document Analysis 
* Content Analysis of mass-
media outputs 
Mobilising Structures  
of Buen Vivir 
 Political Leadership 
 Strategic Alliances 
* In-depth interviews 
* Document Analysis 
* Content Analysis of mass-
media outputs 
Mainstreaming Buen Vivir 
 Closure of political access 
Welfare Provision  
* Document Analysis 
* Content Analysis of mass-
media outputs 
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In the beginning of the organisation of fieldwork, sampling followed a purposive form. 
Cases and participants were chosen in a strategic way because they were relevant to the 
research questions guiding this thesis (Bryman, 2008). The elite of indigenous leaders of 
CONAIE, for example, were selected because of their important role within the 
indigenous movement as political strategists. However, once I arrived in Quito sampling 
followed an opportunistic approach, more specifically, I used the snowball form. Whilst 
following purposive sampling, some of the people I planned to interview either directly 
deny or cancel interviews. This is the case, for example of governmental officials 
working at the Secretariat of Buen Vivir. I contacted the head of communication of this 
secretariat who asked me to specify the objectives of interviews and the purpose of my 
work. I received later an email refusing meetings with the secreatriat staff arguing my 
work was ‘too political’ and, therefore, not connected to the ‘social goals’ of this 
secretariat. After an exchange of emails and even presenting myself in the building of the 
secretariat to press for an interview, I did not receive positive responses. Neither I could 
interview some environmentalist activists connected to indigenous peoples from the 
Amazonia, who rejected interviews because ‘already too many researchers have used 
them in the past’ for interviews without engaging with their struggle. In relation to this 
particular issue, I discuss my position as researcher in the following section.  
 
Notwithstanding these difficulties when trying to contact participants, whilst I was in 
Quito interviewees proposed and provided new contacts that resulted in meaningful, but 
not planned beforehand, interviews. This is the main reason I changed from a purposive 
to a more opportunistic form of achieving participation in interviews. This approach 
proved to be effective whilst doing fieldwork because it provided me with new 
opportunities not foreseen whilst organising the trip to Ecuador.  
 
Before travelling to Ecuador, I attended meetings organised in London by the Ecuadorian 
Embassy in the UK. I developed communications with key contacts during these 
meetings, which were helpful in providing me with contacts in Ecuador. These meetings 
were: ‘Ecuador’s Citizens’ Revolution’, University College London - Institute of the 
Americas (3rd December 2012); ‘Celebrating Ecuador’s Citizens’ Revolution’ (12th 
February 2013); ‘2013 Ecuador Elections Analysis, Canning House Meetings’ (25th 
February 2013); ‘Ecuador’s New Economic Vision: growth, redistribution and 
sustainability’, University College London (12th March 2013).  
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Whilst in Quito, I attended several events which allowed me to engage in informal 
conversations with the participants as well as coordinate interviews: Historia del 
Pensamiento Político Ecuatoriano (Casa de la Cultura Ecuatoriana); Parlamento de los 
Pueblos Andinos (Universidad Central del Ecuador); Acto creación de Frente 
Progresista Revolución Ciudadana (sede Quito Alianza Pais); Seminario Internacional 
y Foro Público: ¿Por qué es hora de hablar de Petróleo y Capitalismo en Ecuador? 
(Escuela Politécnica Nacional); Tribunal Ético Yasuni (Yasunidos – Centro de Arte 
Contemporáneo).    
 
In this study, the analysis of official documents deriving from the State was mainly 
focused on official reports published by governmental organisations, such as both 
national development plans (2009-2013 and 2013-2017). Important laws (such as the 
Mining Law, the Hydrocarbons Law and the Water Law) were also analysed. 
Governmental plans presented during the national elections in 2013 by Alianza Pais (‘35 
Proposals for the Socialism of Buen Vivir’) and Unidad Plurinacional de las Izquierdas55 
(based on the construction of the ‘Democratic Society of Sumak Kawsay’), were 
analysed. The particularity of the 2013 national elections in Ecuador was that for the first 
time in the electoral history of the country the idea of Buen Vivir was explicitly used in 
the political manifestos of these two political parties.  
 
In relation to content analysis, I used mass-media outputs56, primarily Ecuadorian 
national and local newspapers, and radio and television news programmes in order to 
                                                 
55 Plurinational Unity of the Lefts: coalition formed by the political party Movimiento Popular 
Democrático (MPD – Popular Democratic Movement), Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik 
- Nuevo Pais (MUPP-NP, Pachakutik Movement of Plurinational Unity)55, and Socialismo Revolucionario 
(sub-faction of Partido Socialista Ecuatoriano). Its presidential candidate was Alberto Acosta, a former 
political ally of Rafael Correa. As president of the Constituent Assembly, Acosta was jointly responsible 
for the articulation and incorporation of the idea of Buen Vivir. Today, Acosta and Correa represent 
opposite positions.   
56 El Universo: one of the most important newspapers in Ecuador. Ideology: liberal – right wing. Since 
2010 in open confrontation with Rafael Correa who filed a libel complaint against the three owners of the 
newspaper and one journalist. The newspaper was sentenced to pay Correa US$ 42 million in damages. 
The same year Correa pardoned the newspaper. El Comercio: Ecuador’s second biggest newspaper, 
covering news mainly from Quito, Guayaquil and Cuenca. Ideology: liberal. Opposite to Correa’s 
government, it supports the presidential candidate Guillermo Lasso (right wing, former banker – he 
currently occupies the second position in opinion polls). Ecuador en vivo.com: online newspaper. 
Ideology: progressive, left-wing. It is a strong supporter of Alberto Acosta and Unidad Plurinacional de 
las Izquierdas. El Telégrafo: state-owned newspaper, it is a strong supporter of the Revolución Ciudadana 
and Rafael Correa’s government. Ecuadorian radios: Radio El Telégrafo, Radio La Prensa, CRE Satelital 
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gather information (as well as the opinions/reactions of significant actors) about media 
coverage on campaign acts, demonstrations, particular conflicts, debates, and so on. 
Sampling was mainly based on dates (2005 – the rise of Rafael Correa as political leader 
– to the present). Coding was mainly based on subjects and themes.  
 
The data gathered was primarily assessed in terms of its validity (Bryman, 2008). Validity 
is concerned with the correspondence between concepts and observations, and therefore, 
with the applicability of the former to understand the particular and the concrete (Carmel, 
1999). Coding was made through two processes. The first one took place while on 
fieldwork, and entailed the transcription of interviews, as well as the careful examination 
of field notes and documents in search of key themes and tentative relations with 
theoretical concepts (Bryman, 2008). The second process took place after fieldwork and 
involved the use of computer software NVivo. Although English quotes are provided in 
this thesis, the transcription, coding and analysis of the material was carried out in 
Spanish.  
 
As a result of qualitative thematic analysis of interviews, literature review, media outputs 
and document analysis, the detection of key themes allowed me to construct the four 
episodes around with the findings of this thesis were structured - the Constituent 
Assembly as a moment of articulation(Chapter 1); the Yasuni-ITT Proposal as both 
moment of articulation and fragmentation(Chapter 4); the new wave of mass 
demonstrations as moment of fragmentation (Chapter 5); and the State Social Provision 
via Neo-extractivism as both moment of articulation and fragmentation (Chapter 6). In 
this way, the construction of these episodes was the result of inductive thematic analysis, 
rather than being fixed in advance and used to structuve interviews.  
 
 3.3 Reflections on the researcher’s position: The Foreigner 
On one of my first days in Quito I headed to CONAIE’s headquarters. Prior to my trip to 
Ecuador, I opened communications by exchanging emails with one indigenous leader, 
Severino Sharupi (Indigenous Leader Territorios y Tierras, CONAIE), who would later 
on become a crucial contact for the development of interviews and encounters during my 
                                                 
560 AM, Radio Sucre, Coordinadora de Radio Popular Educativa del Ecuador; and TV Channels: Gama 
TV, Ecuador TV, Cablevisión, Ecuavisa, Telesur TV. 
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stay in Ecuador. In these emails I explained my research, its objectives and the 
importance of including the voices of one of the most important protagonists of the 
political process in Ecuador. Severino asked me to send a list of questions in order to 
prepare him and others who could help me with the interviews. He also told me he had 
read my Master’s dissertation (available online) and put forward to me some provocative 
questions challenging my stance on the matter. This exchange was promising. It stopped, 
however, weeks before travelling to Quito – the main reason why I did not have an initial 
timetable of interviews with CONAIE’s members. I decided therefore to present myself 
in person in order to organise the interviews. 
 
The building housing CONAIE’S headquarters was impressive and intimidating. A 
symbol of the anti-neoliberal struggle in Ecuador during the 1990s, a few months after 
my visit it would become the focus of another bitter dispute between the government of 
Rafael Correa and CONAIE (Chapter 5). The massive black gate was not able to fully 
hide the three-floor building painted with the whipala (an indigenous emblem). The 
doorman let me in into the hall. After explaining the reason for my visit he talked to 
someone on the phone. He spoke mainly in Kichwa and some bits in Spanish. I only 
understood “...there is a girl at the door...she is foreigner”. The phrase immediately 
floated like a menacing ghost of what my fieldwork experience could be: someone who 
can only observe from the door, not able to introduce herself into the indigenous 
experience, a foreigner in nationality, colour, language57, customs, standpoint...the other 
of the otherness.  
 
Researching on indigenous matters brings up sensitive issues. Smith (1999) argues that 
for indigenous peoples research is linked to European colonialism, which has excluded 
and marginalised them for centuries. Their knowledges, organisational forms and cultural 
practices have been disqualified as backwards and non-modern, and for that reason they 
are neglected and excluded. At the same time, they have been the ‘object’ of study of 
government officials, scientists, representatives of religious organisations, multinational 
organisms, NGO officials, and so on. Much has been written on indigenous peoples but 
little with them. In the particular case of Ecuador, the emergence of Buen Vivir makes 
their cosmology visible but at the same time the phenomenon goes beyond this 
                                                 
57 My native language is Spanish.  
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indigenous cosmology, making a sense of lost ownership apparent in the process. This 
situation puts the researcher in a complicated position. How to approach indigenous 
people without replicating the mistakes and abuses of the past (and present)? 
 
I was asked to wait on the second floor; indigenous leaders from all over the country 
were in a meeting which was about to finish. I counted twelve offices on the second floor; 
on the third one there was an enormous place for meetings and assemblies. Hanging on 
the walls, several pictures of old and new demonstrations, as well as pictures of historical 
leaders, gave testimony of the historical social and political struggle of this organisation. 
When the meeting was over, I saw indigenous leaders, women and men, coming down 
the stairs, all of them wearing indigenous traditional clothes. The image was imposing. 
Most of them were carrying briefcases and laptops. I later found out that in that meeting 
they were deciding the next national strike and mobilisation.  
 
My interviews with indigenous organisations’ leaders deal with specific political and 
organisational issues, as well as with the struggle over the meaning not only of the idea 
of Sumak Kawsay (Buen Vivir was barely used during the interviews) but also the 
meaning of the political phase that has begun since Rafael Correa came to power. The 
interviews were semi-structured and reflected a high level of reflexivity on the political 
process from the interviewee’s own standpoint, about their own situation and the 
country’s and region’s context. The same happened with people I interviewed or talked 
to who are not identified with the indigenous cause, who openly support the government 
of Rafael Correa, or who participate in environmental organisations. What was striking 
about my fieldwork experience was that everyone I talked with (including the taxi driver 
or my landlady) had an opinion on the political process in contemporary Ecuador and felt 
a need to express it. I believe this is why it was fairly easy to organise interviews and 
meetings. People were disposed to talk about politics. The president of Acción Ecológica, 
an important environmental organisation in Ecuador, put it this way: “...the Ecuadorian 
has been historically, at least since the Liberal Revolution [1895], a political animal. The 
Ecuadorian loves politics, you get in a taxi and the taxi driver gives you his opinion about 
the Free Trade Agreement with the US.” (Yvonne Yanez, Acción Ecológica, interview 
in Quito, October 2014).  
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I consider important a reflexive identification of the researcher’s position regarding the 
process of research and the intellectual and epistemological dispositions produced, in this 
case, by the field of sociology in which this research unfolds (Flyvbjerg, 2001). In this 
sense, I follow Bourdieu and Wacquant’s understanding of reflexivity which points to the 
systematic revision of the ‘unthought categories of thought which delimit the thinkable 
and predetermine the thought’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 40). This revision implies 
continuous and rigorous reflection on practices and their historical contexts, as well as 
on the frames of my own analysis and position.  
 
In relation to the research on and with indigenous groups, there is a body of work that 
highlights a particular form of engagement. This approach to research encompasses 
Activist Research (Hale, 2006; Speed, 2006), Anti-oppressive research (Sandoval, 2000; 
Potts & Brown, 2005), and forms of Participatory Action Research (Fals Borda and 
Mohammand, 1991; Greenwood and Levin, 1998). These forms of research differentiate 
themselves vis-à-vis forms of social research that do not contribute directly to the 
implementation of radical and transformative social change via the production of valid 
and transformational social knowledge (Greenwood and Levin, 1998). In other words, 
these methodologies reject the separation of knowledge generation from action. Hale 
(2006) defines activist research as a political alignment with subaltern organised groups 
and their struggle, with whom the different phases of research are jointly designed and 
discussed. This means not only the denunciation of injustice and oppression by the 
powerful but the affirmation that knowledge is actively produced ‘through a dialogue 
among politically situated actors’ (Hale, 2006: 100), and that this process of knowledge 
production needs to be incorporated into the research process. This form of participation 
aims to alter the power relations between researchers and participants (or co-inquirers) 
facilitating the control of the latter on their own destinies (Potts & Brown, 2005; Nicholls, 
2008). ‘Injunctions for participation demand methods that reify local and lived 
knowledge and focus on praxis to address interests and concerns of the participants’ 
(Nicholls, 2008: 118). In the case of activist research, focus is not only placed on the 
content of the knowledge produced by research, but equally on the relationship of 
alignment with the organised group in struggle. This implies a creative understanding of 
the transformational power of theory and methods within social research.  
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Authors such as Smith (1999), Fawcett and Hearn (2004), Hale (2006) and Nicholls 
(2008) argue that research involving the decolonizing moves promoted by indigenous 
peoples demand this type of collaborative undertaking methodology. This argument is 
based on the premise that ‘indigenous peoples have been systematically deprived of 
power… and need to reclaim it as a right’ (Baistow, 1994: 37), implying a self-
determined epistemology instead of imposing one from the position of a cultural outsider. 
The assumption here is that decolonial (or counter-colonial) research demands the 
overcoming of the power relationship exercised by modern social research over its 
‘objects of study’, and constructs a fundamental critique of the very foundations of 
modern social science (Giri, 2006).    
 
Whilst I assert the importance of the approaches discussed above, my research departs 
from those that blend with the indigenous’ cause, which in my opinion tend to 
romanticize and mythicise the meaning of the “Indian Question”-social conflict-State 
relationship. I consider that in this way I avoid the temptation of considering only one 
collective as the exclusive agent of history and the embodiment of its truth (Coronil, 
2007). This thesis focuses on the level of the relationship of indigenous confederations 
vis-à-vis the State. I focus on indigenous confederations as political actors because it is 
where negotiations with the State can be more clearly observed. This thesis deals with 
the indigenous peoples as political subjects. In the context of this research, indigenous 
peoples do not stand as ‘the other’ but as ‘equals’ (Becker, 2008; Schaefer, 2009). In 
other words, I take indigenous organisations on an equal footing with other subaltern 
groups because, primarily, they have not remained outside the political sphere in 
Ecuador. On the contrary, indigenous organisations have been very active, and have had 
significant influence in the Ecuadorian political decision-making process for the past 40 
years (as shown in Chapter 1). They have been able to raise the “Indian Question” as a 
political issue through their own efforts (Andolina et al., 2009). As explained in the 
introductory chapter of this thesis (page 21), the “Indian Question” refers to the kind of 
rights indigenous peoples should be granted as citizens of democratic States (Lucero, 
2003; Postero and Zamosc, 2004). Albó (1991) explains that the term “Indian”, used in 
the past in a derogatory way, has been appropriated and its meaning subverted by 
indigenous peoples mainly since the 1930s when they started their political 
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organisation58. Indigenous political activism also included major political acts such as 
forming political parties (i.e., adopting Western forms of political organisation) and 
lending support to a military coup against Mahuad’s government in 2000, as well as 
participating in State institutions. Hence, while indigenous peoples suffer from many 
forms of exclusion and hardship in Ecuador, they are definitely neither political outsiders 
nor do they position themselves completely outside ‘modern’ political institutions.  
Their achievements include public acceptance of cultural diversity, legal recognition of 
multiple indigenous rights and territories, political recognition of representative indigenous 
organisations, and the creation of institutions to manage indigenous affairs, which are often 
directed or influenced by indigenous representatives. Indigenous movements have also 
participated in popular coalitions that have challenged donor-led development initiatives and 
removed corrupt and unresponsive elected officials (Andolina et al., 2009: 1-2).  
 
The inclusion of the participants’ standpoints and the processes of production of 
knowledge and reflexivity are considered here to be of paramount importance. Indeed, 
as will be shown in the empirical chapters (4, 5 and 6), fieldwork was an experience of 
co-producing knowledge. Participants’ voices are valued and included together with my 
analysis and reflection. However, I did interview and interact with a plurality of actors 
standing on opposite positions. I did not align with any of them and was clear during 
interviews, participation in various events and informal conversations about my stance 
on the matter. I do not consider that the researcher can thoroughly maintain an impartial 
or neutral position throughout the whole research process into conflictive political 
situations such as the one at stake in Ecuador (as in several Latin American countries), 
characterised by an increasing distance and opposition between groups. It is difficult not 
to empathize with the struggle of indigenous peoples who have suffered injustices and 
hardships. However, I do consider that the processes of the construction of popular 
alternatives, marked by the rise of progressive governments in contemporary Latin 
America, exceed the struggle of one particular socio-political movement. In this sense, I 
acknowledge positive aspects of the government of Rafael Correa and the existence of 
transformations in favour of popular interests. 
   
3.4 Ethical considerations 
Pascale (2011: 8) explains that researchers should ‘think about research ethics not as a 
set of norms to which one must conform but as a set of conditions that produce the subject 
                                                 
58 As shown in Chapter 1, the term “Indian” was used to name the first indigenous organisation in 
Ecuador, the Federación Ecuatoriana de Indios (FEI, Ecuadorian Federation of Indians).  
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position of social researcher –the position from which it becomes possible to produce 
credible knowledge’. Among these conditions, confidentiality, anonymity, and informed 
consent given by individuals to participate in the research, are the main ethical concerns 
in this research process (Bryman, 2008) in order to do good and do not harm. I consider 
the first two as interrelated to one basic condition, i.e., the non-disclosure of information 
about identities and records. In this respect I found myself in a difficult position. I talked 
to people (formally and informally) who due to their position within the organisation 
and/or public notoriety were, first, easily identified, and second, expressly wanted to be 
identified. I have decided to handle this sensitive issue in a pragmatic way, with the 
expressed consent of participants in those cases that they were willing to be identified 
(the majority), and the use of pseudonyms in the cases of those who expressed their desire 
to remain anonymous (Statement of Ethical Practice for the British Sociological 
Association, 200259). In relation to the informed consent of participants, further to the 
explicit disclosure of the objectives of my research avoiding deceptive practices, I used 
‘consent forms’ when appropriate. I therefore obtained a combination of formal written 
consent and informal verbal consent from the participants, informing participants of their 
right to withdraw from this research at any time.  
 
 3.5 Final Remarks  
Wittgenstein’s lesson (1980) says that ‘nothing we do can be defended absolutely and 
finally. But only by reference to something else that is not questioned’. There are strong 
normative positions in relation to indigenous issues, which aim to challenge power 
dynamics through research. Researching indigenous matters brings up sensitive aspects. 
Whilst I acknowledge this, my stance is marked by my epistemological concerns guiding 
this research. These epistemological concerns deal with the indigenous peoples as 
political subjects. In this context, indigenous peoples do not stand as ‘the other’ but as 
‘equals’. In other words, I take indigenous organisations on an equal footing with other 
subaltern groups because, primarily, they have not remained outside the political sphere 
in Ecuador. In this way, my research departs from those that blend with the indigenous’ 
cause, which in my opinion tend to romanticise and mythicise the meaning of the “Indian 
Question”-social conflict-State relationship. I consider that in this way I avoid the 
                                                 
59 http://www.britsoc.co.uk/media/27107/StatementofEthicalPractice.pdf [Accessed July 2012].  
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temptation of considering only one collective as the exclusive agent of history and the 
embodiment of its truth. 
 
In this chapter I also explained the criteria followed for the configuration of case studies, 
mainly marked by the intersection of three interrelated categories: framing Buen Vivir, 
the mobilising structures of Buen Vivir and mainstreaming Buen Vivir. In the following 
chapters each of these categories become prominent in the analysis: Chapter 4 is mainly 
focused on framing strategies of Buen Vivir by different political constituencies; the 
analysis in Chapter 5 is based on the impact of Buen Vivir in the organisation of 
contentious politics; finally, Chapter 6 deals with the impact of Buen Vivir at an 
institutional level and the opportunities opened for a new political process. This salient 
analytical prominence does not imply the disconnection with the other two categories, 












Buen Vivir and the appropriation of political rhetoric: the multiple uses 
of Buen Vivir in strategic differentiations 
 
 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to show the political nature of the definitions of Buen Vivir. 
The chapter deals with the rationalisation and strategic use of Buen Vivir to create 
differentiations primarily between two political forces: the indigenous movement 
represented by CONAIE and the government of Rafael Correa. By process of 
rationalisation I refer to actions that make definitions of Buen Vivir consistent with the 
political objectives of the groups supporting them. The process of rationalisation points 
to the expansion of the instrumental and strategic rationality (Habermas, 1986; 
Domingues, 2000; Gane, 2002). The argument here is that the battle over the meaning 
and ownership of this political concept serves to define political boundaries (us and them) 
between stakeholders who are in competition for positions of power in a process of 
renewal of political settlements in Ecuador.  
 
In the context of the Constituent Assembly (2006), Buen Vivir became disputed and, in 
doing so, it instituted in practice a real space for democratic deliberation. It was in this 
space of deliberation that Buen Vivir became the symbol of an alternative to mainstream 
neoliberalism sought by the Ecuadorian people. Whilst its existence can be traced back 
before the Constituent Assembly in different publications written mainly by indigenous 
intellectuals (GTZ, 2002; Viteri, 2002; Acosta, 2002; Sarayaku, 2003), it is at the 
Constituent Assembly that this idea became representative of broad demands for change, 
and a central political concept around which different discourses were woven (Hidalgo-
Capitan and Cubillo-Guevara, 2014).  
 
Different political forces have tried to appropriate the idea since its gestation and 
inclusion in the national Constitution. Groups of intellectuals, grassroots activists, and 
indigenous and civil society organisations, international networks of academics, and 
members of political parties are among the multiplicity of social agents re-designing the 
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principles, nature and meanings of Buen Vivir. So far, Buen Vivir has been used to 
represent an alternative to the neoliberal model, to development and its idea of progress 
and modernisation, to the capitalist system and even modernity as a whole. It is in this 
context that Buen Vivir has emerged as a socio-political and identitarian concept 
(Altmann, 2015). The idea of Buen Vivir has been subjected to a dispute over its meaning 
that reveals a process of rationalisation that has ultimately determined political actors’ 
strategic positioning.  
 
The power struggle that has developed since the foundation of the Constituent Assembly 
shows that there is no common understanding of Buen Vivir. On the contrary, it is 
possible to identify a number of definitions stressing and highlighting different aspects 
according to the interests, goals, and visions of the actors supporting them. In Chapters 
2 and 3 I referred to this as ‘framing Buen Vivir’. In the struggle over meaning, actors 
claim ownership of the idea and its definition, and seek to discredit the definition given 
by opponents. This makes Buen Vivir a porous and malleable concept, a symbol of the 
struggles at stake in contemporary Ecuador, which redefine areas of inclusion in and 
exclusion from the political sphere.  
 
 4.1 Framing Buen Vivir: legitimacy and authenticity in dispute 
Both the indigenous movement and the government of Rafael Correa have been 
fundamental for the rise and consolidation of Buen Vivir as the proxy upon which 
different socio-political agents in Ecuador have defined their position within the post-
neoliberal turn dominating the country and region. The increasing conflicts that have 
unfolded in the attempts to implement Buen Vivir have led to a greater distance between 
these two actors. Each of them defines the concept in different ways according to their 
interests, goals, and political battles, defending the legitimacy of the frame they mobilise 
while discrediting the frames held by political opponents. In this way, the definition and 
mobilisation of the frameworks of Buen Vivir becomes a powerful tool to create and 
openly redefine subjective positions in the political and social arena in Ecuador.  
 
The debate that emerged with the writing of the new constitution in Ecuador 
comprehended the discussion over the type of society and the type of State to be 
constructed (Acosta, 2008; Gudynas, 2009). Constitutional reforms are not new in 
Ecuador. By 2006, the country already had 20 national constitutions (SENPLADES, 
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2010: 27). Notwithstanding this, the writing of the Constitution of Montecristi (2008) 
was different due to the context of social uprising in which the decision to call for a 
Constituent Assembly was made. By that time, the country had suffered the worst 
economic crisis in its history, an important portion of the population was already living 
abroad, and the uprising of the forajidos heralded the end of the neoliberal model of 
governance and growth. The writing of the new Constitution therefore reflected the desire 
for transformation of a plurality of agents who pushed to include their demands in the 
new legal document (Muñoz, 2008).   
 
The participation of a plurality of agents in the definition of proposals and the articles to 
be included in the Constitution triggered new conflicts. The first signs of tension were 
apparent between a sector of the indigenous movement represented by the CONAIE and 
representatives of Alianza Pais in relation to what forces set up the agenda of the 
Assembly. As explained in Chapter 1, the Constituent Assembly comprised 130 
delegates. Alianza Pais obtained 74 seats whilst leftist parties (included indigenous party 
Pachakutik) only obtained 13 seats. Even though indigenous and leftist organisations 
secured minimum representation in the Assembly, their demands overwhelmingly set the 
agenda of the assembly as they became part of the agenda of Alianza Pais. These 
demands included the acknowledgement of Ecuador as Plurinational; the control, 
regulation and restriction of the extractive economy; and the implementation of land 
redistribution, among others. The disparity in the number of representatives created 
friction between the government and the indigenous movement. Among the latter it 
generated suspicion of the government’s appropriation of their demands and their 
exclusion from places of deliberation and decision-making. In the interviews undertaken 
for this research, indigenous leaders were clear that during this process what was at stake 
was the definition of hegemonic positions in order to guide the process of transformation. 
 
These hegemonic positions are related to the imposition of a dominant interpretation. As 
will be analysed in the following sections, there are competing understandings of Buen 
Vivir that reflect particular visions of the State, the economy, development, political 
participation and so on. Hegemonic practices arise when dispersed elements come 
together with the purpose of assembling a conception of the world that will become 
(temporarily and partially) dominant while articulating different interests: ‘the theory of 
hegemony is about how a social element can discursively transform its particular social 
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boundaries into the boundary of the community’ (Pessoa, 2003: 486). Hegemony 
counteracts the openness of the social system via the formation of nodal points or systems 
of meaning (discourse) that are the result of political struggles. Martin (2002: 25) states 
that  
Dominant discourses succeed by displacing alternative modes of argument and forms of 
activity; by marginalising radically different discourses; by naturalising their hierarchies and 
exclusions presenting them in the form of ‘common sense’; and by effacing the traces of their 
own contingency. 
 
I argue that the struggle at stake in Ecuador is for the definition of a hegemonic 
understanding of Buen Vivir. The dispute is played out between three main 
interpretations. In this chapter I identify three different ways to frame Buen Vivir: (1) the 
Pluralist Sumak Kawsay (mobilised by the indigenous movement opposing Correa’s 
government); (2) Buen Vivir as rational social transformation: the construction of the 
State (mobilised by the government); and finally (3) Deep Buen Vivir: ecology and post-
development in action (mobilised by environmental activists). The analysis of this 
particular framework allows me to explore the second event used in this thesis, the 
Yasuní ITT proposal, to understand the moments of articulation and differentiation 
between social movements and the State. This work of distinction between alternative 
frames has been done mainly by drawing on the interviews (Appendix) and informal 
conversations carried out whilst doing fieldwork, as well as through analysis of official 
documents collected during this period. 
 
 4.2 Pluralist Sumak Kawsay – the indigenous movement   
Whilst most scholars refer to the indigenous sector in Ecuador as carrying a 
homogeneous and unified understanding of Sumak Kawsay (Buen Vivir is barely used 
here), analysing the way this idea is framed by indigenous elites allows me to distinguish 
at least two related but different dimensions. In the first one, Sumak Kawsay is framed 
around the construction of a Plurinational State, which is placed at the heart of the frame 
with a strong political and pluralist vision. Current indigenous leaders of national 
indigenous organisations mobilise this frame. In the second one, Sumak Kawsay is 
framed around Pachamama as a symbol of Andean indigenous philosophy and traditional 
communitarian praxis. These two dimensions are not mutually exclusive; on the contrary 
they intersect in many points and one can even be thought of as functioning as the 
conceptual basis of the other. Nevertheless, in their construction different elements are 
strategically selected and highlighted with special emphasis, which makes them 
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distinctive from each other. On the other hand, those who mobilise Sumak Kawsay are 
starting to question the representativeness and political effectiveness of the second 
dimension, which justify in principle the division between both dimensions.   
 
a) Pluralist Sumak Kawsay 
The first dimension is the Pluralist Sumak Kawsay. It structures the idea of Sumak 
Kawsay around the construction of a Plurinational State, which at the same time is 
deemed as the only mechanism to guarantee the process of Sumak Kawsay. Here, the 
construction of a Plurinational State is formulated as the distribution of power and control 
over territories among fully recognised nationalities in a unified State. This has long been 
a claim of the indigenous movement, which at the same time forms the backbone of their 
political project (CONAIE, 2012). CONAIE identifies the Plurinational State as the only 
mechanism for the operationalisation of Sumak Kawsay. To define these ideas, current 
leaders of the main indigenous organisations talk about power, redistribution, food 
sovereignty, means of production, real participation in decision-making processes and 
governance.  
 ... participation in decision-making processes on equal ground, in decisive matters for 
 the country as national security, financial issues, justice, strategic resources like water, 
 oil; making joint decisions would make clear the possibility of a Plurinational State...
 (Severino Sharupi, Indigenous Leader Territorios y Tierras, CONAIE - Interviewed 
 August 2014. Author’s translation)  
 
I argue that the centrality given to the idea of the construction of a Plurinational State 
puts power as the heart of the frame mobilised by this sector of the indigenous movement: 
political power, economic power, socio-cultural power. This sector of the indigenous 
movement selects and highlights key elements to define the character of this distribution 
of power: self-determination (economic, political, socio-cultural, judicial), control over 
territories, real participation in decision making processes and in the implementation of 
collective rights, redistribution of wealth, and the management and safeguarding of 
critical resources. 
 
Therefore, according to this frame the construction of a Plurinational State implies, first, 
the inclusion of peoples and nationalities in spaces from which they have been largely 
and historically excluded: State organisms and institutions, and decision-making 
processes. Second, it implies the restructuring of State institutions in order not only to 
recognise the authority of existing communal governments but also to transfer financial, 
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material and technical resources (decentralisation). This implies the recognition of 
indigenous cultural and communitarian organisations, as well as the redistribution of 
wealth at a deeper level. Third, it involves the recognition and strengthening of distinctive 
cultures within the territory: their languages, identities, practices, traditions, knowledge, 
and education. And fourth, it includes indigenous collective rights in a different 
perspective (CONAIE, 2012). 
 
The government structure of the State in Ecuador is divided into national, provincial, and 
cantonal and parish governments. All of them are decentralised autonomous 
governments. But within nacionalidades and pueblos’ logic there is another government 
to which indigenous respond more effectively and with more confidence, which is the 
communitarian government. The community administrates justice, the development of 
the community and its welfare. However, the State has not given financial resources to 
communitarian governments to administrate, which is one of the main demands of 
indigenous peoples. They are recognised as such but do not receive resources. In this 
way, indigenous leaders argue that they are not exercising real power. 
The State says: ‘you demanded a Plurinational State, it is already in the  Constitution; you 
demanded collective rights, they are already in the constitution; you demanded a 
reconfiguration of the administrative structure of the State guided by Sumak Kawsay, it is 
there. The State says: well now, what do you want?’ The peoples not only want  their 
demands in the constitution, which is dead letter. We are demanding that Ecuadorian 
society’s everyday praxis reflects its Plurinational and intercultural character, which is the 
possibility of participating in governance issues (...) First of all, we need to share power. I 
am not talking about power in public spaces but power to cooperate and administrate, I am 
talking about governing society, for example (Angel Criollo, Head of Communication, 
CODENPE – Interviewed August 2014 in Quito. Author’s translation).  
 
The granting of collective rights has been a key aspect of indigenous struggles (Yashar, 
2005). Most of them have been nationally and internationally recognised, signed by 
national governments, and included in official documents. But as the quote from the 
previous interview shows, this is interpreted by many as ‘dead letter’ if they are not 
implemented or fulfilled. The struggle now turns from the recognition of collective rights 
to their implementation. And according to the interpretation of this sector of the 
indigenous movement, what is needed to fulfil them is power. 
 
 There is self-criticism. We fight for legal rights, which are included in the constitution. 
 But we now know that it does not depend much on the constitution or on what is written.   
 It depends on who is power in the country. We have forgotten to build power in the   
 country. We have the best constitution but today we see that that is breaking apart,  
 modified, violated. As we focused on the legal we forgot to build power at every   
 level where you can negotiate on equal ground (Edwin Mina, Indigenous leader,  
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 Youth section ECUARUNARI – Interviewed September 2014, Quito. Author’s 
 translation). 
 
b) Cosmological Sumak Kawsay 
I name the second dimension ‘Cosmological Sumak Kawsay’. This refers to the 
epistemological and ontological basis of the formation of the State, nation, development, 
democracy and society according to the indigenous worldview. It is mainly defined and 
mobilised by indigenous intellectuals and historical leaders who stress the indigenous 
origin of Sumak Kawsay. Most of them form part of what is known as indigenismo, which 
is historically defined as a political ideology that recognises the specificity of the 
Indigenous Question and the right of indigenous peoples to receive special and 
favourable treatment in compensation of their long-standing discrimination and 
marginalisation (Lucero, 2008; Luis Hidalgo-Capitan et al., 2014). The indigenous origin 
of Cosmological Sumak Kawsay defines its ontological difference from other 
understandings of the idea. Whilst this is also related to the construction of a Plurinational 
State, the focus here is mainly placed on the ancestral indigenous philosophy and 
communitarian practices as carriers of a real and radical alternative to Western 
modernity, the capitalist system and colonial State.   
Sumak Kawsay is a different civilizing proposal, with a different knowledge and imaginary 
matrix, where Pachamama is not an object to be exploited but on the contrary, is the matrix 
where we have to arrange harmonically the existence of the planet (...) we point to the 
construction of the human being first, then the citizen. In any case, citizenship has to depart 
from a different concept of humanity. In Kichwa ‘runa’ means man, human, humanity. 
There is not such term in Spanish; at the same time is a word to differentiate from the white 
man. ‘Runa’ means everything, means community, your social being in the community, the 
environment, means our gods, imaginaries, our cosmovision; it is a global and integral 
concept of humanity. From that  global concept of  humanity begins the construction of 
the concrete, which is the commoner who lives in the community. Sumak Kawsay is that. 
It is the risk of constructing a different human  condition that allows the 
construction of a different citizenship. How can you build citizenship out of the same 
values? Accumulation for example, the need to depredate to accumulate as a concept of 
human realization; or the concept of development itself... (Luis Macas, indigenous leader 
CONAIE - Interviewed August 2014 in Quito. Author’s translation). 
 
The Pachamama is used as a symbol representing (i) moral roots, (ii) the spiritual and 
transcendental elements underpinning human-nature relationships, and (iii) the new 
civilizing contract envisaged by the promoters of this frame. 
  
 Sumak Kawsay is an attitude of respect towards the Pachamama and the  
 understanding that I live because there are others who live in me, the forest lives in me, I   
 live because that  mountain lives in me, in my spirit, in my being. Politically, it is a big   
 utopia to construct a new civilisational stage of humanity. It is not the wellbeing born   
 out of the wealth of capital but is born out of the harmonic coexistence with the 
 environment, is born fundamentally out of respect and of the understanding that we   
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 exist because there are others that make us (“Pocho” Alvarez, filmmaker– Interviewed   
 September 2014 in Quito. Author’s translation). 
Indigenous leaders and intellectuals talk about solidarity, reciprocity, harmony, and 
collective cooperation. In order to differentiate themselves from the use given by the 
State, they do not talk about Buen Vivir but about Sumak Kawsay. Buen Vivir represents 
for them the co-optation of a radical idea in order to legitimize the implementation of 
developmentalist policies dependent on extractive activities, which are defined as 
particularly detrimental to the interests and lifeworlds of indigenous communities. Buen 
Vivir is mainly referred to as mere discourse, and discourse deemed as a tool for 
deception. This differentiation between Sumak Kawsay and Buen Vivir is used to trace 
political boundaries between governmental and indigenous forces. 
   
‘Interculturality’ (first coined by FENOCIN) is another important component of this 
frame. To define it, a distinction is made with multiculturalism. Multiculturalism has its 
origins in Western countries (Turbino, 2005). It refers mainly to the existence of a 
collection of singular cultures (without considering their interaction) under the 
dominance of one hegemonic culture (Santos, 2007). ‘Difference’ is then incorporated 
into already existing structures. ‘Interculturality’, as understood by indigenous peoples, 
can only exist in interaction with others (Garcia Linera, et al., 2006). It goes beyond 
tolerance, respect, and recognition of diversity. It constitutes a political project (always 
open) pointing to the radical transformation of social institutions and relations. 
‘Interculturality’ refers to the re-foundation of structures which put different logics, 
practices, and forms of thinking, acting and living into equitable relationships. In short, 
‘interculturality’ connects different lifeworlds. Whilst this kind of interaction does not 
exist without conflicts or struggles over different interests, in an intercultural process the 
marginalisation and exclusion of any group from the process of deliberation does not 
take place (Bressa Florentin, 2011: 43-44).  
 
Cosmological Sumak Kawsay emphasises the epistemological and ontological bases of 
Sumak Kawsay, which give us its distinctiveness and power of rupture with mainstream 
definitions of development, democracy, the State, and so on (Hidalgo-Capitan et al., 
2014). The mainstream understandings of the State are deemed as colonial and 
Eurocentric forms of oppression, exclusion and exploitation. The Sumak Kawsay 
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proposal aims to break with this. Here, indigenous philosophy is put above any particular 
or concrete demand. 
 
In the interviews, indigenous leaders voiced their concerns over the political use, 
effectiveness and representativeness of a frame that puts Pachamama and communitarian 
life at the centre. Some of the interviewees even made ironic comments on the use of 
nature to define Sumak Kawsay. At the same time, some of them raise the issue of 
indigenous people living in the city and its impact in communitarian practices, as well as 
the rise of a new indigenous bourgeoisie (this point will be analysed in Chapter 5). They 
question the representativeness of a definition centred in communitarian life for those 
who, forced or out of choice, live now in the city, have an urban lifestyle, and are not 
longer peasants but workers. It was palpable during the interviews that the crucial 
question: What does it mean to be indigenous in the 21st century? is under discussion and 
revision among the indigenous elite.  
On the one hand, there is an interpretation of Sumak Kawsay within the capitalist State. An 
example is when you see the sign ‘Oil is life’ in the Amazonia, that kind of Sumak Kawsay. 
Or you see big roads, motorways, the Panamericana, we can say that we are travelling in a 
better bus but, at the end, who benefits from that? That is the expression of Sumak Kawsay 
from the government. But on the other, there is not a Sumak Kawsay from indigenous 
communities adapted to the current situation; there is one which is a sort of cultural 
interpretation, an antique; one that can only be thought in an isolated, forest environment. 
But we need to debate about a Sumak Kawsay adapted to the current situation, one that 
proposes a real transformation of the Ecuadorian society as a whole. This is something to be 
debated and constructed. (Leonidas Izas, President of indigenous base organisation 
UNOCAN – Interviewed September 2014. Author’s translation). 
 
 Historically, we have proposed two fundamental questions: one is the redistribution of 
 wealth and means of reproduction, that is, water and land. And on the other hand we 
 have proposed the defence of mother earth, the Pachamama, as a space for life and not 
 for business (...) The claim for autonomy implies the management of and decision-
 making  on resources, resources for life and not as reserves (...) but there is another sector 
 that defines this as a romantic question “let’s do it to defend the butterflies, the  tree 
 leaves” and they are not really thinking in a struggle to transform all this. This is the 
 struggle that I mentioned before about constructing power, about being able to decide. 
 This would be an expression of construction of power (Carmen Lozano, indigenous 
 leader, Seccion Mujeres in ECUARUNARI – Interviewed August 2014. Author’s 
 translation). 
  
Even though historically the strength of the indigenous movement is in the rural sector, a big 
part of its people is already in the urban sector, not everybody lives out of the forest, hunting, 
and [using] the land. A lot of people are living as workers, as traders. We have to include 
these sectors in our structure and represent them, sectors which are not necessarily 
communities but trader associations, or worker unions, both peasants and urban workers. 
And there are other forces: gender and generational forces. We need to think a Sumak Kawsay 
that represents them as well. (Severino Sharupi, Indigenous Leader Territorios y Tierras, 




I argue that the emphasis placed by the Cosmological Sumak Kawsay dimension on 
ancestral philosophy and communitarian practices strengthens the indigenous cultural 
identity to the point that it risks falling into essentialising of their identity, that is, an 
oversimplified representation of indigenous sectors as holding radical distinctive values 
and primordial purity (Andolina et al, 2009), and neglecting the pluralist contributions 
to the debate on Sumak Kawsay (feminism, ecologist, socialism, and so on). It also 
implies the partial loss of political representativeness within and outside the indigenous 
movement. The essentialising of Sumak Kawsay and indigenous identity can be taken as 
a strategy to differentiate from other sectors that might work especially in relation to the 
contradictions incurred by the government (Stefanoni, 2010). In doing so, the indigenous 
movement claims the ‘natural’ ownership of the idea and leadership of the process of 
transformation. However, I argue that an emphasis on a philosophy barely known by the 
rest of society and, if known, with little connection to people’s everyday reality, instead 
of working as an inspiration, can turn into the sectionalism of a struggle that until recent 
years was able to represent the common interest. Becker (2010) considers that this 
strategy might lead to an exclusionary and reactionary position. The retraction of this 
indigenous sector to their identity is proving to test their political strength in a time when 
those in power have been able to articulate a representative (and general) alternative 
project.  
 
 4.3 Buen Vivir as Rational Social Transformation: the construction of the 
 State – Rafael Correa and Alianza Pais 
The construction of Buen Vivir as rational social transformation is connected to the 
recovery of State institutions responsible for planning and development. It is mainly 
mobilised by the government and its allies, with a strong technocratic and expert 
influence. While the recovery and revitalization of State institutions are linked to radical 
and progressive processes of decentralisation, consolidation of local self-governments 
and citizen’s participation60, emphasis is mainly placed on the reclamation of the central 
State as an institution of control, planning and management (SENPLADES, 2013). In 
                                                 
60 The legal foundations of this process of State transformation are included in official documents such as 
the Codigo Organico de Ordenamiento Territorial, Autonomias y Descentralizacion (COOTAD, Organic 
Code of Territorial Organization, Autonomy and Decentralization [Accessed online March 2015: 
http://www.planificacion.gob.ec/sistema-de-informacion-para-los-gobiernos-autonomos-
descentralizados/] and the Plan Nacional de Decentralizacion (National Plan for Decentralization 
[Accessed online March 2015: http://www.planificacion.gob.ec/plan-nacional-de-descentralizacion/].  
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other words, the central components of this frame are the construction, recovery and 
consolidation of State institutions as the pillars of the national project, reconnecting 
development with the State. Here, the State is presented as the privileged arena to 
deliberate about the common good and national interests, recovering control over the 
public agenda. The supremacy of partial interests (indigenous, ecologist) over a general 
(universal) one is interpreted as going against the national project (Ramirez, 2014).  
 
The construction of a sovereign nation (‘la patria es de todos’, ‘volver a tener patria’, 
which in many ways opposes the project of a plurinational country and the predominance 
of the local above the national), the elimination of poverty via the redistribution of 
wealth, and the guarantee of universal social rights (which for some analysts can be 
thought of as an attempt to establish a Welfare State in Ecuador) are at the heart of this 
project with one political horizon: the consolidation of the Socialismo del Buen Vivir or 
bio-socialismo republicano (Ramirez, 2010), informed by neo-Marxist thought like 
Socialism of the 21st Century (Dieterich, 2002) and approaches to development such as 
Human Development. Asked about the difference between the Socialism of the 21st 
Century, Socialism of Buen Vivir and traditional socialism, Rafael Correa explains: 
There is no difference between the Socialism of the 21st Century and the Socialism of Buen Vivir. 
We try to find a name which expresses what we tried to define in the Constitution of Montecristi 
when we incorporated the concept of Buen Vivir. That is why we started using the name Socialism 
of Buen Vivir but they are the same thing. It keeps some similarities with the traditional socialism, 
for example, the idea of social justice, which are big words in Latin America…for example, the 
supremacy of the human being in relation to the capital; that for me is the biggest challenge of the 
21st Century… socialism: what does it mean? To privilege the creation of value, not only the 
creation of commodities. What are the differences? Traditional socialism believed in class 
struggles, in dialectical materialism. Now, our soldiers are the citizens, and our bullets are the 
votes. We are profoundly democratic. Traditional socialism was too rigid, the same medicine for 
any patient. Now we have an Ecuadorian socialism, a Venezuelan, a Brazilian one…that is the 
main difference with the socialism of Buen Vivir. (Rafael Correa, interview TelesurTV61, 
February 2013).  
 
The consolidation of Buen Vivir as representing a ‘national project of the left’ is seen by 
the promoters of this frame as fundamental to positioning themselves as representing a 
radical change in relation to neoliberalism, away from fiscal austerity, deregulation and 
primacy of financial interests over the whole of the economy. Buen Vivir represents here 
an alternative to counteract the effects triggered by the crisis of the capitalist order. 
However, government officials are cautious not to frame this project as a post-capitalist 
or post-neoliberal alternative per se. The need for foreign capital investment, as well as 
                                                 
61 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RwD9lmBGfxM [Accessed April 2013].  
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the maintenance of old and new commercial agreements with global powers, conditions 
the scope of economic transformation in the country. Furthermore, the contradictions and 
orthodox measures taken by the government of Rafael Correa (restructuring and 
elimination of subsidies; the increase in oil and mining exploitation; a new loan from 
Goldman Sachs for U$S 400 millions, which brings the IMF back to examine the current 
state of the Ecuadorian economy) show that the economic turn in Ecuador can be 
qualified more as pragmatic than as a radical or post-capitalist alternative (BBC, 201462). 
 ...the inclusion of Buen Vivir in the Constitution aroused hopes because the moment of   
 the country determined it; we asked for alternatives to neoliberalism, to the political  
 system, to development. But once you have the role, you have to govern inside and   
 outside the country. You have to set limits, powers, responsibilities, you have to  negotiate. 
And it is then that as government you have to make a decision, how are you   
 going to insert the country into global relations? How are you going to manage the   
 finances? You can not make a u-turn brusquely, it would be suicidal. Ecuador is standing  
 as a sovereign country, eager to gain more autonomy and independence from super   
 powers, but we also need to understand that we are experiencing a political struggle in a 
 world marked by global finances; something’s got to give... (Ivan Carrazco Montalvo,  
 consultant in SENPLADES – Interviewed September 2014. Author’s translation) 
 
The economic dimension of this frame is centred in the State playing an important role 
in terms of investment, control and regulation. A strong fiscal discipline together with 
public investment is the pillar of the economic dimension of Rational Buen Vivir. The 
main financial source of funds for State investment, as well as for social spending, still 
comes from oil revenues. Government officials argue that it is only through exploiting 
natural resources that the economy can be diversified, as high natural resource revenues 
would allow greater investment in other areas of the economy63. For the government, 
this reason is strong enough to dismiss many of the contradictions between its rhetoric, 
policies and what is included in official documents and laws in relation to environmental 
protection, agrarian policies, and popular participation. These points constitute the main 
conflict with indigenous groups, among others. In relation to the environment, Rafael 
Correa expressed in one of his presentations in Enlace Ciudadano64  
…90 per cent of our energy comes from oil, with the transport sector consuming the most. Oil 
goes to refineries and then is used internally for transport. We still have an energy structure that 
is highly polluting, unsustainable, even with fiscal cost as oil and derivatives receive state 
subsidies - even many derivatives have to be imported. However, Ecuador sells much more than 
it buys because of oil. And that is the most serious problem for the Ecuadorian economy. If we do 
                                                 
62http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2014/07/140708_economia_ecuador_viraje_economico_correa_v
p.shtml?ocid=socialflow_facebook [Accessed July 2014].  
63 Ecuador is currently building 8 hydroelectric projects, and investing in the construction of the City of 
Knowledge; that is, the construction of new universities in the city of Yachay with an investment of U$S 
400 million per year. These universities will be mainly focused on research and consultancy in order to 
develop new technologies and the extractives industry.   
64 Enlace Ciudadano 316. https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=PeBIcPm4Hng 
[Accessed April 2013]. 
 132 
nothing, by 2020 we will have a deficit in our oil reserves, we will buy much more than we sell 
and will not be able to buy more. It is a very serious problem. With the oil exploration round65 
and new explorations we will have oil to export and to meet internal demand. But there are people 
who oppose this, they are against oil rounds because they are humanists, they love nature. Correa 
hates nature… they are the ones who love indigenous peoples and nature. In any case, what they 
are going to do is to bankrupt the country. Our way of life, our energy consumption is 
unsustainable if we do not find more oil for the next 10 or 15 years while we reform our energy 
structure. It is a matter of survival... this is one of the national objectives... we have to struggle 
together... (Author’s translation).  
 
In terms of oil exploitation, promoters of this frame use the case of Chevron Texaco66 as 
symbol of its position against irresponsible oil extraction, the role of multinationals, State 
responsibility for the environment and for communities affected by these practices. The 
involvement of the State in legal actions taken against Chevron Texaco gives the 
government of Rafael Correa an important rhetorical tool (La mano sucia de Chevron is 
the slogan used by the government) to prove its environmental concerns (Davidov, 2012). 
 
The analysis of the previous frame showed that there is no homogenous interpretation of 
Buen Vivir nor is there homogeneity of actions taken by those mobilising the frame. 
Similarly, in this case, those who mobilise this frame point out critiques and 
shortcomings at the same time. For example, in relation to popular participation, a 
government official working in SENPLADES (Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y 
Desarrollo) says that among the 12 objectives outlined by the Plan del Buen Vivir (2013-
2017) popular participation is there as a “purely decorative element. There is no political 
will from above to accept a real and critical participation. Participation is only allowed 
for those who say everything is fine” (GOS1 – Interviewed August 2014, Quito. Author’s 
translation). These critical voices coming from inside the government question how 
permeable is the current government to critiques coming from those who do not 
completely agree (or openly disagree) with the fundamental pillars defended by Correa’s 
government. They suggest that deliberation is not open to dissent in the government.  
 
                                                 
65 The government has initiated new oil explorations in the Ecuadorian Amazonia with the objective to 
assess Ecuadorian oil reserves in the near future.  
66 Texaco Petroleum Company (now part of Chevron Corp.) had oil concessions in Ecuador for almost 26 
years (1967-1992). In 1992 it ended its contract and handed the concessions to Ecuadorian company 
Petroecuador. A year later indigenous groups from Ecuadorian Amazonia, with the support of human 
rights and environmentalist organisations, filed a lawsuit against Texaco. They accused the company of 
‘knowingly conducting negligent environmental practices...wrecking traditional ways of life, and 
increasing health risks for local people (Valdivia, 2007: 42).  
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The delimitation of political boundaries in this case is traced between, first, the 
government of the Revolución Ciudadana and those who identify strongly with the 
neoliberal past in Ecuador. The government of Rafael Correa questions the credibility 
and legitimacy of politicians of the partidocracia, bankers, and corporatist groups 
(mainly trade union and indigenous organisations), remembering their involvement in 
governmental decisions during the 80s and 90s. Prohibido olvidar (forbidden to forget) 
is the main phrase used by Rafael Correa to refer to those (belonging either to the political 
right or left) who question current decisions of the government and who have in the past 
participated in controversial and unpopular actions during neoliberal times (cases of 
corruption, association in coups, privatisation and financial deregulation are used to 
exemplified this). In accordance with this, the government has recently released a 
campaign against the Restauración Conservadora (conservative restoration), accusing 
groups who criticise the government of attempting to destabilize the government.  
 
The second political boundary is traced around those who strongly question the decisions 
of the government on environmental and economic matters. Young people forming 
Yasunidos67 and ecologist groups are branded childish, traitors and enemies of the 
national project due to their opposition to extractive activities and their defence of the 
Yasuní-ITT proposal.  
[t]he ecologists are extortionists. It is not the communities that are protesting, just a small 
group of terrorists. People from the Amazon support us. It is romantic environmentalists and 
those infantile leftists who want to destabilize government (Correa, 2007; cited in Bebbington 
and Humphreys Bebbington: 136) 
 
The tracing and use of these political frontiers begs questions of the government’s 
democratic openness to plural and antagonistic positions, as well as its willingness to 
allow a plurality of actors to engage in public debates and participate in decision-making 
processes.  
 
4.4 “Deep” Buen Vivir: ecology and post-development in action – environmental 
activists 
                                                 
67 Yasunidos is a group of young ecologists formed after Correa’s government decision of exploiting the 
Yasuní ITT (August 2013). They were responsible for the collection of signatures to call a referendum to 
allow popular participation in the decision over the exploitation of Yasuní. After collecting more than the 
signatures required by law (a total of 756,623), the Consejo Nacional Electoral rejected most of these 
forms.  
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The promoters of Deep Buen Vivir are mainly academics, environmental activists and 
ecological organisations. The rights of nature granted by the Constitution of Montecristi 
are at the centre of this frame and are closely linked to the rights of a diverse multitude 
of social groups (indigenous, peasants, feminists, ecologists, socialists). The fulfilment 
of the rights of nature is used here to represent the path to a post-development era, a post-
oil economy, and a post-capitalist society. Capitalism is defined as the most extreme 
version of alienation, economic exploitation, inequality, coloniality of power and 
environmental degradation. The way to subvert this order is to focus on the local, 
communitarian and small-scale projects that can guarantee, first, the use of natural 
resources in a way that respects the natural environment; and second, the real 
participation of the people in both the definition and implementation of Buen Vivir as an 
alternative to development and neoliberal policies. Promoters of this frame advocate for 
a social and solidarity economy, agrarian reform that can guarantee food sovereignty, 
democratic access to land respecting collective ownership of territories, and the creation 
of incentives and financial credits given by the State to support small-scale projects. In 
addition, tourism is seen as a key economic sector that could replace extractive activities 
in the future.  
 
The government of Rafael Correa is considered a betrayer of the process of change 
initiated in 2006. The ‘pink tide’ governments of the region are ironically depicted as 
complicit in international powers, which together aim to control natural resources and 
promote the intensification of the extractive economic model and with it, a new model 
of colonization.  
The government of Rafael Correa (…) has changed direction, has betrayed the historical 
moment forged by popular and social forces that chose him as President. His mode of 
exercising power is more authoritarian, personalized and caudillesco than ever; he 
encourages the modernization of capitalism especially now that is in a deep crisis and the 
peoples desire to overcome it. A technocratic modernization of capitalism in Ecuador will 
not save the country from the crisis of capitalism in itself. This short-sightedness can only be 
understood as the result of the complicity of this government with transnational capital and 
with big national powers (Alberto Acosta, interview September 2014, Quito. Author’s 
translation).  
 
Conscious of the ambiguities and lack of clear definitions of the idea of Buen Vivir (or 
Sumak Kawsay), and a lack of clear policies to achieve it and indicators to measure it, 
those who mobilise this frame point out the power of rupture of Buen Vivir in relation to 
hegemonic, dominant and monolithic understandings on socio-political and economic 
development. They conceive of Buen Vivir at the moment as an idea that has to be 
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constructed and re-constructed by the participation of a plurality of actors, but yet already 
showing its provocative power to deconstruct ‘hegemonic truths’. For this reason, and in 
a similar was as for the frame mobilised by the indigenous sector, Buen Vivir and Sumak 
Kawsay are separated in order to highlight the different implications of each concept 
according to the actors who mobilise it, and the co-optation of those actors by the forces 
in power in order to redefine and make it functional for conventional development.  
 
Those who mobilised this frame have signed an open letter expressing harsh criticisms 
of the government68. Contrary to the government’s accusation of the formation of a 
conservative restoration (composed of those who manifest their disagreement/opposition 
to the government), the letter denounces a lack of transformation of power structures and 
the delegitimizing of those opposing government decisions; it inverts the government’s 
charge, accusing Correa of implementing a conservative restoration, and of using State 
force to repress popular struggle.  
 
Having said that, and as it happens with the frames defined by the indigenous sector, the 
advancements made by the government of Rafael Correa in relation to the role of the 
State in public investment and infrastructure are also recognised here. However, this 
recognition is quickly undermined: ‘we have to recognise what the government has 
done... BUT we cannot accept...’ In many ways, the ‘but’ employed belies significant 
changes in the State’s management of the economy, institutional transformation, social 
inclusion, and social welfare provision. It can be argued that this ‘but’ suggests that for 
those who question the actions of the Revolución Ciudadana, not only what the State 
does matters, but also how it does it matters. And in this ‘how’ lies the aspirations of 
many groups who conceive a different logic underpinning political, economic, social and 
cultural questions. In other words, it is not only the return of the State as a public arena 





                                                 
68 http://www.ecuadorlibrered.tk/index.php/ecuador/politica/2844-carta-abierta-a-las-organizaciones-
participantes-en-el-encuentro-latinoamericano-progresista [Accessed October 2014].  
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 4.4.1 Yasuni-ITT: moment of articulation and moment of differentiation 
 
The frame analysed in this section, Deep Buen Vivir, uses the Yasuní-ITT proposal as 
symbol of both the struggle to overcome extractivism and protect the rights of nature and 
of indigenous peoples, and the co-optation and transformation of radical ideas in favour 
of capitalist interests. The Yasuní is a national park located in the Ecuadorian Amazon 
and is home to various indigenous peoples who consider the park a sacred place. In 1989, 
it was declared a World Biosphere Reserve by UNESCO (United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation) due to its rich biodiversity. In 1999, part of the park 
was declared an ‘untouchable zone’, prohibiting its exploration and exploitation for 
natural resources69. The Ishpingo-Tambococha-Tiputini (ITT) is an oil field within the 
Yasuní park. It is estimated that the oil reserves in this area are between 846 million to 
950 million barrels, representing 20 per cent of the country’s oil reserves (Rival, 2010; 
Bebbington and Humphreys Bebbington, 2011). The Yasuní-ITT initiative proposed 
keeping the oil in the soil in exchange for international monetary compensation.   
 
In this thesis the Yasuni-ITT proposal is taken as one of the key episodes that help to 
understand the moments of articulation and differentiation between two projects of Buen 
Vivir: the Postneoliberal State of Buen Vivir (a top down approach that justifies extractive 
activities as a strategy to increase State budget to implement redistribute policies and 
social investment) and the Social Movement of Buen Vivir (a bottom up approach that 
stresses the importance of rights, local livelihoods and communitarian practices).  
 
For analytical purposes I divided the proposal into two phases: the first one extends from 
2007, when the proposal was launched, to 2013. The second phase goes from 2013 to 
2016 . In August 2013, the government of Rafael Correa cancelled the proposal by decree 
and authorised the exploration and exploitation of oil in the ITT. The first phase gives an 
account of a moment of articulation between the government of Rafael Correa and social 
movements, as the Yasuni-ITT proposal started as a joined project between both agents. 
Esperanza Martinez, co-founder of Acción Ecológica, an environmental organisation that 
                                                 
69 SOS Yasuní: 
http://www.sosyasuni.org/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=36:yasunational-
park&catid=14:yasunational-park&Itemid=26 [Accessed September 2012].  
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played an important role in the design of the proposal, explains this moment of 
articulation: 
 Alberto Acosta understood that this [the Yasuní ITT] was a visionary proposal; and as Rafael 
  
 Correa is an intelligent person, he realised that it would effectively give him important 
 political benefits both at a national and international level, and it became then a public policy 
  
 (...) I think in this case it was very important that it began not as a bottom-up but as a State 
  
 policy, and from there it gained the involvement of high levels of government (...) they 
 invested a lot  in  promoting this initiative in defence of the Yasuní, they did so much 
 publicity about how well it was working, they undertook a lot... (Esperanza Martinez,   
 Acción Ecológica, interview November 2014, Quito). 
 
In 2007, the government put forward the Yasuní-ITT initiative, presenting it as a radical 
environmental and economic proposal supported in turn by the United Nations 
Development Programme. Ecuador’s government seeks to be compensated for at least 
50 per cent of the revenues it would gain by extracting the oil. The proposal was strongly 
publicised by the government within the country and in international forums as a firm 
step towards a post-oil economy. The target for both 2012 and 2013 was US$ 291 million 
(Davidov, 2012). If that target was not reached, Ecuador planned to start the extraction 
of oil from the ITT field. The proposal encompassed, therefore, both representations of 
natural resources in the Amazonia: conservation and exploitation. The Yasuni-ITT 
proposal was successful at incorporating indigenous and environmental movements’ 
proposals in an official discourse and at positioning those demands at an international 
level (Espinosa, 2013). The government of Rafael Correa urged the participation of 
international powers in the design of a new global governance of natural resources in 
order to recognise them as a common good (Krainer and Mora, 2011).  
 
Notwithstanding the presentation of this proposal as a revolutionary alternative for  the 
management and praise of nature, doubts were raised about the government’s 
commitment to the project, due to internal divisions on how to manage it. Espinosa 
(2013) argued that the Yasuni-ITT proposal had an ambivalent and temporary discursive 
dominance over oil extraction. Over time, it was evident from Rafael Correa’s 
declarations on the matter that he grew more critical of the proposal (El Comercio, 
201370). ‘It is madness to say no to natural resources, which is what part of the left is 
                                                 
70 http://www.elcomercio.com/negocios/Yasuni_ITT-explotacion-petroleo-ambiente-
Ecuador_0_974902709.html [Accessed January 2014].  
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proposing — no to oil, no to mining, no to gas, no to hydroelectric power, no to roads. 
This is an infantile left which can only legitimate the right’71. In August 2013 and by 
decree, Correa cancelled the proposal, announcing the exploration and exploitation of oil 
in the ITT by State-owned Company Petroamazonas. 
 
The cancellation of the proposal marks a moment of fragmentation between the 
government and social movements. The Yasuní-ITT proposal lost the importance that it 
had at the beginning of Correa’s government as a symbol of the country’s revolutionary 
transformation, but it has not lost importance in the discourse supported by social 
movement and environmentalist activists. Since the announcement of its cancellation, the 
proposal has regained importance within the frame mobilised by environmental activists 
called here Deep Buen Vivir. In this frame, the value of Yasuní is particularly stressed, 
not only in terms of its biodiversity and the originality of the proposal of leaving the oil 
underground, but particularly because of the existence of indigenous pueblos (waorani 
territory) and uncontacted indigenous communities (Tagareri and Taromenane) in the 
area (Narvaez et al, 2013). Yvonne Yanez, co-founder of Acción Ecológica (interviewed 
in Quito, October 2014) explained that the effects that extractive activities may have on 
this population are considered as capable of bringing about their extermination. The 
frame Deep Buen Vivir stresses, therefore, the interrelated dimensions of the Yasuni-ITT 
proposal: oil production, environmental conservation, and the recognition of indigenous 
rights.  
 
 4.5 Final Remarks  
   
Table 4 summarises the dimensions of the three framings of Buen Vivir identified and 
analysed in this chapter: the groups who define and support each definition, the focus 
and the core elements highlighted in each of them, the political objectives of each of the 
forces involved and the political boundaries traced between them. The analysis of these 
frames show not only that there is no one homogenous, monolithic and essentialising 
notion of Buen Vivir, but that is constructed and re-constructed through power struggles 
between different forces. It becomes apparent the strength of new and provocative ideas 
that are allowing the breaking up of a homogeneous and hegemonic understanding of 
                                                 
71 R. Correa, ‘Ecuador’s path’, New Left Review, 77, 2012, p 95. 
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economic, social, cultural and political questions. In this sense, it is apparent that Buen 
Vivir has already affected the politics of Ecuador.  
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The empirical findings of this chapter have demonstrated that political forces are 
strategically framing Buen Vivir according to their interests, goals and political battles. It 
is argued that Buen Vivir has been subjected to a process of rationalisation that allows 
the positioning of different forces in the political realm by creating political boundaries 
(us and them) between stakeholders who are in competition for positions of power in a 
process of renewal of political settlements in Ecuador. In this way, it is shown here the 
political nature of the struggle over the meaning of Buen Vivir.   
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In the following chapter, I examine the strategies put forward mainly by the indigenous 
movement represented by CONAIE and the government of Rafael Correa in order to 





























Whilst Chapter 4 deals with the rationalisation and strategic use of Buen Vivir to create 
differentiations between political forces to establish their positions in the political 
process, Chapter 5 deals with the organisational dynamics developed by the indigenous 
movement represented by CONAIE and the government of Rafael Correa in order to 
impose one particular definition. The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to identify the 
effects that the emergence of Buen Vivir in the political realm has had on the organisation 
of contentious politics in order to impose a particular understanding on Buen Vivir. The 
current expression of such a dispute at the institutional level as well as the mainstreaming 
of one dominant understanding of Buen Vivir at the State level are going to be analysed 
in Chapter 6.   
 
The Mobilising Structure of Buen Vivir has been defined in Chapter 2 as the ways in 
which formal and informal ties between people can serve as solidarity and 
communication facilitating mobilisation. Included in this category are the mobilisation 
of resources by participants (both formally and informally), the structuring of networks 
as well as the formation of alliances, claim-making repertoires, and leadership structure. 
Resources for social mobilisation include ideas, time, money, means of communication, 
transportation, alliances with actors which in turn can bring more resources to the 
movement. In relation to the resources analysed in this thesis, the role of ideas has been 
analysed in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 deals mainly with the construction of alliances as key 
resource for competing groups. In the case of claim-making repertoires, this factor refers 
to the learned and repeated character of people’s interactions when making collective 
claims. The repertoires deployed are highly influenced, in turn, by the resources available 
to the organisation. In this chapter I analyse the new wave of demonstrations. I name 
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them as ‘new’ because they taking place in a context of social and political stability 
marking a difference compared with actions in times of crisis in Ecuador (the 1990s and 
beginning of 2000s). The new wave of demonstrations is the third episode analysed in 
this thesis as a moment of articulation between different social and political actors as well 
as a moment of differentiation and fragmentation between these sectors and the 
government.  
 
In relation to the leadership structure, as explained in Chapter 2, I follow the definition 
given by Morris and Staggenborg (2008: 171) as formed by ‘strategic decision-makers 
who inspire and organise others to participate in collective actions’. At the same time, 
leaders are also responsible to link the movement to the larger society and 
institutionalised politics. To understand the ways by which leaders gain legitimacy and 
authority, I draw on Weber’s (1968) definition of different types of leadership -
bureaucratic, traditional and specifically, on his definition of charismatic leadership. In 
relation to the latter, Weber emphasises the emotional character of the collective as well 
as the interactional nature of this type of leadership in the sense that members play an 
important role attributing charisma to leaders.  
 
The analysis of the Mobilising Structure of Buen Vivir is divided into two main parts: the 
first one comprises a discussion of the leadership structure within these two competing 
sectors, arguing that in the case of the indigenous movement represented by CONAIE 
the lack of strong political leaders who can take their idea of Buen Vivir beyond the 
indigenous sector – guaranteeing in addition the construction of institutional power – has 
led the movement to forge unsuccessful alliances with leaders who later betrayed them. 
These alliances have been detrimental to the movement’s popular legitimacy. On the 
other hand, Rafael Correa has shown strong leadership since his arrival on the political 
scene but still lacks the support of a strong organising structure, which positions him in 
an individualistic and overly presidential role. The second part of this analysis is mainly 
focused on a discussion of the strategies and tactical repertoires deployed by these two 
forces since the Constituent Assembly was established in order to show how they are 
competing for the same resources but not willing to cooperate in a joint project, leading 




5.1 Leadership Structure 
5.1.1 Political Power: from partidocracia to populism 
In the 19th century in Ecuador, the State and the political arena were ruled by elites. Civil 
rights were granted only to those who met four criteria: not being subjected to a servile 
relationship, being a man, being over 21 years old (or being married), and being able to 
read and write (Burbano de Lara, 2010). This meant that a vast majority of the population 
were not considered free and autonomous and therefore, were not able to participate in 
political institutions either. Political rights were only granted to a small number of 
citizens, excluding broad popular sections of society from the political community 
(women, indigenous persons, dependent workers). Thus, civil rights and political rights 
were not universal but reflected the relations of political domination and social and ethnic 
inequality of Ecuadorian society at the time.   
 
Until 1979, political parties had a secondary place in political and State life. Burbano de 
Lara (2010: 18) gives three reasons for this: the electoral strength of Velasco’s 
populism72 and his anti-party rhetoric; the alternation between dictatorships and civilian 
governments for a long period of time; and the weakness of traditional political parties 
in responding to popular demands. It was with the transition to democracy that civil, 
political and social rights were universally granted. This inclusion adopted different 
modalities according to the conflicts and interaction between subaltern classes and the 
political elite (Echeverria, 1997; Mejia, 2002; Conaghan, 2003; Pachano, 2008). This 
happened concurrently with the development of a new institutional design that put 
political parties at the centre of the political scene. The Ley de Partidos (Party Law) gave 
political parties the monopoly of representation, excluding any other form of 
participation in political institutions (Verdesoto, 1991). In this way, political parties 
became privileged agents mediating between society and the State, as they became 
responsible for connecting with, organising and transferring social demands to the 
political domain (Echeverria, 1997).  
 
The result of this institutional transformation was the configuration of the so called 
partidocracia, the supremacy of political parties in control of institutional politics. In the 
                                                 
72 Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra dominated the political scene during the 21st century. He was President of 
Ecuador for five terms: 1934-1935; 1944-1947; 1952-1956; 1960-1961; and 1968-1972.  
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following decades, the fragmentation and polarization existing between dominant parties 
and their lack of ability to set governance agreements led to the loss of legitimacy and a 
crisis of representation that dominated the 1990s. The way to tackle this crisis was to 
reform the political system, expanding presidential powers in order to enhance the 
governance of the system. This measure prioritized institutional settings rather than the 
complex dynamic between State, civil society and the market (Echeverria, 2010). The 
paradoxical result was more restriction of political participation.  
 
This led to what Echeverria (2010) calls the ‘anti-politics’ movement that dominated the 
first period of the 2000s, which is the context out of which Rafael Correa, the Revolución 
Ciudadana and Buen Vivir emerged. The ‘anti-politics’ agenda points to the negation of 
representation through traditional political parties and the rejection of political 
institutions. This new phenomenon affected indigenous leaders who occupied places in 
State institutions as it was perceived that once in office they reproduced the same 
mechanisms they originally intended to abolish. The necessity of forging alliances to 
strengthen its position in parliament had a negative impact on the indigenous political 
party Pachakutik, which soon was perceived as part of the political establishment (Philip 
and Panizza, 2011). In this way, the ‘anti-politics’ agenda affected the legitimacy of the 
indigenous movement in leading the mediation of popular demands in the political realm. 
Conversely, it gave Rafael Correa the strength to become the new political leader of the 
Revolución Ciudadana, due mainly to his status as an outsider of the political 
establishment in Ecuador and his ability to articulate and implement the inclusionary 
demands historically mobilised by popular agents. 
  
It is possible to connect the idea of ‘anti-politics’ put forward by Echeverria with a classic 
definition of populism as the direct relationship between the logic of social action and 
the configuration of the decisional field. The appeal to the ‘people’ in opposition to an 
oppressing order (the elites: the bankers, the partidocracia, the mainstream press and 
foreign interests) enables the configuration of a new political identity that antagonises 
the dominant ‘other’ (Laclau, 1977; de la Torre, 2008; Philip and Panizza, 2011). The 
‘anti-politics’ moment in Ecuador, together with the gestation of the Revolución 
Ciudadana helped to establish a new idea of the ‘people’, which with its constitutive 
difference became the legitimate sovereign with direct influence in the decisional realm. 
This was accompanied by the demand of re-founding the country’s constitutional 
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paradigms. The vacuum left by the fall of traditional political parties, favourable macro-
economic conditions (rise of oil prices), and regional transformations (such as the 
presence of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela implementing strong nationalist policies) opened 
the possibility for the rise of a new political leader able to appeal to and represent the 
‘people’.  
 
Rafael Correa was rapidly identified as a populist leader and from the beginning he 
constructed his political image in opposition to the elites. As explained in Chapter 4, 
Rafael Correa and Alianza Pais used this opposition as a rhetorical strategy to trace a 
boundary between what had been part of the political and economic establishment in 
Ecuador until that moment (political parties, social movement organisations, unions, 
bankers, and the mainstream press) and the Revolución Ciudadana. The label of populist 
has been used so far both with positive and negative connotations. The strong and 
charismatic leadership of Rafael Correa was salient from the very beginning, with no 
other figure disputing this place. In the first years of his presidency, Correa was able to 
create a new ‘us’: the citizens carrying out the Revolución Ciudadana. Therefore, 
populism in this case encompasses two dimensions or axes: one horizontal, formed by 
the emergence of demands expressed by the ‘people’; and one vertical, formed by the 
articulation of these demands in a political project represented by a charismatic and 
strong political leader (Kioupkiolis, 2014). The positive dialectic between both axes is 
what gives life to politics (Laclau, 2005). 
 
However, in recent years the vertical dimension has gained importance at the expense of 
the horizontal one (Mazzolini, 2015). During the first years of his presidency, Rafael 
Correa became the nodal point articulating and implementing popular demands. 
However, in the last years of his mandate, an excessive personalisation and the re-
emergence of hierarchies gave strength to the vertical axe, in turn weakening the 
importance of the horizontal one. Popular participation and the openness of spaces of 
deliberation have been considerably reduced. Rafael Correa alleges that his electoral 
victories give him and Alianza Pais the right of decision without the need to open debate 
or participation in decision-making processes. This has triggered increasing unrest 
among different sectors, including the indigenous movement, that call for more 
participation. In addition, the decline of oil prices and the consequent fall of Ecuador’s 
revenues have led to cuts in social spending, rising taxes and reductions in wages. These 
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measures have affected both the middle and working classes73. Even though Rafael 
Correa still enjoys a 45 per cent approval rating, the increasing unrest triggered by these 
decisions has had a negative impact on Correa’s image (CEDATOS, 201574).  
 
 5.1.2 Rafael Correa and Alianza Pais: A new political leader in search of 
 a movement 
Being an outsider was actually Rafael Correa’s most valuable asset, separating him from 
the rest of the political class and popular actors in Ecuador. The emergence of Rafael 
Correa in the political arena was preceded by a profound crisis of legitimacy and 
representation of the political elite and institutions (Burbano de Lara, 2010). Being an 
outsider allowed him, first, to position himself as a redeemer leader and anti-system 
candidate and, second, to mark a clear antagonism between him, the partidocracia and 
those actors associated at that moment with the political establishment, which was seen 
as responsible for the bankruptcy of the country. As he stated in 2009,‘we have defeated 
the representatives of the most backward sectors of the oligarchy, the corrupt banking 
sector, the press compromised with the past.’ 
 
Correa quickly identified himself as someone belonging to the left and with the people, 
even though his origins and trajectory were not close to popular sectors. This has led 
many to label Correa as a populist leader. As understood by Correa, the identity of ‘the 
people’ refers to citizens with no political or social affiliations, leaving those actors 
leading the popular scene until then (indigenous organisations, for example) out of the 
game. These actors are deemed as pursuing particular interests and, therefore, as 
opponents to national and general ones (Ramirez, 2014). Correa constructed a vision of 
himself as having a redemptive mission (de la Torre, 2013) in a context of discredited 
institutions and political parties. This mission did not point to a project of gradual reforms 
but to the re-founding of the nation towards the Socialism of Buen Vivir. He was quickly 
included by analysts such as Philip and Panizza (2011) and de la Torre (2013) in the 
category of new populist leaders in the region. Correa presents himself as a selfless leader 
who wants nothing for himself but all for the motherland. ‘With no interest for us, with 
clean hands, burning hearts, clear minds, for the country; we work in a technical way, 
                                                 
73 http://www.as-coa.org/articles/explainer-whats-behind-ecuadors-2015-protests [Accessed September 
2015].  
74 http://www.cedatos.com.ec/detalles_noticia.php?Id=185 [Accessed September 2015].  
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for equity, for justice’ (Rafael Correa).75 In this way, he started the reconfiguration of the 
political settings in Ecuador taking Buen Vivir to a different level of discourse.  
 
Rafael Correa is today considered by the majority of the Ecuadorian population as the 
political leader who delivers unmet demands: greater wealth distribution, investment of 
the State in infrastructure and public spending, control over strategic resources, and 
social mobility. Whilst embracing socialist humanism, Correa has prioritised economic 
growth and particular policies over popular participation and the democratisation of 
institutional politics. With him, Buen Vivir went from a lifeworld cosmology 
representing an alternative to capitalism to a vision of State consolidation that 
emphasises the construction of a sovereign nation. This implies a significant change in 
trust relations between the people, politicians and institutions. Correa has been able to 
overturn a dramatic situation marked by ‘que se vayan todos!’ (All of them out!), that is, 
marked by complete public distrust of politicians and institutions to convert himself and 
his party to one of the most popular governments in Ecuadorian history, regaining 
people’s trust in State institutions. However, for activists in social movements Correa 
does not represent the left, nor do the reforms implemented by his governments. Their 
criticism points to his obsessive focus on the achievement of higher levels of economic 
performance and the actual implementation of particular policies, sacrificing popular 
participation in the process (Becker, 2013). In 2012, an Amnesty International report on 
Ecuador76 (May-June 2012) criticised the lack of mechanisms of consultation with 
indigenous peoples prior to the enactment of laws (granted in the national Constitution). 
The report also warns of the increasing criminalisation of protest.77 
 
Many have defined Correa’s style as a ‘president in permanent campaign’ (Pachano, 
2007; Conaghan, 2008), an epithet based on a strong discourse of inclusion 
accompanying the actual implementation of government policies. The hyperactive style 
of Correa is expressed in his public appearances in hospitals, schools, universities, and 
inaugurations of new buildings and public infrastructure in different provinces. In all 
                                                 
75 2009 "Intervención presidencial en el acto de entrega de armas en el comando provincial de Manabí". 
Portoviejo, 12 de marzo, http://www.presidencia.gob.ec/discursos/03-12-
09Discurso_entrega_arrnas_Manabi.pdf (Spanish in the original. Author’s translation) 
76 http://movimientos.org/imagen/amnist%C3%ADa%20ecuador.pdf [Accessed April 2012]. 
77 For instance, CONAIE’s Vice-President, Jose Acacho, was arrested together with two other indigenous 
leaders after a protest in the province of Morona Santiago. A judge ruled that they were arbitrarily 
accused of terrorism, murder and sabotage. Nevertheless, they are still indicted on those charges. 
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these public acts, Buen Vivir appears, representing the change in public investment. The 
President’s appearances come together with the broadcasting of the Enlace Ciudadano78 
(The Citizens’ Link), which has become the main governmental communication strategy 
under Correa’s government to advertise and explain its actions. The Enlaces have been 
also used to attack opponents of the government, marking another feature of Correa’s 
leadership, that is, his forceful response to criticisms made of him and governmental 
decisions, either by the press or political adversaries.  
 
Since 2006, Rafael Correa has won three presidential elections as the main leader of the 
Revolución Ciudadana, reflecting the strong relationship he has built up with the 
electorate at a national level (Table 5). In 2006, Rafael Correa won presidential elections 
for the first time with 56 per cent of votes. In 2009, after the approval of the new 
constitution, new presidential elections took place and Correa won this time with 52 per 
cent of votes doubling the vote share of the second-placed candidate, former president 
Lucio Gutierrez. Finally, in 2013, Rafael Correa and Alianza Pais were re-elected in 
power winning in 23 out of 24 provinces with 57 per cent of votes79. In this way, Alianza 













                                                 
78 Enlace Ciudadano is a TV and radio show presented by Rafael Correa every Saturday since 2007. It is 
broadcast by state-owned TV channels Ecuador TV and Gama TV. This show is used to explain 
governmental actions, new projects and current affairs.  
79 Consejo Nacional Electoral: Atlas Electoral 2009-2014.  
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However, the elections for local authorities (alcaldías and prefecturas), which took place 
one year later in February 2014, revealed a worrying result: whilst Alianza Pais 
maintained its supremacy at a national level, it lost strategic electoral strongholds, 
including Quito, Azuay and Imbabura, as well as 21 out of 24 municipalities in provincial 
capitals and 17 out of the 20 most populated cantons in the country (CEDATOS, 2014). 
The results were interpreted by Correa and his people as an unexpected and adverse 
electoral shock. The strategy of Alianza Pais during the campaign relied on Correa’s 
strong popularity as a national leader. Correa showed his support by appearing in pictures 
with local candidates who were also backed up by government machinery. This was 
shown to be insufficient by the poor performance of Alianza Pais at the local level. The 
government misread what was at stake: the dispute over local power, which is built upon 
local alliances with the local political elite. The electoral setback was a wake-up call for 
Alianza Pais on its weak organisational support at the local level. 
 
The results of this election made apparent the differences between national and 
regional/local scales of action, as they showed discrepancies in the political management 
of the national and the local. Jumping scales is commonly associated with social 
                                                 
80 In both national elections, 2009 and 2013, eight political organisations presented candidates for 
president. The table shows the performance of the three political organisations that held the most votes at 
the national level (Atlas Electoral 2009-2014, Consejo Nacional Electoral).   
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movements’ strategies (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007). In case resources are limited and/or 
opportunities are closed at one level, actors can overcome this by engaging at a different 
level of action. Constituting a strategic move, political and social forces can go from local 
to regional and/or national and vice versa according to the circumstances. The indigenous 
movement has been able to move easily across scales (Andolina et al., 2009) whilst 
Alianza Pais is resenting its weak performance at the local level. The lack of connection 
between national and local governments raises questions regarding the actual 
implementation of processes of decentralisation, interlocution and incorporation of local 
demands.  
 
 5.1.3 Alliances 
The reaction of Alianza Pais to the electoral setback was immediate. In Alianza Pais’ 
congress held the 1st of May 2014, the party defined a new organisational structure and 
created the Commission of Social Organisations. I interviewed the head of this 
Commission who acknowledged the weakness of Alianza Pais at the local level and the 
necessity of forging alliances with historical local actors in order to generate governance 
agreements. The first group targeted by the government was the indigenous sector. 
 I believe we have failed by focusing on the construction of a movement that responds to 
 elections; we did not focus on a political project that constructs popular power; that is 
 different. So in this moment we are working on those elements neglected in the past, 
 because  our horizon is the construction of popular power. The Commission of Social 
 Organisations was created because this is a sector that we really need to define, as well as 
 to generate relationships with historical actors who have been working on this political 
 project in one way or another. We are interested in strengthening the social fabric, on 
 capitalising on the investment made by the Ecuadorian State and the government of the 
 Citizen’s Revolution for the benefit of the collective whole. And we also want to identify 
 agendas that enable us to generate governance agreements (Patricia Cervantes, head of 
 Commission of Social Organisations-Alianza Pais. Interviewed in Quito, September 
 2014).  
 
In December 2014 the Alianza Indígena por la Revolución Ciudadana (Indigenous 
Alliance for the Citizen Revolution)81 was created, an alliance between the government 
and specific indigenous organisations (part of FENOCIN, FEI, FEINE and indigenous 
leaders participated in CODENPE). A leader of FENOCIN interviewed in September 
2014 anticipated the decision to come closer to the government arguing that they do not 
want to follow CONAIE’s orders on how to proceed in this respect. ‘We are tired of their 
                                                 
81 http://www.alianzapais.com.ec/comunicamos/9153-alianza-indigena-en-movilizacion-permanente-por-
la-revolucion-ciudadana [Accessed February 2015].  
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[CONAIE’s] manipulation. If we agreed with them we are then truly indigenous. If we 
agreed with the government we are then mercenaries, we sold our souls for money’ (IL3).  
 
The decision to forge an alliance with Correa’s government shows, first, that there is no 
homogeneous position within the indigenous movement in relation to the government. 
Three important indigenous organisations show a different position to the one taken by 
CONAIE (and its member organisations: ECUARUNARI, CONFENIAE and 
CONAICE) and Pachakutik. Internal fragmentation has characterised the indigenous 
movement from its constitution until the creation of CONAIE in 1986 and Pachakutik in 
1996. The fragmentation is due to various reasons: geographical (the division between 
Andean highlands, Amazonian lowlands and the coast played a significant role in their 
organisational history), cultural (numerous nacionalidades and pueblos), political 
(relationship with a multiplicity of actors: trade unions, political parties, the church, 
NGOs, international development agencies) and economic (the development of different 
economic activities in each region of the country: agro-export plantations in the coast, 
agricultural activities in the highlands, oil exploitation in the Amazonia) (Radcliffe, 
2015). As explained in Chapter 1, CONAIE constructed a framework around the notion 
of nacionalidades that enabled the unification into one sole movement. From then until 
the rise of Rafael Correa to power, both CONAIE and Pachakutik marked the political 
direction of the indigenous movement. This gave CONAIE a central role in the 
articulation of the political project of the movement (CONAIE, 1994; Van Cott, 2005). 
The situation changed after the Constituent Assembly, when CONAIE and its member 
organisations started showing the first signs of disagreement with the government. In this 
context the fragmentation within the indigenous movement became apparent again. 
Interpretations pointing to the cooptation of indigenous leaders by the government 
(analysed in section 5.2.1) neglects the internal diversity, fragmentation and tensions 
within the movement.  
 
On the other hand, the creation of this alliance between a sector of the indigenous 
movement and the government is significant as it actually expresses the paradoxical 
relationship between both sectors. They need each other because each of them holds 
resources needed by the other. While the indigenous movement is strong in its 
organisational structure, the lack of a strong leader affects the institutional political 
performance of the movement. Conversely, the strong leadership of Rafael Correa has 
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given Alianza Pais important national electoral victories (even winning a majority of 
seats in parliament), but this national electoral structure contrasts with a lack of 
organisational structure local levels of government (especially in the southern Andes and 
the Amazonas).  
 
The formation of alliances with specific indigenous groups after the electoral setback at 
the local level shows that despite positive performances at the national level, Rafael 
Correa is still a leader in search of a movement with a strong organisational structure. 
The next section shows that the indigenous sector is still missing the benefits of having 
a strong political leader in consonance with their political project and being able to take 
it beyond the indigenous sector. Having this resource could allow the movement to, first, 
avoid the negative implications of forced alliances; and second, to extend their political 
representativeness from the indigenous constituency to the general Ecuadorian people. 
Yet, both the government and the indigenous sector represented by CONAIE are 
involved in a bitter power dispute which made them antagonists to the point of closing 
off possibilities of negotiation. In this context, Buen Vivir represents a dispute over places 
of power, which paradoxically has generated the stagnation of the transformative 
potential represented by the idea of Buen Vivir. The stagnation is related to the loss of 
the articulation between the horizontal (emergence of demands expressed by the people) 
and vertical (articulation of these demands in a political project represented by a 
charismatic leader) axes expressed in the first moment of convergence between the 
indigenous movement and the government at the Constituent Assembly. As explained in 
the previous section, in recent years the vertical dimension has gained supremacy over 
the horizontal one reducing significantly popular participation in decision-making 
processes. 
 
 5.1.4 Rise and decline of the indigenous movement: in search of the 
 Messiah 
 Correa has never betrayed anyone because he has never lost his identity, he is the same; 
 we, the social movements, never bother to know him deeply, we just saw his cover letter 
 and said  ‘this is the one who can take us out of the mud’. And only because we think 
 there is a Messiah, a saviour who will solve our problems. The problem is organisations 
 and poor people have always thought that the solution to our problems will come from 
 someone who is above us; that is the vision of most people. But it cannot be anyone; it 
 has to be someone who shows he is with the people. He is then seen as the saviour, as the 
 Messiah, as ‘this is the one we were waiting for’. Correa was born with that, a lot of 
 people saw that in him (...) our people, people from below, are not prepared to rule this 
 country. That is why we are falling. It is always an alliance with another [leader] but no 
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 one from the indigenous womb (Edwin Mina, indigenous leader ECUARUNARI Sector 
 Juventud, interviewed October 2014 in Quito. Author’s translation). 
 
Political opportunities (agrarian reform, constitutional reforms, presence of elite allies), 
organisational alliances (with leftist parties, trade unions, NGOs, civil society 
organisations), and the strategic articulation of framing processes (peasant struggles for 
land, indigenous struggles for a Plurinational country, indigenous struggles in defence of 
Pachamama and land rights) positioned the indigenous movement, and particularly the 
CONAIE, as a powerful political force. However, with the beginning of the new 
millennium the movement faced new challenges. Alliances with unpopular political 
leaders and the participation of indigenous organisations’ leaders in State institutions that 
were socially discredited undermined the position of the indigenous movement. This not 
only marked the decline of the movement’s power to articulate and represent popular 
unrest, but also led to internal fragmentation within the movement. In other words, 
indigenous leaders’ involvement in State institutions led to the weakening of their 
leadership in what Offe (1985) calls ‘noninstitutional politics’.  
 
The indigenous movement has had many important leaders in its history who have helped 
the movement to obtain important and crucial achievements, positioning it as one of the 
most organisationally sophisticated in the region (Van Cott, 2005; Lucero, 2006; Becker, 
2008). However, individual leadership is not the most important pillar of the Ecuadorian 
indigenous movement. The strength of its political and social organising project has 
always surpassed the action of individual leaders within the movement. The indigenous 
movement represented by CONAIE in Ecuador has been able to create and consolidate a 
strong organisational structure able to advance independently of its leaders. 
Notwithstanding this feature of the movement, it was apparent in many interviews with 
indigenous activists that there is concern over the lack of a charismatic leader born out 
of the movement who can compete with Rafael Correa. The charisma and popular support 
that Rafael Correa has gained since coming to office has led them to rethink the role of 
leaders within and outside the movement, as well as their power to mobilise and push for 
the implementation of indigenous historical demands.  
 
The indigenous elite represented by CONAIE argue about the necessity of forging 
alliances with leaders outside the movement in order to gain political strength. They state 
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that outsiders such as Lucio Gutierrez and Rafael Correa used indigenous demands, 
including them as part of their campaign discourse, but betrayed the movement once in 
power, weakening it. Past alliances have taken away CONAIE’s credibility and popular 
legitimacy and have made their members wary of future alliances.  
 [In 2005] there was no candidate identified by social movements or left movements as the 
 one who can mobilise our proposals. Correa started taking those proposals and 
 incorporating them in his discourse; he started talking about the proposals elaborated by 
 social movements: the plan of Buen Vivir, food sovereignty, the rejection of Free Trade 
 Agreements, etc. He appropriated those proposals; he appropriated the indigenous 
 discourse without approaching indigenous leaders but forming his ring of trust. He did 
 not need to use them for long because for the next elections he was already well 
 positioned. And he got what he was looking for, that other sectors sought to establish 
 alliances with him during the campaign. That was the strategy of the indigenous 
 movement, to forge alliances as we did it in the past with Lucio Gutierrez (Caty  Machoa, 
 indigenous leader sector Mujeres, CONAIE, interviewed in Quito, October 2014. 
 Author’s translation).  
 
It is apparent in the interviews that there is also regret for not having a political leader 
who identified himself as indigenous, as in the case of Evo Morales82 in Bolivia. The 
Bolivian president represents, for Ecuadorian indigenous representatives, a leader who 
can both mobilise indigenous historic demands while making them general enough to 
gain support from those sectors not particularly close to the indigenous cause (Stefanoni, 
2009; Garcia Linera, 2010; Silva, 2016). The confluence of these two characteristics is 
what they identify as the key factor that has enabled Evo Morales to gain control of the 
State. Even though Morales has been in recent years criticised by a sector of the Bolivian 
indigenous movement, his origins as a peasant leader and proximity to social movements 
puts him in a better position than Correa (Stefanoni, 2016; Postero, 2010; 2013). Silva 
(2016: 9) explains that in the case of Rafael Correa ‘[m]any on the left have wondered if 
Correa is “a true leftist.” They see in his actions a brazen violation of the new 
constitution. He has been accused of denying workers, teachers, and indigenous 
organizations an effective voice in the government and distancing himself from the social 
movements’. 
 
The demand for a leader born out of the movement was shared by most of the 
interviewees. However, authors such as Zamosc (2007), Becker (2010), and Altman 
(2013) have warned about the negative implications that an indigenous leader might have 
                                                 
82 Evo Morales, former coca growers’ leader and current leader of the Movimiento al Socialismo 
(Movement Toward Socialism, MAS), was elected president of Bolivia in 2005 with 54 per cent of votes, 
re-elected in 2009 with 64 per cent, and re-elected for a third presidential term in 2014 with 60 per cent 
of votes. Morales is the first indigenous president in the history of the country (Webber, 2011).  
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for their struggle: (i) an indigenous leader could emphasise the ethnic factor to a point of 
alienating the movement from other social agents who acted as allies in the past; (ii) the 
internal fragmentation of the indigenous movement can hinder the chance of having a 
leader representing the whole movement; (iii) the increasing rural/urban division among 
indigenous people can hinder the election of a leader able to represent them all. The 
authors remark that an indigenous leader has to have the political openness to connect 
the movement with diverse sectors of society.  
 
The indigenous movement in Ecuador has led popular contentious action since the 1990s. 
The representation of popular grievances was achieved not only due to the movement’s 
capacity to mobilise its members in an ‘anti-neoliberal’ struggle but also due to its ability 
to elaborate demands and include them in a coherent political project (Buen Vivir and the 
Plurinational State) (Altman, 2013). Notwithstanding the regret expressed for not having 
strong political leaders born out of the movement, interviewees remarked on the 
importance of intellectual indigenistas in the definition and mobilisation of Sumak 
Kawsay as a political idea. Most of these intellectuals are Kichwas, hold university 
degrees and are prolific publishers, have strong linkages with the main indigenous 
movement organisations and engage in significant participation with international 
organisations (United Nations, Inter-American Institute of Human Rights, Andean 
Coordinator of Indigenous Organisations, and so on). Their work has been crucial for the 
proliferation of their understanding of Sumak Kawsay (discussed in Chapter 4). However, 
reflection on the necessity of a politically strong leader who can guarantee entrance to 
institutional power structures provokes questions about the potential and limitations of 
social movements’ political organisation when this feature is missing. 
 
In addition, the indigenous movement has shown its capacity to build a solid national 
organisation, which connects local, regional and national scales of action (Andolina et 
al., 2009). This structure appears to endure and advance independently of individual 
leadership. However, it is actually this absence that has forced the indigenous movement 
to create unsuccessful alliances with those who are strategically better positioned in the 
political arena. This was the case with Rafael Correa. He was an outsider of the 
Ecuadorian political scene without a movement and organisational structure to support 
him. Nevertheless, he has become the leader of the political process in Ecuador, 
suggesting that strategic and organisational reasoning cannot in itself determine the 
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course of political transformation. The materialization of contingencies (for example, the 
emergence of a charismatic and popular leader) plays a decisive role in determining the 
course of a political process.  
 
 
5.2. Co-optation and (de)mobilisation 
While the construction of a stronger organisational structure at different levels is still a 
pending task for Rafael Correa and Alianza Pais, they recognise that that is actually the 
strongest feature of one of their main opponents in the popular arena. If Alianza Pais 
wants to win the support of the popular sector it has to negotiate with one of the principal 
actors still controlling it: the indigenous movement. By 2005 the latter was weakened 
due to their mistakes at forging strategic alliances, which led to the loss of support and a 
poor performance in the electoral politics of Pachakutik as voters turned to other leftist 
parties (Van Cott, 2005). Nevertheless, the indigenous movement still enjoys popular 
legitimacy thanks to their struggle against neoliberal policies especially during the 1990s.  
 
Since his emergence onto the political scene, Correa has identified important leaders and 
offered them positions in government. This was the government’s way of negotiating 
with the indigenous sector. The acceptance of those positions has generated friction 
within the indigenous sector as many interpret the participation of their leaders in the 
State as an attempt to co-opt and divide their organisations. As explained in section 5.1.1, 
the indigenous movement and the organisations that represent it have always been 
fragmented by geographic, political, cultural and ideological positions (Lucero, 2006). 
However, the presence of Correa and Alianza Pais has exacerbated those divisions to the 
point of submerging the indigenous leaders in a state of disorientation. The president of 
CONFENIAE, Franco Viteri, explained in an interview the current division existing 
within the indigenous movement into three ideological groups: a historic one (mainly 
related to the demand for the construction of a Plurinational State), a pro-election one (in 
reference mainly to those supporting Pachakutik) and the Correistas (those who are 
willing to give their support to the government of Rafael Correa).  
 There are three groups within the indigenous movement, three ideological groups: one 
 that stands for the historic struggle; a second one which is pro-elections that only thinks 
 about elections for its own benefit; and a third one that grows with Correa, the Correistas, 
 those who made alliances with him. The first two groups generated fragmentation within 
 the movement, which started losing power. Then, in relation to Correa, some wanted the 
 alliance and others did not. This created more fragmentation within the movement 
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 (Franco Viteri, President CONFENIAE, interviewed in Quito, October  2014.  Author’s 
 translation).  
  
 
The existence of the Correistas within the indigenous movement shows that the 
interpretation of the current relationship between the indigenous movement and the State 
only as cooptation is questionable as it neglects, first, the internal fragmentation within 
the indigenous movement that pre-existed the rise of Rafael Correa to power, and second, 
the agency of those factions willing to work along the government. In this sense, Lapegna 
(2014: 8) argues that ‘[c]ooptation privileges a top-down understanding of the 
relationship between the polity and social movements, downplaying relational and 
interpretative processes. It may be shortsighted to see the relationships between social 
movement and the polity in terms of the latter “manipulating” the former, or to assume 
that leaders can easily control their constituents’.  
 
It is palpable from the interviews that the only way to get out of this state of confusion 
regarding the position of the movement vis-à-vis the government (and the strong 
leadership of Rafael Correa) is to denounce the co-optation of their leaders and ideas. In 
fact, the current relationship between social movements and the State in contemporary 
Ecuador has been widely interpreted as co-optation rather than participation (Zibechi, 
2009; Adamovsky, 2009). Some of the indigenous organisations interpret the division 
within the movement as a result of the actions of the government. Key members are now 
working with Correa and supporting the Revolución Ciudadana. This is seen by the 
indigenous opposition as the abandonment of radical and transformational demands by 
those occupying governmental positions. For the indigenous sector opposing Correa, 
working with and for the government at this particular moment means leaving behind 
their political project, as well as the bond with the communitarian sphere, in order to 
align with the project of the government, which is still based on an extractive economy 
and is reluctant to open spaces for critical deliberation. This has redoubled the indigenous 
demand for autonomy and its opposition to the current government, closing off in turn 
any possibility of dialogue.  
 
For others, however, the division within the movement preceded Correa and is marked 
by factors such as indigenous movement’s participation in electoral politics and the 
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consolidation of an indigenous bourgeoisie. In this context, Correa’s strategic approach 
to indigenous leaders exacerbated the fragmentation.  
Within the indigenous movement there are now apparent class divisions. Since 1996, when 
Pachakutik was created, a sector of the indigenous movement has positioned itself at the 
electoral level and stayed there for too long. They are thinking of making strategic alliances 
with the right, while also accumulating money because they earn much more than a worker. 
This is generating a difference between a very small sector [of the movement] and the 
majority. This is happening not only with the sector involved in electoral politics but also 
with other sectors of indigenous people who have started making a lot of money. For instance, 
in Otavalo they have a lot of workers, large  factories, hotels, textiles. So there is already a 
big difference between the indigenous person who is a worker, a peasant, a housewife, and 
the other who has employees and means of production, who works at the financial sector 
where you can see they are earning 35.000 dollars. They are all indigenous, some in and 
others out of the organisation. The wealthiest represent other interests, their own interests and 
those of this emergent indigenous economic group. They forged alliances with the 
bourgeoisie of this country. The distance from this sector started before Correa’s government 
but it strongly increased with this government. In the coming years it is going to be evident 
that there are two fractions: those who have a capitalist vision who are dominated by the 
indigenous bourgeoisie emerging within the indigenous movement; and the other sector is 
the historic one that manages to unite people from below, that represents exploited, 
oppressed, poor people. This has never happened before but is what is happening within the 
indigenous movement. That rupture is going to happen. We are going to fight for the 
grassroots and for the ideology of the bases. We are advocating for that rupture because 
otherwise we are all together, and the enemy can easily hide in this crowd (Delfin Tenesaca, 
indigenous leader ECUARUNARI, interviewed November 2014 in Quito. Author’s 
translation). 
 
The history of the relationship between the indigenous movement and the State shows a 
complexity that cannot be reduced in terms of co-optation or demobilisation. The 
existence of internal divisions within the movement regarding the support to the 
government and the involvement in State institutions points to the diversity of positions 
within the movement in relation to these questions. The indigenous movement in Ecuador 
has a vast history of ambivalent relations with the State, but throughout its history has 
been able to position itself as a necessary interlocutor for governments and the State 
(Andolina et al, 2009). At times, the State has been considered an ally able to extend its 
regulations and legislation to the rural sector (Burbano de Lara, 2010; Tuaza, 2010); at 
times, the movement has demanded its protection; it has claimed the affirmation of rights 
using legal mechanisms (for example, the international ILO Convention 169); indigenous 
representatives have held official positions in State institutions (chapter 1); and the State 
has been also considered as a repressive and colonial apparatus, an “enemy” of the 
indigenous question (Bonetto, 2012; Quijano, 2009). These changes in the relationship 
between social movements and the State have been mainly due to the spaces and 
possibilities made available by the State, as well as those that have been opened up by 
the transformational actions of social movements.  
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I agree with authors such as O’Donnell (1993, 2007), Tapia (2009), and Natalucci (2012) 
that this dynamic between the State and social movements should be interpreted as a 
struggle for the institutionalisation of norms and interaction patterns. These processes of 
institutionalisation transform and redefine the forms of participation, the mechanisms of 
representation and the dispositive of legitimating, which as a whole forms the political 
community (O’Donnell, 1993; 2007). Institutionalisation as process mediating the social 
and the political implies, first, moments of creation of norms and actions; and second, 
moments of implementation of those norms and actions. I argue that what is at stake in 
contemporary Ecuador is related to the definition and implementation of Buen Vivir. In 
this struggle the dispute over the meaning and ownership of Buen Vivir is used, first, to 
trace political boundaries (as examined in Chapter 4) establishing distinctive positions 
within the political realm. Second, a set of political strategies is deployed in order to 
impose one particular understanding of Buen Vivir to guide its implementation (analysed 
in this chapter). It is in this struggle that the State transforms the previous channels and 
forms of participation of indigenous movements in State institutions. The relative 
autonomy (power) these sectors had in the past to manage public organisms and 
institutions of the State have been limited by the government of Rafael Correa (Ramirez, 
2014). This is the result of power struggles between the government and the indigenous 
movement, which are reflected and impact on State institutions. As discussed in Chapter 
2, the State appears here not as neutral but as an arena for the unfolding of disagreements 
and struggles between different forces.  
 
In this sense, and contrary to the interpretation of indigenous opposition, I propose the 
consideration of the dynamic between the indigenous sector – as part of civil society – 
and the State in contemporary Ecuador not only as co-optation or demobilisation, but as 
the ongoing restructuring of the mediation between civil and political society through 
processes of institutionalisation. The interpretation of co-optation maintains and 
reinforces the divide between the social and the political spheres. I argue that the dynamic 
between movements and the State encompass a tension, in turn blurring that divide. This 
dynamic moves from movements of articulation and moments of differentiation and 
fragmentation both between and within these sectors. While the writing of the new 
Constitution that includes Buen Vivir as guiding principle can be considered as the 
moment of creation of new norms and articulation between the indigenous movement 
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and the government, the current dispute between CONAIE and the government of Rafael 
Correa can be interpreted as a struggle over the implementation of those norms and 
patterns of action. In this struggle they are disputing spaces of power and are not willing 
to give in to the conditions imposed by the other sector.  
 
As explained in Chapter 1, during the 1990s the indigenous movement forged an 
alternative project that started to be implemented in the mid-2000s when Correa gained 
power. Since then, the debate and struggle over crucial questions, such as the economic 
and development model, the role of nature, and individual and collective rights, has been 
reinforced and enacted by these political forces. Far from being silenced or suppressed, 
the debate has reached a higher level involving more actors than before (such as young 
environmentalists like Yasunidos) and more ‘sophisticated’ demands. Whilst before the 
Revolución Ciudadana popular demands referred to basic social rights such as health and 
education, today’s demands are related to mining projects, water usage and land 
distribution. The transformation and refinement of these demands illustrates the 
improvement of welfare provision by the State, as well as achievements obtained through 
popular struggle in Ecuador. This transformation has given social and political stability 
to the country, in turn shifting the dynamic between opposing forces. In March 2016, the 
UNDP (United Nation Development Programme) regional representative83, Jessica 
Faieta, participated in a public meeting at the National Assembly in Ecuador. The UNDP 
representative highlighted the success of social and economic policies in Ecuador 
considering them as one of the best in the region due to the achievement of poverty 
reduction and social development. Social policies include an increasing public 
investment in areas such as health and education. From 2003 to 2011, poverty rates based 
on income have fallen from 49.8 to 28.6 per cent at a national level, from 71.3 to 50.9 
per cent in rural areas and from 38.7 to 17.4 per cent in urban areas84. In total, over one 
million people were lifted out of poverty. 
 
Despite the recent decline of Correa’s approval rating, from 55 per cent (April 2015) to 
46 per cent (June 2015), a large number of the Ecuadorian population is still willing to 
vote for Rafael Correa as he is still perceived as the leader who delivers longstanding 
                                                 
83 http://www.ec.undp.org/content/ecuador/es/home/presscenter/articles/2016/03/24/jessica-faieta-
destaca-pol-ticas-sociales-de-ecuador-para-la-reducci-n-de-la-pobreza/ [Accessed March 2016].  
84 Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INEC).   
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demands (CEDATOS, 2015). In 2015, the then Minister for Culture, Guillaume Long, 
explains that  
 ...Ecuador has seen a great drop in inequality that has clearly contributed to the 
 government’s popularity. Redistribution, less unemployment [4.7 per cent in 2015] 
 and the reduction of poverty are, in part, the consequence of high levels of public 
 investment. In clear contrast to the neoliberal orthodoxy that  government should be 
 rolled back, the State has built nurseries, schools, hospitals, universities, roads and 
 wider infrastructure. 85 
These measures have generated massive support from both the working and middle 
classes86. In order to construct effective and strategic alternatives to it, the opposition 
(including the indigenous movement) has so far failed to interpret the new social and 
political context in contemporary Ecuador by only appealing to the ‘cooptation’ 
explanation.    
 
5.3 Repertories of action: New wave of mass demonstrations 
From the 1990s until the mid 2000s large-scale demonstrations were a powerful political 
tool of the country’s public sphere, led mainly by the indigenous movement. The crisis 
triggered by the implementation of neoliberal policies mobilised people on the streets 
demanding change. The number of socio-political conflicts as well as street mobilisations 
diminished (Table 6) in the period 2008-2009, with the arrival of Rafael Correa, the 














                                                 




86 Accessed November 2015: http://www.as-coa.org/articles/explainer-whats-behind-ecuadors-2015-
protests  
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Source: Observatorio Conflictividad Socio-Politica. Revista Ecuador Debate No. 73-84. 
 
Authors such as Sander (2011) warn about mobilisations against governments that 
identify themselves with the left, arguing that such actions can contribute to enhance the 
position of those sectors identified with the right spectrum within the political arena. The 
author argues that those social movements confronting governments such as the one of 
Rafael Correa might be ‘mistaking a vacillating ally for the enemy’ (Sander, 2011: 104). 
This partly explains the diminishing number of mass demonstrations between 2008 and 
2009. However, the situation has changed in recent years as a group of diverse actors 
have been calling for mobilisations against the decisions of the government of the 
Revolución Ciudadana. The necessity of alliances of the indigenous movement has even 
led a sector to get close to representatives of the right political spectrum in Ecuador in 
order to oppose the power of Rafael Correa and his project of unlimited election. This is 
the case of Pachakutik and Guillermo Lasso, for example. The approach has been 
strongly criticised by CONAIE, among others87. 
 
From 2010 onwards, several demonstrations organised by the indigenous movement took 
place, mainly in Quito, without mobilising a large number of activists on the streets.88 
                                                 
87 http://www.telegrafo.com.ec/politica/item/conaie-rechazo-reunion-entre-pachakutik-y-guillermo-
lasso.html [Accessed April 2015].  
88 http://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/marcha-agua-ley-aguas-indigenas.html [Available online. 
Accessed March 2012].  
Period No. Conflicts 
November 2007-February 2008 163 
March 2008-June 2008 155 
July 2008-October 2008 117 
November 2008-February 2009 98 
March 2009-June 2009 95 
July 2009-October 2009 134 
November 2009-February 2010 220 
March 2010-June 2010 270 
July 2010-October 2010 358 
November 2010-February 2011 248 
March 2011-June 2011 257 
July 2011-October 2011 286 
 163 
An example is the Marcha por la vida y la dignidad de los pueblos convened by the 
indigenous movement in 2012 to demand the Water Law. Barely 500 people attended 
this demonstration. The lack of support from the middle class for indigenous 
mobilisations is an important factor in the weakening of the indigenous movement, 
making apparent their loss of power at convening and mobilising a wider sector of 
Ecuadorian society. Humberto Cholango, a historic leader of the indigenous movement, 
explained this loss of support due to the creation of a new middle class working for the 
government of Rafael Correa. 
Correa got it right with the organisational division. This division has different moments. The 
first one is the moment of the middle class. When Correa came to power there were nine 
ministries and around 300.000 public servants, today there are 20 ministries and one million 
public servants. What has he done? He created jobs for the middle class. Correa says ‘there 
are no pelucones [people from the right political spectrum] in this government’ even though 
they still control the economy, the industry, companies. But Correa created another right 
sector, a right within the government, a bureaucratic right which is the middle class working 
at the ministries. You find families from the poorest neighbours with a relative working in 
the government. So that family is not going to support our organisation while his relative has 
a salary. If that family says or do something against the government Correa discharges them 
from their jobs. In that way Correa managed to weaken the organisations and the social 
struggle in the country, especially in Quito where due to its history the middle class strongly 
supported the indigenous movement; we are not supported by the middle class right now 
(Humberto Cholango, former President CONAIE, interviewed August 2014 in Quito. 
Author’s  translation).  
 
However, since 2014 there has been a rise in large-scale mobilisations gathering an 
increasing amount of people as a strategy to show discontent with the government and to 
put forward movements’ demands and proposals (Table 7). The convenors of these 
mobilisations, however, represent a mix of sectors that identify themselves as 
representatives of the ‘frente de unidad popular’ (front of popular unity). The increase in 
mobilisations has also been accompanied by an increase in the number of people 
attending the demonstrations (although these new demonstrations do not equal in number 
the ones that took place in the 1990s). For instance, in September 2014 a demonstration 
was organised by the union Frente Unitario de los Trabajadores (United Workers Front), 
mainly against a new Labour Code proposed by Alianza Pais. While the union was the 
principal convener, the demonstration was a display of alliances between different 
sectors, such as indigenous groups, unionists, teachers, telecommunications workers, 
doctors, students, journalists, and environmentalists. As shown in Table 7, this coalition 
of actors marched together in several demonstrations. This indicates how Ecuadorian 
civil society is now working as a multi-organisational space in order to coordinate 
heterogeneous demands and resources (Natalucci, 2013).  
 164 
 
Table 7: Chronology mass demonstrations May 2014 – June 2015 
May 2014 
Organised by trade unions against the new Labour Code discussed 
at the National Assembly 
July 2014 
Organised by the indigenous movement against the Water Law. 
Organisation of Parlamento de los Pueblos (Peoples’ Parlament) 
July 2014 
Organised by unions, students and indigenous movements against 
the new Labour Code 
September 2014 
Organised by students against the rise of public transport cost 
November 2014 
Organised by trade unions and indigenous movement against the 
new Labour Code 
March 2015 
Organised by trade unions against the new Labour Code. CONAIE 
participated against legal eviction notice of its headquarters 
building 
May 2015 
Organised by indigenous movement, trade unions, student 
movements, doctors and teachers against FTA, the rise of public 
transport cost, re-categorisation of teachers’ retirement funds 
June 2015 
Organised by indigenous movement, trade unions, environmental 
movements against changes on the national constitution 
August 2015 
National Strike organised by CONAIE, Frente de Unidad Popular, 
trade unions against constitutional changes, Decreto 16, against 
Water and Land Laws, in favour of free admission to universities, 
for bilingual education, against the FTA, against open-pit large-
scale mining projects 
Source: Observatorio Conflictividad Socio-Politica. Revista Ecuador Debate No. 73-84.  
 
Unlike the demands of the 1990s, which were general, universal and against a clear 
‘enemy’ (that is, the neoliberal regime), this time the grievances and demands mobilised 
were eclectic, sectoral, and particular to each group: 
 (i) against the new Labour Code;  
(ii) against the Telecommunications Law;  
(iii) against the exploitation of the Yasuni-ITT; 
(iv) against the recategorisation of teachers’ retirement funds; 
(v) against Decreto 16; 
(vi) for bilingual education and indigenous justice;  
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(vii) against the rise of public transport cost; 
(viii) against the Water and Land Laws; 
(ix) against the proposal to indefinitely re-elect all elected officials. 
 
The particular agenda mobilised by the indigenous movement is mainly focused on five 
issues: 1) the rejection of the Water Resources Law; 2) the project of the Rural Land and 
Ancestral Territories Law; 3) indigenous justice; 4) the rejection of Free Trade 
Agreement; and 5) the rejection of the Decreto 16. 
(1) the rejection of the recently approved Water Resources Law, which gives the State 
complete power to plan the provision of service and the management of water resources 
for irrigation and human consumption. Indigenous leaders claim that this new law, first, 
allows the privatisation of natural water sources; second, it does not recognise the 
existing administration of communitarian governments; third, it excludes indigenous and 
peasant representatives from decision-making bodies as the newly created Autoridad 
Única del Agua (a Plurinational and Intercultural Water Council was created as part of 
this authority to incorporate indigenous demands to control and participate in the design, 
promotion and evaluation of public policies related to water. Despite this, indigenous 
representatives still have no power to make decisions or reject regulations of the 
Autoridad Única del Agua as was originally demanded); and fourth, it does not cancel 
the concessions given to mining projects in the country89; 
 
(2) the project of the Rural Land and Ancestral Territories Law90: indigenous leaders are 
demanding participation in the design of this law and the implementation of a 
consultation prior to its approval. They are calling for a law that allows the fair 
redistribution of land and food sovereignty, and that respects communitarian 
governments, their management over the territory, and collective land rights (as 
guaranteed in the national Constitution, article 171);   
 
                                                 
89 http://www.telegrafo.com.ec/politica/item/concluyo-debate-sobre-ley-de-aguas-documento.html    
[Accessed June 2014];  http://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2014/07/03/nota/3182026/indigenas-
gobierno-se-confrontaron [Accessed July, 2014].  
90 http://www.telegrafo.com.ec/politica/item/comision-recomienda-la-realizacion-de-una-consulta-
prelegislativa-para-la-ley-de-tierras.html [Accessed December 2014]; 
http://expreso.ec/expreso/plantillas/nota.aspx?idart=7126245&idcat=19308&tipo=2 [Accessed 
November 2014].  
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(3) indigenous justice: the Constitutional Court recently decided to limit the right of 
indigenous communities to manage and resolve their conflicts internally according to 
communitarian justice.91 The legal resolution dictates that communitarian justice can 
only be applied to minor conflicts, but not to those which are an attempt against life (e.g., 
murder, rape). This is interpreted as a limitation of the Plurinational State. Indigenous 
leaders have declared themselves in rebellion against this measure.  
 
(4) the rejection to the recently signed Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Ecuador 
and the European Union (EU). The struggle against the signing of Free Trade Agreements 
(FTA) has been a historical one strongly defended by the indigenous movement. In 2005, 
popular mobilisations stopped the bilateral agreement the government of Ecuador 
intended to sign with the US (Acosta et al., 2006). The rejection of these agreements was 
one of the strongest demands by the time Rafael Correa emerged, a demand that Correa 
was able to integrate as part of his rhetoric92 (Rosales, 2013). In 2006 Rafael Correa 
wrote: “the idea of free trade benefiting always and everybody is simply a fallacy or naive 
closer to religion than science, and it does not stand up to a profound theoretical, 
empirical or historical analysis” (Acosta et al., 2006. Spanish in the original. Author’s 
translation). 
 
However, in 2014 the government of Ecuador signed a Free Trade Agreement with the 
European Union, which has caused unrest especially in rural and indigenous sectors. Isch 
(2014), Acosta (2014), Acosta et al. (2006), Falconí and Jácome (2005) argue that the 
agreements entailed more than bilateral tariff elimination. These authors argue that FTA 
affects legal sovereignty and food security; it has a detrimental impact on employment 
and on the subsistence of small and medium-sized enterprises; it restricts access to 
medicines due to prohibitive prices; it affects intellectual property on ancestral 
knowledge and the management of genetic material coming from biodiversity habitats; 
and finally, it restricts sovereignty in the establishment of processes of reduction or even 
elimination of public debt.  
 
                                                 
91  http://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2014/08/10/nota/3356526/resolucion-cc-afecta-estructuras-que-
son-milenarias [Accessed September 2014].  
92 Rafael Correa and colleagues even published a book about this called “El Rostro Oculto del TLC” 
(The Hidden Face of Free Trade Agreements) (Acosta et al., 2006).  
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The main beneficiaries of the FTA are large agro-industrialists exporting fish, bananas, 
cut flowers, coffee, cocoa, broccoli, fruits and nuts (Acosta et al, 2006). Those most 
affected by the FTA are peasants practicing small-scale agriculture. The unrest caused 
by the signing of the FTA strengthens the demand for the design and implementation of 
an agrarian reform, which has been at the top of indigenous and peasant movements’ 
demands for decades. Land concentration is still high and living conditions in rural areas 
are still precarious. Although poverty rates have declined since Correa came to power, 
more than half of the rural population still lives below the poverty line. The indigenous 
movement is pushing for an agrarian reform and an economic model based on small and 
medium-scale agricultural production. Powerful elites in control of the agro-industry 
exercise pressure against any type of reform. By not confronting the economic elites and 
not dismantling structures of land concentration (5 per cent of landowners have 52 per 
cent of agricultural land), Correa has become the target of ferocious criticism (Machado, 
2012).   
 
(5)  The rejection of the Decreto 16: this decree, signed by president Correa in June 2013, 
obligates social and civil organisations to register with State institutions and to inform 
them about their constitution, objectives, financial resources, and the composition of their 
members. The State is responsible for approving the legal standing of such organisations. 
Demonstrations and any act of social rebellion that questions public policies and/or State 
decisions can be interpreted by the State as a threat and, therefore, be used to dissolve 
the organisations involved. Indigenous leaders argue that this decree cannot be 
interpreted without considering activists’ denunciations of persecution and the 
criminalisation of protests since Correa came into power.   
 
This new wave of demonstrations is the third episode analysed in this thesis as a moment 
of articulation between different social and political actors as well as a moment of 
differentiation and fragmentation between these sectors and the government. It takes 
place in a context of social and political stability, marking a difference compared with 
actions in times of crisis (the 1990s and beginning of 2000s) and post-crisis (2006 
onwards). This is the reason why I name this as ‘new’ wave of demonstrations in 
comparison with the ones taken place during the anti-neoliberal struggle during the 
1990s. Mobilisations today demonstrate that those opposing the government are 
minorities, which by themselves are unlikely to be harmful to the power currently held 
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by the government of Alianza Pais. Pulling together heterogeneous grievances is the 
method by which these actors gather people on the street in order to show their power of 
mobilisation.  For the indigenous sector, this means marching alongside sectors that are 
not necessarily close to their Buen Vivir cosmology. The effect of this is to weaken the 
political impact they have towards the construction of a Plurinational State to reach Buen 
Vivir. While all these actors are able to put together their demands in mass 
demonstrations, they fail to reach to a common framework that can work as an amalgam 
of all their grievances and claims. In the 1990s, the heterogeneity of the people marching 
and blocking streets in the main cities of Ecuador created a common voice for their 
struggle. This struggle was clearly identified as an ‘anti-neoliberal’ one and the 
foundations of an alternative were put on display. Now that Buen Vivir and the new 
Constitution have been legally proclaimed as representatives of the alternative to the 
neoliberal regime and heralded by a leftist government, there seems to be a lack of a 
mobilising ethos to unite different sectors in a powerful way.   
 
The mobilisations were interpreted by the government and its allies as an attempt to 
destabilize the government. The government’s response was to mobilise activists in 
official demonstrations around the country to show support for the President and the 
government. The ethos in this case was clear: they were marching against the 
‘restauración conservadora’ and in defence of the Revolución Ciudadana. In September 
2014, the formation of a coalition of 15 local and national organisations of the left 
(including, among others, Alianza Pais, Partido Comunista Ecuatoriano, Partido 
Socialista Frente Amplio, and even a fraction of the indigenous party Pachakutik-
Chimborazo) called Unidos was announced.93 This new coalition’s main plan of action 
is the implementation of the Socialiasmo del Buen Vivir.  
 
The mobilisations against the government provoked hostile reactions from the 
government. One form of retaliation taken by Correa’s government targeting the 
indigenous movement was to announce the end of the contract CONAIE had with the 
State for its headquarters building. The current Ministry of Economic and Social 
Inclusion gave the CONAIE the order to vacate the building by the end of December 
                                                 
93 http://www.telegrafo.com.ec/politica/item/la-izquierda-ecuatoriana-se-une-en-un-inedito-frente-de-15-
organizaciones.html [Accessed October 2014].  
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201494. According to Correa, the main reason underpinning this decision is that a public 
building cannot be used for political, electoral, or religious purposes, citing that CONAIE 
was using it not for social but political reasons. CONAIE has occupied that building since 
1990 when the then Ministry of Social Welfare gave the public building to the indigenous 
organisation on free loan. The building has historic and symbolic connotations for 
popular sectors: (i) the struggle against neoliberal policies; (ii) the evolution of the 
indigenous movement’s organisational bases in Ecuador; and (iii) one of today’s few 
spaces of organised resistance still marking limits and challenging the government and 
its Revolución Ciudadana. The news has been taken by members, supporters and even 
opponents to the movement (mainly people from the government) as a ‘bad political 
strategy’ for Correa.95 CONAIE has declared it would not comply with the legal eviction 
notice. The President has been nationally and internationally criticised for this decision, 
while the indigenous organisation has received numerous expressions of support. To 
some extent, the signs of support and solidarity shown by other sectors and organisations 
have revitalised the indigenous position in the struggle for democratic participation. In 
turn, the image of Rafael Correa as the only centre of authority not willing to open spaces 
for deliberation and dissent has been made more apparent. Notwithstanding this the 
government’s popularity and political legitimacy have not been particularly affected.  
 
 5.4 Final Remarks 
In this Chapter I analysed the main resources,  repertoire of action and the leadership 
structure deployed mainly by CONAIE and the government of Rafael Correa. In relation 
to the latter, I argued about the importance of leadership to launch and make dominant a 
particular definition of Buen Vivir. I showed that the leadership and political legitimacy 
gained by Rafael Correa moved Buen Vivir from a lifeworld cosmology representing an 
alternative to capitalism to a vision of State consolidation that emphasises the 
construction of a sovereign nation. I also argued that the indigenous movement 
represented by the CONAIE have an enduring and strong organisational structure but the 
lack of strong political leaders that can take their idea of Buen Vivir beyond the 
indigenous sector put them in disadvantageous position. For the past 40 years, indigenous 
                                                 
94http://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2015/01/12/nota/4427996/temas-discordia-se-llevan-bases 
[Accessed January 2015].  
95http://www.elcomercio.com.ec/actualidad/conaie-alianza-pais-edificio-enfrentamientos.html  [Accessed 
January 2015].  
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organisations have been very active, and have had significant influence in the Ecuadorian 
political decision-making process. They have been able to raise the “Indian Question” as 
a political issue through their own efforts. This political activism included major political 
acts, such as forming political parties, participating in State institutions, and putting 
forward radical policy alternatives, such as the ones represented by Buen Vivir. The 
indigenous movement positioned itself as a necessary political interlocutor for 
governments and the State. However, the emergence of such an extremely popular and 
charismatic leader as Rafael Correa, representing a left-turn in Ecuadorian history, has 
led the movement to a state of confusion, which shows their lack of this particular 
political asset: a strong leader. Indigenous leadership that transcends the indigenous 
sector is becoming problematic to achieve and is proven to be an obstacle in their 
struggle. On the other hand, whilst the indigenous movement is still strong at representing 
the local level, the adverse electoral results in local elections for the government of 
Alianza Pais have shed a light on the lack of organisational structure of this political 
force at the local level.  
 
In relation to the creation of alliances between a sector of the indigenous movement 
(excluding CONAIE) and the government is significant as it actually expresses the 
paradoxical relationship between both sectors. They need each other because each of 
them holds resources needed by the other. In this context, the fragmentation within the 
indigenous movement became apparent again. I argue that interpretations pointing to the 
co-optation of indigenous leaders by the government neglect the internal diversity, 
fragmentation and tensions within the indigenous movement.  
  
Finally, I showed that a new wave of demonstrations in a context of social and political 
stability demonstrates that those opposing the government are minorities that need to 
form coalitions and put together heterogeneous grievances in order to show their power 
of mobilisation. The CONAIE is forging alliances with other sectors such as unionists, 
teachers, students and environmentalists. This indicates that civil society in Ecuador is 
currently working as a multi-organisational space in order to coordinate heterogeneous 
demands and resources.  
 
Contrary to analyses that reduce this struggle to one of co-optation or demobilization, I 
argue that the “Buen Vivir era” in Ecuador has opened a new phase in the relationship 
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between social movements and the State, in which they are struggling over the definition 
and implementation of new norms and actions represented in their definitions of Buen 
Vivir. In this process of institutionalisation of Buen Vivir, these actors are reconfiguring 
the mediation between both sectors, processes of participation and mechanisms of 
representation. The locus of the struggle is the State but the struggle points to the need to 
rethink the definition of the State, its functions and institutions.  
 
In the next chapter I analyse the expression of this struggle at the institutional level, the 
mainstreaming of one dominant understanding of Buen Vivir at the State level and the 



























Mainstreaming Buen Vivir: the institutional impact  
 
 
Basically, we are doing things better  
within the same model of accumulation,  
rather than changing it,  
because we do not want to harm the rich;  
but it is our intention to have a more just  
and equitable society 





So far, I have shown that the battle over the meaning and ownership of Buen Vivir is 
political. In Chapter 4 I have distinguished three main definitions of Buen Vivir supported 
by the indigenous movement represented by CONAIE, the government of Rafael Correa 
and environmental activists. I have shown that these definitions are the product of a 
process of rationalisation, which refers to actions that make definitions of Buen Vivir 
consistent with the political objectives of the groups supporting them. I have also 
demonstrated that this process of rationalisation points to the expansion of the 
instrumental and strategic rationality to trace boundaries between competing political 
forces in order to establish positions in a political realm which seems to be under a 
process of renewal. This process of renewal of political settlements is primarily 
characterised by: (i) a central role of the State in planning and controlling the economy, 
which has led to a greater control and regulation of market forces whilst at the same time 
increasing the State’s decision-making power over public policy; (ii) the fall of traditional 
political parties; (iii) the rise of popular political leaders; and (iv) the articulation of a 
post-neoliberal political project represented by Buen Vivir. In Chapter 5, I have focused 
the analysis on the mobilising structures of the CONAIE and the government of Rafael 
Correa. These mobilising structures refer particularly to the resources and strategies put 
forward by them with the main objective to impose their own definition of Buen Vivir. I 
have argued that indigenous leadership that transcends the indigenous sector is becoming 
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problematic to achieve and is proven to be an obstacle in their struggle. I have also 
exposed that the lack of organisational structure of the Alianza Pais at the local level is 
detrimental for the consolidation of their political force. Despite this organisational 
weakness, I have also shown that the strong political leadership of Rafael Correa and the 
popular legitimacy gained since in power have enabled Buen Vivir to move from a 
lifeworld cosmology representing an alternative to capitalism to a vision of State 
consolidation that emphasises the construction of a sovereign nation. 
 
In this chapter, I distinguish two main political projects, one mobilised from above by 
the government of Rafael Correa pointing to the construction of a central State. The other 
is the one mobilised from below by CONAIE, which points to political participation in a 
plurinational State. From the qualitative analysis done in Chapter 4 and 5 I propose an 
analytical typology that summarises the principal conceptual and ideological lines of 
each competing project. I aim to demonstrate that the political project supported by the 
government is becoming dominant (mainstream). 
I then move on to analyse the current expression of this dispute between the indigenous 
movement represented by CONAIE and the government at the institutional level by 
analysing the mainstreaming of Buen Vivir at the State level. The mainstreaming of Buen 
Vivir is related to the political structure and institutionalised context within which the 
process of struggle between the CONAIE and the government unfold. This is what has 
been discussed in Chapter 2 as the political opportunity structure (Tilly, 1978; McAdams, 
1982; Tarrow, 1994, 1996), and it principally points to the links and interaction between 
institutionalised politics and social movements. In this process of struggle these actors 
seeks to legitimise and strengthen their influence in selected policy arenas, building on 
their investments in framing and mobilising debate based on alternative interpretation of 
Buen Vivir. As explained in Chapter 2, the State is conceived here as the inscription of 
struggles between forces, a specific way of processing and institutionalising social 
contradictions (Lechner, 1980; Aricó, 1981; Zavaleta, 1990; Thwaites Rey, 2010, 2012).  
 
I mainly analyse one dimension within the political opportunity structure that is named 
by Tilly (1985) as offensive actions. As discussed in Chapter 2, in the case of defensive 
actions, political opportunities are not so much the outcome of collective action as of 
structural processes and political structures, which are relatively independent of 
collective action. Once a movement has consolidated its organisation, new opportunities 
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and constraints for the movement result from the dynamic interaction between 
movements and political structures (McAdam et al., 1996). Their actions are, therefore, 
named as offensive actions. Considering CONAIE’s high level of social and political 
organisation as well as the active interaction this organisation has had with political 
institutions, it is in this particular set of actions that I focus my analysis. Within this 
dimension, I seek to understand a set of institutional transformations. First, I analyse the 
opening up and closure of political access. These changes show a modernising process 
at the institutional level. I argue that they also indicate a concentration of power in the 
State that is not accompanied by inclusive processes of empowerment and political 
participation of competing forces. Second, I analyse a set of policies related to welfare 
provision and the management of natural resources. It is argued that the prominent role 
the State has acquired in this function has helped to construct popular legitimacy based 
on attempts to subject markets to social results. The fact that the main financing source 
for social provision is still based on the exploitation of natural resources makes apparent 
the great paradox of the process opened up by Buen Vivir and the Revolución Ciudadana 
in the sense that it is where the tension between an ambitious social programme and the 
aim to curb extractive activities lies.  
 
These transformations have allowed the government to achieve important goals in social 
policy as well as political legitimacy, which is reflected on electoral victories and 
approval ratings. At the same time, however, these transformations lie at the very heart 
of the conflict between the State and the indigenous movement. I aim to show that, as 
defined in Chapter 2, every State institution reveals the trace of the conflict that generated 
it. In this way, the process of transformation of the State should be thought of in relation 
to social conflict; that is, in a relational and dynamic way. 
 
6.1 Two Political Projects 
The construction of these two political projects is the result of my own qualitative 
thematic analysis, ‘an emphasis on what is said rather on how it is said’ (Bryman, 2008: 
553) of interviews, literature review, media outputs and document analysis. Following 
this method, I have reconstructed two different socio-political narratives. The purpose of 
this exercise is to summarise the complexity of the data studied in Chapter 4 and 5 into 
two clear visions of the economic, the social and the political in contemporary Ecuador. 
Consequently, these two stereotypical political projects fulfil a twofold function. First, 
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they aim to describe the main conceptual and ideological elements put forward by actors, 
and second, they suggest an analytical framework to approach the mainstreaming of Buen 
Vivir.  
 
The configuration of both political projects encompasses three main categories: (1) the 
economic; (2) the social; and (3) the political. I argue that both are postneoliberal and put 
forward a logic of resistance to capitalism, but stress different aspects. In the case of the 
State of Buen Vivir, what prevails is a drive to go against the rule of free market and the 
Washington consensus, and aims at taming capitalism. In the case of the Social 
Movement of Buen Vivir, what prevails is a drive to go against the dominance of Western 
modernity, and aims at eroding capitalism (Wright, 2015).  
 
 6.1.1 State of Buen Vivir 
(1)  THE ECONOMIC: two fundamental pillars of the State of Buen Vivir are the control 
of the economy and development by the State, and redistribution. The central role of the 
State in not only controlling the economy but also directing it to the fulfilment of rights 
(limiting in turn the action of the most powerful economic groups) appears here as one 
of the most powerful characteristics of the State of Buen Vivir, and its main difference 
with the neoliberal State.  
 
(2) THE SOCIAL: the recovered welfarist and social responsibilities of the State has to 
be accomplished following two main premises: the first one is related to the nature of the 
economy controlled by the State; the second one is related to the nature of the rights to 
be fulfilled. In this sense, the State not only has to direct the economy to the satisfaction 
of social rights but it must promote and implement the diversification of the economy in 
order to overcome dependence on the extraction of natural resources and the exportation 
of primary goods. Success in this enterprise will allow the implementation of a native 
post-capitalist alternative in which countries such as Ecuador will not have to enact the 
economic and political role assigned by the global capitalist system, and therefore, will 
not have to fully participate in the reproduction of such a system. In this way, the role of 




(3) THE POLITICAL: The appeal to the ‘people’ in opposition to an oppressing order 
(the elites: the bankers, the partidocracia, mainstream press and foreign interests) 
enables the configuration of a new political identity antagonising with the dominant 
‘other’. Populism here encompasses two dimensions or axes: one horizontal formed by 
the emergence of demands expressed by the ‘people’; and one vertical formed by the 
articulation of these demands in a political project represented by a charismatic and 
strong political leader. Corporatist structures within the State are seen as representatives 
of particular interests with little inclination to participate in the construction of the 
common (universal) good, and therefore, excluded. The government has not challenged 
neoliberalism with horizontality and participation, but with an increased verticality and 
concentration of power in the Executive.   
 
 6.1.2 Social Movement of Buen Vivir  
(1) THE ECONOMIC: Capitalism is defined as the most extreme version of alienation, 
economic exploitation, inequality, coloniality of power and environmental degradation. 
The way to subvert this order is to focus on the local, communitarian and small-scale 
projects which can guarantee, first, the use of natural resources respecting the natural 
environment; and second, the real participation of the people in both the definition and 
implementation of Buen Vivir as alternative to development and neoliberal policies. The 
focus is placed on social and solidarity economy, an agrarian reform which can guarantee 
food sovereignty, democratic access to land respecting collective ownership of 
territories, and the creation of incentives and financial credits given by the state to support 
small projects. 
 
(2) THE SOCIAL: Social agents are considered here as conscious of their culturally and 
historically constructed position; aware that their cultural and political identity involves 
contestation regarding the interpretation of meanings and hegemonic norms. They are 
also aware of the power relations contributing to their social construction. In this 
contestation, around which they build up their political and cultural identity, their 
lifeworld philosophy is brought up as source of new alternative meanings and practices.  
 
The role of the State in the diversification of the economy will allow the fulfilment of 
individual rights and the rights of nature, considered one of the most original elements 
of the State of Buen Vivir. In close connection with the rights of nature are the collective 
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rights of native communities whose livelihoods are being affected by extractive activities. 
The full satisfaction of collective rights addresses this issue and recognises the 
importance of lifeworld philosophies that interconnect human and more-than-human 
entities. In addition, collective rights also point to the legal recognition of the exercise of 
self-determination and autonomy over matters relevant to the collective group. This 
points, therefore, to the reconsideration of the formal division of political authority within 
the State, to its decentralisation and redistribution of power, installing in turn a plural and 
participatory dynamic. This is directly connected to the definition of the State as 
plurinational and considered the main mechanism to overcome the colonial legacy still 
present in the nature, dynamic and action of the current State.  
 
(3) THE POLITICAL: Participation in decision-making processes at all levels, the 
elaboration of representative demands, and the exercise of autonomy and self-
determination are the most important elements included in this ideal type. They all point 
to the democratic and horizontal dynamic attributed to social agents. The lack of 
hierarchies and the prevalence of a practice of reciprocity are key elements of interaction 
among social agents. The assumption here is that social movements put forward a 
practice of democratization of decisions and a continuous socialization of deliberations 
on common issues following a relational rationality (opposed to the instrumental 
rationality imposed by the capitalist system). Their decisions and the demands mobilized 
are representative of the general, not of the particular.  
 
The exercise of autonomy and self-determination are deemed necessary to retain the 
creative, rebellious and anti-establishment character of social agents. Therefore, 
participation in and engagement with State institutions is seen both as necessary to 
articulate diverse demands into State policies and into transformative practices, and as a 
decision to be cautious in order not to lose their disruptive capacity. In the exercise of 
this relative autonomy from the State, social agents deploy a set of strategies and take 
advantage of resources and opportunities made both by their own actions and by the 
potential opening of the political structure.  
 
In what follows I aim to demonstrate that the mainstreaming of Buen Vivir at the State 
level refers to, primarily, the political project that I call above the State of Buen Vivir. In 
other words, the mainstreaming of Buen Vivir at the State level contributes to a new post-
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neoliberal political settlement on the basis of the partial exclusion of the political project 
that I call the Social Movement of Buen Vivir.  
 
6.2 Mainstreaming Buen Vivir: offensive actions in the configuration of 
post-neoliberalism 
 
The political projects explained in the previous section underpin the political conflict that 
reign between the CONAIE and the government since Rafael Correa took power. The 
establishment of the State as responsible for the implementation of new policies of 
national development makes apparent the opposition between the projects mobilised by 
these two sectors. Conflicts emerge as this indigenous sector demands changes to the 
distribution of power in order to participate in decision-making processes, as well as to 
gain access to means of production, organisation and communication. In this dispute, 
antagonistic forces define the very nature of the State, as well as possible courses of 
action for State transformation. The transformations pushed by the government (from 
above) and the transformations demanded by socio-political agents (from below – 
analysed in Chapters 4 and 5) present both commonalities and differences. These are 
determined not only by the definition of the State held by each force but also by the 
dispute over the mechanisms of representation and participation allowed and demanded 
by each of these agents.  
 
The vision of the State and the demands put forward by the CONAIE have been analysed 
in Chapter 4 in relation to the establishment of a Plurinational State. As defined in the 
political project of CONAIE (CONAIE, 2012), the construction of a Plurinational State 
implies, first, the inclusion of peoples and nationalities in State organisms and 
institutions, and decision-making processes, spaces from which they have been largely 
and historically excluded. Second, it implies the restructuring of State institutions in order 
not only to recognise the authority of existing communal governments but also to transfer 
financial, material and technical resources (decentralisation). This implicates the 
recognition of indigenous cultural and communitarian organisation, as well as the 
redistribution of wealth at a deeper level. Third, it involves the recognition and 
strengthening of distinctive cultures within the territory including their languages, 
identities, practices, traditions, knowledge, and education. And fourth, it includes 
indigenous collective rights.  
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As it going to be argued in the remaining sections of this chapter, the changes 
implemented by the government of Rafael Correa are not following this path. Far from 
the vision of a Plurinational State as defined above, these changes are in line with the 
centrality of the State, a modernisation rationale and concentration of political power. 
Far from the implementation of a more inclusive and horizontal dynamic that includes 
the participation of a plurality of sectors, the State in Ecuador shows verticality and the 
partial closing of channels of real and critical participation (discussed in Chapter 5). In 
this sense, it can be argued that the government of Rafael Correa has not challenged 
neoliberalism with horizontality and participation, but with an increased verticality and 
concentration of power.   
 
The latter explains the conflict with a sector of the indigenous movement represented by 
CONAIE (among other sectors such as environmentalists and trade unions). 
Notwithstanding these conflicts, the government of Rafael Correa has been able to build 
up a strong popular legitimacy based on the repositioning of the State in terms of welfare 
provision and the strength of the national economy by escaping free market orthodoxy. 
These are not small achievements and need to be evaluated in the light of the historical 
context from which this government emerged (analysed in Chapter 1). The concentration 
of power mentioned above has been significantly displaced from market forces to the 
State. This displacement has not been achieved in a repressive way but by the generation 
of popular consensus via State social investment. This has been the result of offensive 
actions produced by the active interaction between the CONAIE and the government of 
Rafael Correa. I analyse these actions in the following section. They have helped the 
government to construct a new legitimacy that has had effects in the political process 
opened by Buen Vivir and the Revolución Ciudadana. This matches the definition of 
postneoliberalism put forward by Grugel and Riggirozzi (2012: 3-4).  
Postneoliberalism is, then, an evolving attempt to develop political economies that are  
 attuned to the social responsibilities of the state whilst remaining responsive to the  
 demands of ‘positioning’ national economies in a rapidly changing global political  
 economy. Crucially, in much of Latin America it is emerging in the context of an 
 unprecedented export bonanza that permits the adoption of more expansive public 
 spending than has been the case since the 1980s.  
 
 6.2.1 Offensive Actions: Institutional transformations 
a) The partial closure of political access 
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The government of Rafael Correa has implemented a process of dismantlement of 
corporatism’s power within the State. The government has targeted all collegiate bodies 
where the private sector was over-represented, removing its power of vote and decision. 
Until Rafael Correa took power, corporate lobbies were closely associated with the 
conservative technocracy governing the country. However, the effort to weaken 
corporatism within the State has not only targeted economic powers. It has also pointed 
to the arrangements that exist between the State and civil organisations and unions96, by 
which these groups have decisional power over specific matters. In the case of the 
indigenous movement, CONAIE took control of the institutional spaces focused on 
indigenous matters within the State: the DINEIB - Dirección Nacional de Educación 
Intercultural Bilingüe (National Directorate of Intercultural Bilingual Education) created 
in 1988; CODENPE (Consejo de Desarrollo de las Nacionalidades y Pueblos del 
Ecuador – Development Council of Nationalities and Peoples of Ecuador) created in 
1998; and the DINASI – Dirección Nacional de Salud Indígena (National Directorate of 
Indigenous Health) within the Ministry of Public Health, created in 1999. These 
institutional spaces aimed to implement policies and programmes for indigenous peoples. 
 
In 2009, the government of Rafael Correa removed by decree (No.196) the indigenous 
control of the DINEIB (the institution that had, before the decree, administrative and 
planning independence). Since then, the DINEIB is under the control of the State through 
the Ministry of Education. The Comisión Nacional de Educación Intercultural Bilingüe 
(National Commission for Intercultural Bilingual Education) was created integrating 
representatives of indigenous nationalities who are appointed under public competitive 
examination (based on merit and not by affiliation to indigenous organisations). 
CODENPE was eliminated in 2014 when the Ley Orgánica de los Consejos Nacionales 
para la Igualdad (Organic Law of the National Councils for Equality) created the 
Consejo Nacional para la Igualdad de Pueblos y Nacionalidades (National Council for 
the Equality of Peoples and Nationalities). Prior to the implementation of this law and 
the creation of the Councils for Equality, indigenous representatives were chosen directly 
by indigenous organisations. Since the implementation of this institutional 
transformation, indigenous representatives are chosen by merit through a public exam 
                                                 
96 For instance, the uprising of the police force on 30th September 2010, which for many commentators 
was an attempt at a coup d’état, was linked to several institutional reforms to dismantle existing 
mechanisms of State protection of the police force.  
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(Peña Lopez, 2015; Vacacela, 2015). The limitation of corporate representation within 
the State is one of the reasons for the conflict between the government and the indigenous 
movement. 
 
In recent years, both the government and the indigenous movement agreed on the 
necessity of State control of water. However, they disagreed on the composition of the 
new organism through which this might be implemented. The indigenous movement 
represented by the CONAIE demanded the formation of a Plurinational Council with the 
participation of indigenous representatives, governmental officials, the private sector, 
and sectors of civil society (communities, movements and social organisations). For the 
government, this option undermined its power over the sector and it rejected the proposal. 
This situation triggered important mobilisations and tensions between both sectors 
(analysed in Chapter 5). The government finally formed the National Secretary of Water 
in 2008, excluding indigenous representation. The debate on the Water Law shows the 
indigenous movement’s demand for participation in the debates over laws, as well as the 
definitions of State policies.  
 
The last two points are important as the dilemmas over social representation in the State 
and the battle over the definition of the nature of the latter are at the core of the conflicts 
between the indigenous movement and the government since the approval of the new 
Constitution and the rise of Buen Vivir as a political banner. This shows that the State is 
not neutral but the arena for the inscription of struggles between forces, a specific way 
of processing and institutionalising social contradictions (Lechner, 1980; Aricó, 1981; 
Zavaleta, 1990; Thwaites Rey, 2010, 2012). After several electoral victories, the 
government of the Revolución Ciudadana sees corporatist structures as representatives 
of particular interests with little inclination to participate in the construction of the 
common (universal) good. This attitude shows the government’s interpretation of 
universal suffrage as the main mechanism of legitimate participation. The restriction 
imposed on the participation and decisional power of the indigenous movement within 
the State has been a serious challenge of indigenous autonomy. As discussed in Chapter 
2, indigenous claim for autonomy does not mean the rejection of the State but actually 
autonomy within the State. What agents like the indigenous movement are demanding is 
to keep the places already won within the State, whilst at the same time redefining the 
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conditions of occupation of those places in order to gain power of decision in the 
construction of a Plurinational State.  
 
The institutional transformation implemented by the Revolución Ciudadana goes hand 
in hand with the reconfiguration of political coalitions, as well as the restriction of the 
power of economic groups that in the past have operated to neutralise the function of the 
State. The set of reforms put forward by the government of Rafael Correa has allowed 
the State to hold more control and regulation over market forces whilst at the same time 
increasing the State’s decision-making power over public policy. I argue that these 
changes are the expression of a process of renewal of political settlements in Ecuador.  
 
One of the most important changes has been implemented on the role of the State in 
public planning. At the beginning of its government Alianza Pais eliminated by decree 
the Consejo Nacional de Modernización del Estado (CONAM - National Council of State 
Modernisation), which was created in the 1990s to support the privatisation of public 
companies and services. The creation of the Secretaria Nacional de Planificación y 
Desarrollo (SENPLADES – National Secretariat of Planning and Development) has re-
established the link between development and State institutions, as well as strengthening 
the latter as the fundamental pillars for social provision. The rationale underpinning the 
creation of this new secretariat is the use of planning as a tool of the political process 
(Arsel, 2012). From 2007 to 2011, 103 laws were approved, 29 per cent of them were 
directly linked to State transformation and 23 per cent to the development regime, 30 per 
cent were related to the guarantee of rights (SENPLADES, 2012: 100). SENPLADES is 
responsible for the design and construction of the first and second Buen Vivir National 
Development Plans (2009-2013 and 2013-2017). These national plans act as the main 
point of reference for the design and implementation of public policies, programmes and 
projects, the State’s budget, the investment and allocation of public resources, and the 
coordination of responsibilities between the central State and autonomous and 
decentralised governments.97 The National Plan for Good Living 2013-201798 establishes 
12 National Objectives for Buen Vivir, organised in three main subject categories, which 
                                                 
97 Gobiernos Autónomos Descentralizados (GADs – Spanish).  
98 The document establishes 12 objectives, 93 goals, 111 public policies, and 1,095 strategic guidelines.  
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are State and popular power (objective 1); Rights and freedoms for Buen Vivir (objectives 
2-7); and Economic and productive transformation (objectives 8-12).99  
 
SENPLADES coordinates the National and Decentralized System of Participatory 
Planning. Whilst emphasising the decentralised and participatory nature of the process 
of planning, the national government concentrates its power of decision in agenda-setting 
and resource allocation, connecting public planning and investment. This point is 
relevant to understand the conflicts at stake in contemporary Ecuador. Some interviewees 
for this thesis declared that the openness of spaces of real and critical citizens’ 
participation is a ‘political debt’ with a small chance of being implemented due to the 
government’s lack of political will to create institutional channels to open these spaces. 
SENPLADES’ officials recognise in interviews that the government’s priorities are the 
implementation of economic objectives and not the participatory ones.  
 
As a consequence of the regained centrality of the State, ministries recovered power in 
setting up policy agendas. In previous decades, a multiplicity of agencies, councils and 
commissions kept control over relevant aspects of the public agenda (Echeverria, 2010; 
Verdesoto and Ardaya, 2010). Whilst these organisms formed part of the State structure, 
most of them were created by multilateral development banks to avoid the interference 
of ministries on decisive matters related to structural adjustments executed at the time 
(SENPLADES, 2009). With the dismantling of these organisms, ministries recovered 
control over their areas of incumbency.  
 
In June 2013, the government created by decree the Secretaria del Buen Vivir. The main 
function of this secretariat is to engage with other State institutions to create and 
implement policies towards the attainment of Buen Vivir. The goal is to promote the 
                                                 
99 The objectives are: 1- To consolidate democratic governance and construct the people’s power; 2- To 
foster social and territorial equity, cohesion, inclusion; 3- To improve people’s quality of life; 4- To 
strengthen citizen capacities and potential; 5- To build spaces for social interaction and strengthen 
national identity, diverse identities, pluri-nationality and interculturality; 6- To consolidate the 
transformation of the judicial system and reinforce comprehensive security, with strict respect for human 
rights; 7- To guarantee the rights of Nature and promote environmental sustainability globally; 8- To 
consolidate the social and solidary economic system sustainably; 9- To guarantee dignified work in all 
forms; 10- To promote transformation of the productive structure; 11- To ensure the sovereignty and 
efficiency of the strategic sectors for industrial and technological transformation; and 12- To guarantee 
sovereignty and peace, enhancing strategic insertion worldwide and Latin American integration 
(SENPLADES, 2013).  
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rights included in the Constitution to construct an ethical, responsible, and sustainable 
way of life. Since its creation, the head of this secretariat, Freddy Ehlers, has become a 
permanent character on national television talking about Buen Vivir in terms of happiness 
and against consumerism, a rather lighter version of what was first promoted by the 
government.  
 Harmony is part of Buen Vivir. Harmony means balance. A conscious life implies 
 balance  between mind, emotions, body and spirit. It also means harmony between people 
 and between people and nature. For this it is necessary that a cultural transformation 
 leads us to an era of human civilization where unconditional love, human coexistence and 
 social justice constitute a new form of life. Buen Vivir has an external and internal scope. 
 The external scope refers to the satisfaction of needs such as education, health, food, 
 home and everything related to a decent life. The internal scope is related to Being 
 and consciousness, sources of integral development and wellbeing (Secretaria del Buen 
 Vivir webpage; accessed November 2014. Spanish in the original. Author’s translation).  
 
The decision to recover the power of action of ministries also affected the social sector 
surrounding previous institutions; that is, international agencies of cooperation, NGOs 
and consulting agencies, which have had less influence on public institutions since 
Correa came to power (Vacacela, 2015). The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
designed by the United Nations have been placed at the same level of importance as the 
goals dictated by the National Development Plan. The MDGs have even been questioned 
as minimalist objectives in the pursuing of people’s wellbeing (Ramirez, 2014). One 
negative effect of this decision is the isolation of ministries from social networks and 
collective agencies concerned with public policy matters (e.g., social movement’s 
organisations, communitarian cooperatives, interest groups).  
Next section analyses important achievements in social policy obtained by the 
government of Rafael Correa by applying redistributive policies. These achievements 
have enabled the government, first, to gain legitimacy and vast support of the Ecuadorian 
population. And second, social policy achievements have enabled the understanding on 
Buen Vivir supported by the government to become dominant. 
  
 
b) Welfare Provision via Neo-extractivism  
The definition of Buen Vivir mobilised by the government of Rafael Correa prioritises 
the satisfaction of social and economic rights above nature and indigenous rights. As 
explained in Chapter 4, at the heart of this definition are the elimination of poverty via 
the redistribution of wealth and the guarantee of universal social rights, with the State 
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acting as the main authority in planning and development. I also argue there that for the 
government it is only through exploiting natural resources that this can be achieved and 
the economy can be diversified, as high natural resource revenues would allow greater 
investment in other areas of the economy. For the government, this reason is strong 
enough to dismiss many of the contradictions between its rhetoric, policies and what is 
included in official documents and laws in relation to environmental protection, agrarian 
policies, and popular participation. This deepens the existing fragmentation between the 
government and the CONAIE.  
 
Rafael Correa used national ownership and governance of natural resources as the nodal 
point of his government’s strategy to dismantle neoliberal policies (Perrault and Valdivia, 
2010; Rosales, 2013). It increased the State budget by providing USD 2,500 million in 
additional revenues. Whilst this has been translated into an increase in social spending 
and redistributive policies, it has also deepened the country’s already heavy dependence 
on oil revenues, in turn leaving the Ecuadorian economy vulnerable to market 
fluctuations. Gudynas call this new phase ‘neo-extractivism’ (2009), referring to the 
increase in resource extraction in order to use the extra revenues generated for 
redistributive purposes. Authors such as Gudynas (2009), Escobar (2010) and Escribano 
(2013) argue that despite introducing some significant changes, neo-extractivism does 
not challenge or question the premises of neoliberal governance.  
 
The renegotiation of oil contracts100 and the strengthening of Ecuador’s oil companies 
(Petroecuador and Petroamazonas) were part of the government’s strategy to nationalise 
resources and implement pro-growth economic policies. The reform of the Ley de 
Hidrocarburos (2006) recognises the participation of the Ecuadorian State in 50 per cent 
of the revenues generated by the difference between the sale price and the monthly 
average sale price on the date of signing the contract (ingresos petroleros excepcionales). 
Before this reform the revenues were absorbed by transnational oil companies. In 2008, 
this was modified by executive order (Decreto Ejecutivo No. 1402). Since then, the State 
has obtained 70 per cent of the revenues generated by contracts signed after 1st August 
                                                 
100 Source: Ministerio Coordinador de Política Económica, 2013, El desempeño económico y social de 
los primeros seis años del gobierno del presidente Correa (informe).  
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Figure 4: Social Investment and Management of External Debt 2005-2011 
Values: millions of US dollars 
Source: Banco Central Ecuador and Ministerio de Finanzas Ecuador  
 
The renegotiation of oil contracts in 2006 provided USD2,500 million of additional 
revenues; capital repatriation brought back USD2,000 million (SENPLADES, 2013: 15). 
This was translated into a greater distribution of resources, an increase in public 
investment and in consumption subsidies (Figure 4). The reasons underpinning this 
decision were that public investment increases the aggregate demand, boosting economic 
growth in the short term. It injects capital and expands production generating economic 
growth and it generates additional investment (SENPLADES, 2013). For 2011, the 
growth rate was 8 per cent, up from 3.6 per cent the previous year and above the 
government’s prediction of 6.5 per cent (Becker, 2013: 43).  
 
The approach to mining activity has been different with a Mining Law passed in 2009, 
enabling large-scale mining activity. Davidov (2012) clearly expresses that  
 ...oil has become the symbol of neoliberal restructuring and the IMF loan-debt paradigm 
 that was eventually rejected. The mining sector, that, due to its limited development 
 during the neoliberal ‘oil’ years, does not have such symbolic neoliberal ‘baggage’, has 
 become a site for a new, ostensibly populist, resource nationalism which also involves 
 the exploitation of natural environments for subsoil resources (Davidov, 2012: 14).  
 
For Davidov (2013, 2012), mining activity is discursively mobilised by the government 
of Rafael Correa to reflect the expansion of a ‘new and progressive’ State that questions 
(only rhetorically) oil extraction by considering it part of the ‘old’ neoliberal economic 












conflicts between the government and indigenous organisations, who fiercely oppose 
mining activity and demand to be consulted on extractive activities that do or could take 
place in their territories (Bebbington et al., 2008). The Constitution legally recognises 
their rights to be consulted but does not grant power of consent or veto over extractive 
endeavours. Correa insulted and degraded indigenous and conservationist movements for 
being ‘criminals and subversive terrorists’ (Kuecker, 2007; Becker, 2010). In February 
2015, the creation by decree of a new Ministry of Mining (El Telégrafo, 2015101) was 
announced. The President also announced the implementation of new tax incentives to 
attract foreign investments.  
 
Large-scale copper and gold mining projects taking place in northern Ecuador (Intag) 
and in the southeast (the mining projects Mirador and Fruta del Norte in the provinces 
of Morona Santiago and Zamora Chinchipe) involved Canadian (Kinross and Corriente 
Resources) and Chinese (CRCC-Tongguan consortium, operating through Ecuacorriente, 
the Ecuadorian subsidiary) companies operating in these areas (Gallagher et al., 2012). 
The Mirador mine has a deposit of about 2.9 million tons of copper (Alvaro, 2014) and 
once constructed, the mine will consist of six sites across a 10,000-hectare concession 
that overlaps with 6,000 hectares of the Protected Forest of the Condor Highland 
(Banktrack, n.d.). The law stipulates that companies must rehabilitate mines after 
completing the activity. However, the amount of waste, water, and energy used to carry 
out mining activities, as well as the construction of new roads, negatively affect local 
populations who question the social, economic and ethical principles underpinning 
decisions to allow the implementation of such activities in an area extremely rich in 
biodiversity (Carlos Zorrilla, interviewed in Quito, September 2014). Local indigenous 
populations fear that the implementation of these projects would prolong a historical 
process of cultural and environmental colonisation and dispossession (Harvey, 2014). 
These new mining projects have triggered increasing unrest, expressed in street protests 
(see Table 7 in Chapter 5) and the filing of a lawsuit by Ecuadorian NGOs and human 
rights groups that argue that the project violates the constitutional rights of nature.  
 
                                                 
101 http://www.telegrafo.com.ec/politica/item/nuevo-ministerio-de-minas-se-crea-por-decreto-
ejecutivo.html [Accessed March 2015].  
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Ecuador is developing mining activity and investing heavily in it. For this endeavour, as 
well as for the development of other energy projects (large hydroelectric dam and gas 
projects) and national infrastructure, Ecuador has greatly depended on Chinese loans 
(Krauss and Bradsher, 2015; North, 2013). The China Development Bank has provided 
credits for oil, as it has done for other Latin American countries including Venezuela and 
Brazil. Chinese investment represents 57 per cent of the total foreign investment in 
Ecuador since 2005 (Krauss and Bradsher, 2015). Unlike the loans given by the World 
Bank and the IMF in the past, which came with structural adjustments programmes, the 
loans provide by China, which are of more than USD10 billion since 2005 to the present, 
come with commercial conditions (Gallagher and Myers, 2014). Escribano (2013) 
explains the mechanism by which China grants loans to Ecuador in exchange for oil.  
 ...when the China Development Bank (CDB) grants a billion-dollar loan to Ecuador, 
 Petroecuador pledges oil shipments to China to cancel the loan. Chinese oil companies 
 then buy the oil at market prices and deposit their payments in Petroecuador’s CDB 
 account. CDB withdraws money directly from it to repay itself for the loan. In Ecuador, 
 PetroChina deposits 79% of the oil revenue in Petroecuador’s CDB account and diverts 
 the remaining 21% to pay back the loan. Ecuador signed a US$1 billion loan-for-oil in 
 2009, another in 2010 and a third – worth US$2 billion – in 2011 (Escribano, 2013: 157).  
 
The role China has played in the development of Ecuador has been crucial, considering 
the poor relations of the country with organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank 
(Escribano, 2013; Rosales, 2013; Gallagher et al., 2012). The presence of China has 
provided help in the short-term by becoming one of the most important sources of credit. 
In 2011 these loans reached USD7,200 million. However, as a significant portion of 
Ecuador’s oil reserves are already committed, China reduced in 2012 the loans and 
limited them to particular and concrete projects. This has had an impact on fiscal 
accounts, producing a deficit of 4.7 per cent (2012). For this reason, in 2013 the 
government of Rafael Correa obtained a loan from Goldman Sachs (USD400 million) 
setting Ecuador’s gold reserves as a guarantee (BBC Mundo102, 2014). In June 2013, 
Ecuador’s issued bonds of ten years for USD2,000 millions (interest rate: 7.95 per cent). 
This implied getting the support of the IMF. The decision has been heavily criticised by 
the government’s opponents.  
In this moment the Ecuadorian State is in serious trouble due to the lack of economic 
resources. It has run out of money, there are concrete facts to prove it. The government comes 
back with its former ally the IMF, pawns a part of our gold reserve in Goldman Sachs. This 
proves that something is going on; we know nothing about the debt with China: how much 
is our debt with China? Then, it is not true that our economy is changing, it is not real. I 
                                                 
102http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2014/07/140708_economia_ecuador_viraje_economico_correa_vp.shtml?ocid=socialflow_
facebook [Accessed September 2014].  
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mean... if we are indebted, all the money they are producing through oil exploitation and 
mining, where is it going to go? That money is going to pay the debt we have, and the great 
infrastructure they are building up, and the splurges of this government (Pocho Alvarez, 
interviewed in Quito, July 2014. Author’s translation). 
 
The fact that credits are granted for oil, however, deepens Ecuador’s dependence on 
extractive activities delaying the diversification of energy and economy policy. This 
creates an apparent permanent case of Dutch disease, which is defined as currency 
appreciation due to the increase on revenues of one particular sector. The sharp economic 
development of this sector causes a rise on the price of other exports, making them in 
turn less competitive in the external market, and therefore, causing their decline (Bresser-
Pereira, 2007). The insufficient diversification of the economy is even recognised by 
SENPLADES:  
 Currently, the productive diversification of the Ecuadorian economy is insufficient; the 
 participation of the manufacturing sector in the national product and the development 
 of the service sector are limited. The economy is vulnerable to changes in the 
 international context (especially export prices) and barely sustainable (SENPLADES, 
 2013: 29, Spanish in the original, author’s translation).  
 
The fact that the Ecuadorian economy has been dollarized since 2000 has limited 
Correa’s choices in diversifying the primary export economy. Dollarization has affected 
exports by increasing their price whilst imported goods (mainly from Asia) become 
cheaper. External competition to Ecuador’s weak industrial sector has hindered strategies 
for economic diversification. North (2013: 121) explained that neighbouring countries 
such as Colombia and Peru, who export many of the same commodities to the same 
markets, can devalue their currency and therefore sell cheap. In addition, remittances 
coming from Europe and the US, where most of the Ecuadorian population has 
emigrated, are currently sustaining the household economy of an important percentage 
of Ecuadorians. 
 
These new economic policies repositioned the State in the economic realm and 
strengthened its welfare provision. The redistribution of revenues led by the State made 
the inclusion of a vast portion of marginalised population possible. The percentage of the 
population living on less than USD2 a day dropped from 37 to 9 per cent from 2000 to 
2014 (World Bank, 2015). According to a report released by ECLAC103 (2012), between 
2007 and 2011 Ecuador reduced inequality by 8 percentage points (Rosales, 2013). 
                                                 
103 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.  
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Between December 2006 and December 2012, more than a million people escaped from 
poverty (PNUD, 2013). In education, there was an increase in enrolment in education at 
all levels, the secondary school fee (USD25 fee) was abolished, free textbooks and 
uniforms were provided to schoolchildren, with free lunches for primary school children 
(Radcliffe, 2015:322). In addition, there was an increase in the availability of health 
services.  
 
The implementation of social policies like the Bono de Desarrollo Humano (Human 
Development Bond) and the Bono de la Vivienda104 (Housing Bond) has been highly 
valued by citizens. By 2010, over a million people (1,173,822) were beneficiaries of the 
Human Development Bond (Machado, 2012). For many analysts (Reyes, 2014; Baez, 
2014), the Bono de Desarrollo Humano was the key factor that helped Correa to win the 
election in 2013. Furthermore, its rise from USD35 to USD50 implemented by Correa’s 
government in January 2013 (right before the beginning of the electoral campaign) forced 
the other candidates not only to include this bond in their own campaign agendas but also 
to promise to increase the amount in case they won the election.  
 
Table 8: Social Indicators 2006-2014 
  
 Dec.06 Dec.07 Dec.08 Dec.09 Dec.10 Dec.11 Dec.12 Dec.13 Dec.14 
Unemploy
ment (%) 










0.5396 0.551 0.515 0.504 0.505 0.473 0.477 0.485 0.466 
HDI ---- ---- 0.697 ---- 0.701 0.705 0.708 0.711 ---- 
  Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Censos, Banco Central Ecuador and ECLAC (CEPAL) 
 
                                                 
104 Bono de Vivienda is a real estate credit granted by the State. http://www.rips.gob.ec/rs/ [Accessed July 
2014].  
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However, some commentators (Radcliffe, 2015; Salama, 2015; Machado, 2012) argue 
that even though inequality has declined at a national level, the persistence of entrenched 
inequalities shows that the policies implemented have been inefficient in addressing 
complex social heterogeneity. Radcliffe (2015) argues that a narrow understanding of 
inequality that neglects intersectionality, that is, the articulation of different facets of 
social discrimination that as a result configure distinctive relations of power, leads to 
inadequate social policies in re-ordering unequal societies. Affirmative actions in relation 
to gender equality have been poorly redefined and instrumented. In addition, whilst 
poverty rates have dropped nationally, in rural areas – where the effects of the investment 
on infrastructure and social spending are still unseen – more than half of the rural 
population live in poverty.  
 
The concentration of land among just a few landowners is still unaffected by government 
policies. The Atlas of Socio-Economic Inequalities of Ecuador105 (2013, Atlas de 
Desigualdades Socio-económicas del Ecuador), together with the establishment of 
Equality Councils are important advances for the identification of diverse types of 
inequality but they still fail to recognise these inequalities as intertwined rather than as 
additive. In this sense, the aspects of inequality mentioned above question the 
inclusiveness of the policies implemented by the government. Current economic 
strategies have proven to bring poverty alleviation and a reduction of inequality in the 
short-term, but create doubts about the sustainability of such positive effects in the long 
term (Gonzalez-Vicente, 2011; Bebbington, 2012; Rival, 2012; Yates and Bakker, 2014).    
 
The limitation imposed on economic powers is defined by Tilly (2010) as one of the 
general mechanisms with great influence in processes of democratisation. However, the 
reduction of influence of social and political agents, such as the indigenous movement, 
by arguing that they represent particular interests, questions the democratic character and 
political sustainability of these reforms. Institutional reforms designed to broaden the 
autonomy and sovereignty of the State without the participation of a plurality of social 
agents engenders a risk of bureaucratization.  
  
                                                 
105 The Atlas of Socio-Economic Inequalities of Ecuador (SENPLADES, 2013) offers information on 
changes in education, health, poverty, gender violence, use of time and care, employment and social 
security, child labour and mistreatment, and housing, accounting for rural and urban disparities.  
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 6.3 Final Remarks 
In this chapter I analysed one dimension of the political opportunity structure, offensive 
actions, particularly relevant for the understanding of the mainstreaming of Buen Vivir 
in institutional politics. McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996) explain that offensive 
actions are the result of the dynamic interaction between movements and political 
structures, and produce new opportunities and constraints for the movement. The case of 
Ecuador, and particularly, the relationship between the CONAIE and the government of 
Rafael Correa showed that the offensive actions put forward by the government 
significantly restricted CONAIE’s participation in institutional politics helping in turn to 
legitimise and strengthen the position of the government in the political process.  
 
First, I outlined two political projects that I named the State of Buen Vivir and the Social 
Movement of Buen Vivir. The construction of these projects was the result of my own 
qualitative thematic analysis. I reconstructed two different socio-political narratives to 
summarise the complexity of the data studied in Chapter 4 and 5 into two clear visions 
of the economic, the social and the political in contemporary Ecuador. These political 
projects underpinned the political conflict that reign between the CONAIE and the 
government since Rafael Correa took power. The establishment of the State as 
responsible for the implementation of new policies of national development made 
apparent the opposition between the projects mobilised by these two sectors. 
 
Second, I analysed two offensive actions that allow the government of Rafael Correa to 
legitimise and strengthen the influence of their understanding of Buen Vivir in selected 
policy arenas. These actions are related to two main areas: first, institutional 
transformations designed to partially closure political access to corporativism as well as 
to reposition the State in the political realm; second, State social provision via neo-
extractivism. The analysis showed that there have been significant transformations in 
these areas that have given the government of Rafael Correa political legitimacy and 
popular support enabling in turn the government’s definition of Buen Vivir to become 
dominant. This has allowed the State to hold more control and regulation over market 
forces whilst at the same time increasing the State’s decision-making power over public 
policy. In this sense, I argue there is a process of renewal of political settlements in 
contemporary Ecuador.  
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The analysis also shows that there is a tendency towards centralization and concentration 
of power in the State. Transformations are not accompanied by inclusive processes of 
empowerment and political participation. Far from the implementation of a more 
inclusive and horizontal dynamic that includes the participation of a plurality of sectors, 
the State in Ecuador relies on hierarchy and verticality in decision making processes,   
closing channels of real and critical participation. In line with the discussion of the 
dilemmas of the relationship between the State and social movements (Chapter 2), in the 
case of Ecuador the opposition of two different logics is apparent. The State implies a 
concentration of decisions on the management of the public (monolithic power), whilst 
social movements put forward a practice of democratization of decisions and a 
continuous socialization of deliberations on common issues. A constructive relationship 
between both parts will imply the intersection of vertical and horizontal dynamics. In the 
case of Buen Vivir in Ecuador, it is apparent the dominance of the vertical over the 
horizontal dynamic.  
 
In the final chapter, I summarise the main findings of this thesis and their implications 
for the understanding of the relationship between social movements and the State in 














The Political Process of Buen Vivir: Contentious Politics in 
Contemporary Ecuador 
 
When Buen Vivir emerged in institutional politics (that is, when it was included in 
national development plans, the national Constitution, political projects and 
governmental plans) it was subjected to a systematic process of rationalisation by 
different agents. Arguably, for the first time in Ecuadorian history, the same name (Buen 
Vivir) has become both a frame for collective action, as well as an institutional frame. I 
argue that the coexistence of these two frames, differently interpreted and contested by 
different parties, is at the core of the political process in contemporary Ecuador. The 
result of this was, as shown in Chapter 4, the configuration of competing definitions by 
different actors. Each of them assigns to this idea a specific meaning according to their 
ideological vision, position, demands and interests. The rationalisation of Buen Vivir 
allows the actors involved to establish political boundaries between them. In this way, 
this process of rationalisation has impacted the two main components of contentious 
politics: the organisation of insubordination (social movements in order to impose one 
particular understanding of Buen Vivir (analysed in Chapter 5), and the political structure 
(the State) by mainstreaming one particular definition of Buen Vivir at institutional level 
(analysed in Chapter 6).  
 
In this thesis, I have exposed the political nature of the struggle over the meaning and 
implementation of Buen Vivir showing the power relations involved in its definition and 
construction. I have identified moments of articulation and fragmentation between the 
forces involved that redefine political boundaries in a process of renewal of political 
settlements in contemporary Ecuador from neoliberal to post-neoliberal that in turn 
changed the possibility of new demands and forms of insubordination. In doing so, I have 
shown the dynamic of social transformation involving active tensions between political 
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structure (State) and insubordination (social movements) avoiding essentialist or static 
understandings.  
 
 7.1 Research Questions and Contributions 
In what follows I summarise the main findings of this thesis which answer the three 
research questions guiding this work, and their implications for the understanding of the 
relationship between social movements and the State in contexts of political change. 
These findings are justified on the basis of the analysis of the evidence provided 
throughout the thesis, which is a combination of substantial primary sources and material 
as well as the close detailed inspection of secondary resources related to Buen Vivir, the 
indigenous movement, the government of Rafael Correa and the State in Ecuador.  
 
7.1.1 Research Question 1: In what ways is the idea of Buen Vivir defined and 
 contested? How are these definitions used and what for? 
 The Rationalisation of Buen Vivir to Redefine Political Boundaries 
I have addressed this question in Chapter 4 using ‘framing’ as primary category of 
analysis. This category (defined in Chapter 2) helped to show that the deployment of 
ideas, meanings and identities has become in Ecuador a political strategy. As analytical 
category, framing has been particularly useful to stress that the deployment of ideas and 
definition of meaning is actively produced by agents in the construction and 
interpretation of these ideas. Agents involved in the political process of Buen Vivir has 
not been considered in this thesis as passively reflecting, transporting or becoming 
determined by political and social realities, but actually actively and strategically 
constructing them. I have defined the process of rationalisation as the actions that make 
definitions of Buen Vivir consistent with the political objectives of the groups supporting 
them. This process points to the expansion of the instrumental and strategic rationalities 
at the expense of normative and moral considerations (Habermas, 1986; Domingues, 
2000; Gane, 2002).  
 
I have analysed the strategic definitions of three groups: the indigenous movement 
represented by CONAIE, the government of Rafael Correa, and environmental activists. 
The definition constructed by indigenous sectors is mainly focused on the construction 
of a Plurinational State as well as on the Pachamama as symbol of Andean philosophy 
and communitarian praxis. The definition of the government is centred on the recovery 
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of the State to guarantee universal social rights and redistribution of wealth. The 
definition constructed by environmental activists is based on the rights of nature granted 
by the national constitution and the practice of radical democracy.  
 
I have shown that the political differentiation and fragmentation between these forces 
came after a first moment of political articulation represented by the Constituent 
Assembly (Chapter 1). The Constituent Assembly was a political event of deliberation 
and participation of a heterogeneous group of agents. This implied the mobilisation of 
people and resources and the negotiation of proposals that needed the consensus and 
approval of those participating. It is here when Buen Vivir consolidated itself as the proxy 
upon which different socio-political agents defined their position within the post-
neoliberal turn dominating the country.  
 
The agents constructing the competing definitions of Buen Vivir claimed the authenticity 
and legitimacy of their own definition and sought to discredit the ones given by political 
opponents. In this way, they established distinctive political positions in a process of 
renewal of political settlements. This process of renewal of political settlements has been 
primarily characterised by: (i) a central role of the State in planning and controlling the 
economy, which has led to a more control and regulation of market forces whilst at the 
same time increasing the State’s decision-making power over public policy; (ii) the fall 
of traditional political parties; (iii) the rise of popular political leaders; and (iv) the 
articulation of a post-neoliberal and anti-capitalist political project represented by Buen 
Vivir.  
 
I have shown that the indigenous movement drew political boundaries with the 
government of Rafael Correa and its mainstream understanding of Buen Vivir. This 
differentiation affected, in turn, the internal unity of the movement as it exposed the 
division of indigenous sectors supporting and working along the government. The 
government traced political boundaries, first, with the neoliberal elite: the partidocracia, 
bankers, and corporatist groups. Second, it differentiated itself from the opposing forces 
questioning current decisions on environmental and economic matters (environmental 
and indigenous movements and trade unions). Finally, environmental activists traced 
boundaries with the government of Rafael Correa.  
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The analysis of the strategic definition of Buen Vivir by competing political forces has 
shown that there is no one homogenous, monolithic and essentialising notion of Buen 
Vivir, but that is constructed and re-constructed through power struggles. In this way 
Buen Vivir has become a powerful tool to create and openly redefine subjective positions 
in the political and social arena in Ecuador.  
 
The analysis has also shown that framing is not a unified and consensual process within 
forces. The discussion of the different frames (Chapter 4) showed that there are 
disagreements not only between but also within these competing forces. In the case of the 
frame mobilised by the CONAIE, indigenous leaders voiced their concerns over the 
political use, effectiveness and representativeness of their own frame that puts 
Pachamama and communitarian life at the centre. These concerns generated tensions 
within this sector of the indigenous movement (page 122). Critiques also arose within 
the government about their own definition of Buen Vivir (page 126). These concerns 
questioned how permeable the government was to critiques coming from those who do 
not agree with the fundamental pillars defended by Correa’s government. This finding 
warns about the use of the category framing to refer only to the competition between 
framings, overlooking internal dissent, which is of equal importance in the analysis of a 
political process. 
 
7.1.2 Research Question 2: What are the strategies deployed by competing socio-
political forces to impose their own definition of Buen Vivir?   
The importance (and the perils) of leadership to mainstream Buen Vivir 
I have approached this question mainly in Chapter 5. To respond it, I have used 
‘mobilising structures’ as main category of analysis. This category relates to the 
organisational dynamics of contentious action. It defines the ways in which formal and 
informal ties between people can serve as solidarity and communication facilitating 
mobilisation. One of the key dimensions within this category has been the leadership 
structure. Following Weber’s definition (1968), I stressed the importance of 
understanding the emotional character of the collective as well as the interactional nature 
of charismatic leadership. Members play an important role attributing charisma to 
leaders. In this way, the extraordinary characteristics perceived on the leader work as 
inspiration to members. 
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I have shown that the rise of Rafael Correa as a strong and charismatic political leader 
(which coincided with the emergence in Latin America of equally strong leaders such as 
Hugo Chavez and Evo Morales) enabled the government to take Buen Vivir from a 
lifeworld cosmology representing an alternative to capitalism to a vision of State 
consolidation that emphasises the construction of a sovereign nation. In this way, strong 
leadership has been significant to impulse and make dominant a particular definition of 
Buen Vivir. Conversely, the lack of this political asset by the indigenous movement has 
shown to be detrimental as led them to unsuccessful alliances with negative implications 
for their political struggle.  
 
Correa’s position as an outsider of the political establishment allowed him to identify 
himself as a redeemer leader in opposition to the elites constructing at the same time a 
new idea of the ‘people’ as the legitimate sovereign with direct influence in the decisional 
realm. This is why Correa as well as the leaders mentioned above are considered today 
as representatives of the rise of populism in Latin America. Correa showed his ability to 
articulate and implement (although with uneven success) the inclusionary demands 
historically mobilised by popular agents and represented by Buen Vivir. This represented 
the articulation and positive dialectic of two organising axes of politics: one horizontal 
representing the emergence of demands expressed by the ‘people’. And one vertical, 
formed by the articulation of these demands in a political project represented by a strong 
political leader.  
 
I have also shown the perils of strong leadership in the political process when the two 
organising axes of politics mentioned above lose articulation. The dominance of the 
vertical axis, as it is apparent currently in Ecuador with a concentration of power in the 
Executive and the president, as well as the lack of popular participation and the 
democratisation of institutional politics question the democratic character of the 
government and political sustainability of the changes implemented. The concentration 
of power and lack of popular participation have led to a new wave of mass demonstrations 
in Ecuador, showing in turn that the implementation and consolidation of transformative 
practices need the involvement of and collaboration between the State and social 
movements. New coalitions among social actors (indigenous movement, students, 
environmentalists, trade unions) show that civil society in Ecuador is currently working 
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as a multi-organisational space in order to coordinate heterogeneous demands and 
resources. 
 
7.1.3 Research Question 3: How is this contestation expressed at the institutional 
level? Which definition is becoming dominant at the State level and what are the 
consequences of this? 
This question has been approached in Chapter 6. I have proposed two main answers.  
a) Two Political Projects 
The construction of these two political projects is the result of my own qualitative 
thematic analysis. I have reconstructed two different socio-political narratives acting at 
different levels. The political project constructed from the top-down by the government 
of Rafael Correa follows a State-centred strategic logic of social democracy and is named 
in this thesis as the State of Buen Vivir. The political project constructed from the bottom-
up by the indigenous movement follows a society-centred vision of insubordination, and 
it is named here as the Social Movement of Buen Vivir.  
 
The principal characteristics of the State of Buen Vivir are: (i) the control of the economy 
and development by the State, directing the economy to the fulfilment of rights and 
limiting the action of the most powerful economic groups; (ii) the diversification of the 
economy; (iii) the recovering of the welfarist and social responsibilities of the State; and 
(iv) the appeal to the ‘people’ in opposition to an oppressing order. The characteristics of 
the State of Buen Vivir correspond to the logic of resistance that aims at taming 
capitalism.  
 
The principal characteristics of the Social Movement of Buen Vivir are: (i) a focus on the 
local, communitarian and small-scale projects to counteract the harms of capitalism, 
reinforcing bonds of solidarity, equalitarian participation and self-determination; (ii) the 
construction of cultural and political identities based on lifeworld philosophy; (iii) the 
fulfilment of collective rights as well as the rights of nature; and (iv) democratic and 
horizontal dynamic.  
 
I have argued that both projects refer to logics of resistance to capitalism aiming at either 
eroding or taming it. There are moments of articulation and moments of differentiation 
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between them. These projects set the horizon in relation to which political actors define 
their positions and interpret events.  
 
b) Offensive actions: institutional transformations 
The second answer to Research Question 3 refers to the political opportunity structure, 
and particularly, to the offensive actions of CONAIE and the government of Rafael 
Correa. The mainstreaming of Buen Vivir is related to the institutionalised context within 
which the process of struggle between the CONAIE and the government unfold. It points 
to the links and interaction between institutionalised politics and social movements. 
Offensive actions are the result from the dynamic interaction between agents and political 
structures (McAdam et al., 1996). I have analysed two offensive actions. The first one 
refers to transformations in the structure of the State that have had as a result the partial 
closure of political access to corporativism (including CONAIE). The second refers to 
the role of the State in the provision of social protection via neo-extractivism.  
 
 b1) The Partial Closure of Political Access 
The government of Rafael Correa has implemented a process of dismantlement of 
corporatism’s power within the State. The government has targeted all collegiate bodies 
where the private sector was over-represented, removing its power of vote and decision. 
Until Rafael Correa took power, corporate lobbies were closely associated with the 
conservative technocracy governing the country. However, the effort to weaken 
corporatism within the State has not only targeted economic powers. It has also pointed 
to the arrangements that exist between the State and civil organisations and unions, 
including CONAIE, by which these groups have decisional power over specific matters. 
 
b2) Welfare Provision via Neo-extractivism  
I have shown that the government has been able to build up a strong popular legitimacy 
based on the repositioning of the State in terms of welfare provision and the strength of 
the national economy by escaping free market orthodoxy (although without abandoning 
a modernization rationale). Political legitimacy was constructed on attempts to subject 
markets to social results. The redistribution of wealth led by the State has had a 
significant social impact reflected on poverty alleviation, reduction of unemployment and 
inequality, increment of enrolment rates in education at all levels, and the increase in 
health service provision. The fulfilment of fundamental rights had been made possible 
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thanks to the presence of the State. These results have legitimised the definition of Buen 
Vivir constructed by the government which has been able to mainstream it at State level. 
Ecuador’s indicators show important changes and improvements that have real impacts 
on people’s lives. On the other hand, Ecuador’s economy is still dependent on 
extractivism and this has had also negative effects on certain sectors of the population, 
mainly indigenous groups living in rural areas whose collective rights have been denied 
or neglected by the persistence on resources exploitation. This, in turn, shows that there 
is not a strong political consensus on going beyond the extractive economy, which 
translates into moderate support for the indigenous and ecologists movements’ call to go 
beyond extractivism.  
 
 7.2 The Political Process of Buen Vivir: implications for the 
 understanding of the relationship between social movements and the State 
The political process of Buen Vivir in Ecuador means the complex-multifaceted dispute 
over the leadership of actions of change that moved the country away from a neoliberal 
course. The rise of Buen Vivir divided Ecuadorian politics into two opposing camps, one 
demanding change and one resisting it, the former being the focus of this thesis. Buen 
Vivir divided the public space and defined the nature of political change (gradual, rapid, 
progressive or not, social democratic, anti-capitalist, etc.) in the structuring of moments 
of articulation and fragmentation, constructed upon the interplay of ideals and practices. 
In this way, it has developed a process or, as the title of this thesis suggests, the political 
process of Buen Vivir.  
 
Within this process, transformations encompass the repositioning of the State in the 
control of planning, development and social provision, which has guaranteed President 
Rafael Correa’s popular legitimacy, with more than eight years in power. It implies, on 
the one hand, a significant reduction of social movements’ power of representation of the 
popular field. This has been the result of the emergence of such a charismatic leader as 
Rafael Correa and significant mistakes made by the indigenous movement in the past, 
showing the importance of leadership in the political process. On the other hand, the 
contradictions of the government in its attempt to diversify the economy have opened an 
interstice that social movements are taking advantage of to revitalise their position and 
struggle. The new wave of mass demonstrations entails changes in comparison with the 
popular struggle of the 1990s. The indigenous movement does not lead the struggle 
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anymore and for that reason needs to forge alliances with other sectors that are not 
necessarily close to the indigenous vision of Buen Vivir and social transformation. On 
the other hand, the demands elaborated by these agents have become more sophisticated 
since the satisfaction of basic needs is fairly covered by State social provision. In this 
way, demands do not point to social rights but to the fulfilment of the rights of nature, 
and the democratic distribution of water and land.  
 
The tension existing in the relationship between the government of Rafael Correa and the 
indigenous movement represented by CONAIE goes in line with the conceptualisation 
of the State (Chapter 2) which defines it as having a relational nature and as the 
inscription of struggles between forces, a specific way of processing and 
institutionalising social contradictions. In this way, the process of transformation of the 
State has to be thought of in relation to social conflict, that is, in a relational and dynamic 
way. 
 
This research shows that important transformations have taken place in the process, as 
well as conflicts and contradictions that arise in relation to further implementation. It 
demonstrates the importance of political leadership (and the limitations arising from it), 
of enduring organisational structures and of the elaboration of meaningful and 
representative political projects able to articulate demands and visions of their 
implementation. These aspects, political leadership, organisational structure and 
meaningful political projects, constitute fundamental features of a process of change. The 
political process of Buen Vivir points to the restructuring of the State and to the relation 
of social agents with it. In the process, the above mentioned aspects interplay and excel 
according to the power struggle unfolding between different agents. An ideal dynamic 
would suppose a balanced coordination of the three aspects. Currently in Ecuador, 
political leadership prevails over the other two, explaining the conflicts arising from this 
dominance. 
 
Therefore, the approach to contentious politics put forward by Tilly, Tarrow, Diani and 
McAdam has been assessed relevant for the analysis of the political process of Buen 
Vivir. It has provided pertinent analytical categories (framing processes, mobilising 
structures and political opportunities) that have allowed me to connect politics and 
identity. In this way, it has enabled to go beyond the dichotomy proposed by the identity-
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based approach (page 65) and the resource mobilisation approach (page 67), that is, 
between the prominence of either expressive or instrumental actions. By using the 
political process approach I have been able to analyse the contestation of ideas and 
meaning, the investment on mobilising, and link these two factors of contentious action 
with the structure of the State in a conjunctural moment in Latin America’s history when 
the State is claimed back as key actor in the political and economic realm.  
 
Whilst the political process approach has enabled me to understand the relationship 
between collective action and political structure, has not provided a definition of the 
nature of the State pertinent for the Latin American context. I have argued that in the 
political process the role of the State changes. It goes from the domination of the 
neoliberal model to an attempt to construct a post-neoliberal order with the State 
attempting to subject markets to social results. I have, therefore, connected the work of 
Tilly and Tarrow with the one elaborated by Latin American Marxist authors (Lechner, 
Arico, Thwaites Rey). These authors put forward a definition of the State as relational, 
not neutral, and as a platform for the inscription of social conflict. By using this 
understanding of the State, I have avoided questioning negatively the participation of 
social movements in State institutions considering, in turn, the State a crucial 
interlocutor. On the other hand, I have pondered the positive involvement of the State in 
processes of transformation. I have argued in favour of considering that it is at the level 
of the State that movements wage their principal struggles.  
 
This thesis focuses on social transformation involving active tensions between political 
structure (State) and insubordination (social movements). It does so in the context of the 
rise of Buen Vivir in institutional politics in contemporary Ecuador. It offers a detailed 
sociological analysis of the agents involved in the process, providing a comprehensive 
account of their historical background, goals, frame definitions, and strategic actions. 
Away from essentialist or static interpretations on the matter, it argues that the political 
process moves through complex dynamics, involving moments of articulation and 
fragmentation in which agents and events move closer to or away from what was here 
identified as two political projects: the State of Buen Vivir and the Social Movement of 
Buen Vivir.  
 
 7.3 Theoretical Contributions 
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This research posits two main theoretical contributions.  
 
First, it provides an interpretation of postneoliberal transformation away from binary 
interpretations (revolution-reform, emancipation-cooptation), highlighting key aspects of 
a complex dynamic that encompasses both  transformations and  continuities. Within 
these transformations, the repositioning of the State as the main locus of struggle, as well 
as responsible for controlling planning, development and welfare provision, is a major 
step towards the establishment of a postneoliberal order. The elaboration of an alternative 
project, represented here by Buen Vivir, is another crucial factor. The existence of 
ambiguities and struggles in its definition and implementation proves the complex 
relationship between ideals and practice. Finally, enduring organisational structures are 
shown to be crucial for the consolidation of a postneoliberal dynamic.  
 
This thesis moves away from the interpretation of co-optation, which dominates debates 
on the relationship between structure (the State) and insubordination (social movements). 
It argues that interpretations of co-optation depart from a top-down approach of social 
and political dynamic without fully accounts the ambivalent but mutual relations between 
social agents and the State. This thesis shows that the line in Ecuador  separating the 
social from the political is blurred and an interpretation of co-optation would only 
reinforce that division. The understanding of co-optation is based on strong normative 
judgements regarding the division between the social and the political that to a great 
extent neglect the multiple historical relations between governments, social movements, 
political parties and so on.  
 
Second, it makes a contribution in its eclectic use of theory. It develops a productive 
relationship between a Marxist theory of the State coined in Latin America and a 
Weberian version of the construction of rebellious solidarities pursuing a thorough 
historical and sociological analysis. In analyzing the struggle of contemporary 
indigenous movements in cases such as Ecuador where they are already consolidated and 
recognised as political actors, the focus was placed on the organizational challenges they 
face in this new phase that I call the political process of Buen Vivir. In this sense, the 
approach advanced by Tilly, Tarrow and others writing on contentious politics offers a 
good analytical framework. I also set up the main conceptual coordinates to understand 
the specificities of the State in Latin America, its past and current role, and the dilemmas 
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of a necessary relationship between the State and social movements. I argued in favour 
of a conceptualisation of the State as relational and as a platform where social conflicts 
are inscribed and processed by State machinery, which in turn is transformed by the 
process. In this way, I proposed going beyond dichotomous thinking in the relationship 
between insubordination vis-à-vis structure (co-optation vs. emancipation; institutional 
power vs. communitarian autonomy; and so on) in order to capture the ambiguities and 
complexities of relational processes of social transformation. 
  
 
7.4 Future Research  
I assert that this work is original and contributes to the ongoing debate on current socio-
political and economic challenges in the region. At the same time, I acknowledge the 
scope for further research that will allow me to explore the relationship between 
insubordination and political structure at the local and regional levels. 
 
Firstly, in this thesis the focus is placed on a limited number of agents who were 
particularly important to the rise of Buen Vivir in Ecuador. National indigenous 
movements’ confederations, such as CONAIE, are considered here as key protagonists 
and are therefore, central to the analysis. In other words, my work is centred on the elites 
within the indigenous movement, as well as within the government. They were chosen 
due to their historic role in the mobilisation of popular demands, as well as for their close 
links with the State. Other agents situated at the local and community level were left out 
of the analysis. Research situated at the local level would have provided a different level 
of analysis in relation to the gestation of demands, the creation of bonds of solidarities, 
local realities, the implementation of alternative local projects of Buen Vivir, as well as 
the effects of the implementations of State policies at the local level. What can be called 
social movement bases (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007) provide information on the ideological 
traditions, informal networks, and communal solidarities that act both as the precondition 
of the formation of the movement, as well as the support for the movement’s activities. 
Such an analysis could create enough input to be compared with the current status of the 
movement at the national level (the findings of this research). I do think this can motivate 
further future research plans.  
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Secondly, at the theoretical level, this research still relies on work produced in the North 
(although this is critically appraised), and for that reason can be easily labelled as 
Eurocentric. I consider that an approach to the study of social movements and the State 
of the South by the South is still to be constructed. Those that exist at the moment provide 
few analytical categories to grasp the complex historical and socio-political dimensions 
of these agents. They also present an essentialising and decontextualised view on the 
matter (discussed extensively in Chapters 2 and 3). A critical revision that acknowledges 
political, cultural and economic differences is needed for a more accurate interpretation 
of contentious action in Latin America. However, the core points of theories such as New 
Social Movements approach and Marxist approaches are relevant in the analysis of 
contentious action in Latin America. 
 
Lastly, the time frame of this research extends to the beginning of 2015. Whilst writing 
these final lines, new and unexpected changes are taking place in the region. New 
governments of the right are taking power in countries such as Argentina, as well as 
wining legislative elections as in the case of Venezuela. Brazil is facing an institutional 
crisis. Ecuador and Bolivia face challenges in the coming general elections. All these 
changes indicate a new political dynamic in the region out of the scope of this research.  
 
The findings of this thesis allow me the formulation of new research questions which I 
will seek to develop in future projects. I aim to expand the research on social 
transformations involving active tensions between the State and social movements at the 
local level as explained above. A comparative analysis of the interaction between the 
State and indigenous movements at the regional level (countries such as Bolivia, Brazil, 
and Colombia share similar social problems) would be also particularly important in 
order to grasp the complexity of Buen Vivir as political project. The interaction of the 
three fundamental factors studied in this research (different political openings to 
collective action, competing ways of framing collective action and organisational forms) 
could be further analysed at different levels of action and in different contexts. In this 
way, the generalisability of the argument proposed in this thesis, which particularly 
applied to the relationship between the faction of the indigenous movement represented 
by CONAIE and the government of Rafael Correa, could be tested in relation to other 








List of Interviews  
Whilst in Ecuador I carried out in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 
representatives of indigenous movement’s organisations, governmental officials, and 
representatives of political movements, environmental organisations and academics. 
With most of them I met several times in formal and informal settings. Most of the 
interviewees were willing to be identified. I used pseudonyms in the cases of those who 
expressed their desire to remain anonymous.  
 
1) Severino Sharupi, indigenous leader Territorios y Tierras CONAIE.  
2) Angel Criollo, head of Communication CODENPE. 
3) Edwin Mina, indigenous leader Sector Juventud, ECUARUNARI.  
4) Attawallpa Oviedo Freire, academic.  
5) Luis Macas, indigenous leader CONAIE.  
6) “Pocho” Alvarez, filmmaker.  
7) Leonidas Izas, president of indigenous base organisation UNOCAN.  
8) Carmen Lozano, indigenous leader Sector Mujeres, ECUARUNARI.  
9) Ivan Carrazco Montalvo, consultant in SENPLADES.  
10) GOS1 (anonymous), government official SENPLADES.  
11) GOS2 (anonymous), government official Secretaria Nacional de Gestión de la 
Política.  
12) Alberto Acosta, academic.  
13) Esperanza Martinez, co-founder Acción Ecológica.  
14) Franklin Ramirez, academic.  
15) Santiago Ortiz, academic.  
16) Tania Laurini, filmmaker and environmental activist.  
17) Pablo Ospina Peralta, academic.  
18) IL1 (anonymous), indigenous leader FENOCIN.  
19) Samuele Mazzolini, academic.  
20) Patricia Cervantes, head of Commission of Social Organisations – Alianza Pais.  
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21) Caty Machoa, indigenous leader Sector Mujeres CONAIE.  
22) Franco Viteri, indigenous leader President CONFENIAE.  
23) IL2 (anonymous), indigenous leader FENOCIN.  
24) Humberto Cholango, indigenous leader CONAIE.  
25) Apawki Castro, indigenous activist.  
26) Yvonne Yanez, co-founder Acción Ecológica. 
27) Carlos Zorrilla, activist.  
28) Carlos Viteri, assemblyman.  
29) IL3 (anonymous), indigenous leader FENOCIN.  
30) GOS3, government official Ministry of Environment.  
31) Alexandra Proaño, President nationality ANDOA.  
32) Delfin Tenesaca, indigenous leader ECUARUNARI.  
33) Marcelino Chumpi, prefecto Morona Santiago province.   
34) Estefania Montalvo, director of Communication – Ministry of Environment.  
35) GOS4 (anonymous), government official Secretariat of Buen Vivir.  
36) GOS5 (anonymous), government official Ministry of Social Development.  
37) Carlos Nuñez, indigenous leader Sector Juventud CONAICE. 
38) SML1 (anonymous), social movement’s activist Alianza Pais.  
39) IL4 (anonymous) indigenous activist CONAICE.  
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